One influential explanation for the prevalence of suicide attacks is ‘occupation theory,’ the idea that foreign occupation is the key force motivating this phenomenon. The most recent iteration of this argument can be found in Robert Pape and James Feldman’s Cutting the Fuse, published late last year by the University of Chicago Press. This recent book reaffirms the occupation theory advocated in Pape’s earlier volume Dying to Win, but also goes beyond that original thesis by arguing that foreign occupation is also the best explanation even for the motivations of transnational suicide attackers.
Yesterday I published a book review with the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, arguing that while the relationship between occupation and suicide missions is a subject worthy of serious attention, Cutting the Fuse ultimately fails as a book. It is characterized by straw man argumentation, contradictions, poorly defined critical concepts, and cherry-picked evidence. In fact, I contend that it may be the worst academic book on terrorism published in 2010.
An excerpt from my review:
Clear errors are evident in Pape and Feldman’s aforementioned refutations of other alleged causes of suicide attacks–because in many cases their refutations also undercut their own explanation of the phenomenon. The most glaring error is their explanation that Islamic extremism cannot account for the rise of transnational suicide attacks because such extremist ideology “is a global phenomenon, one that has been in existence in a variety of forms, not just for many decades, but almost since the
inception of Islam itself” (p. 53). Thus, they contend that religious extremism “cannot account for the rise of transnational suicide terrorism over the past 30 years.” In other words, since Islamic extremism has existed for such a long period, it does not sufficiently explain a phenomenon that has only arisen in the past three decades.
The historical illiteracy of this passage is remarkable for an obvious reason: Foreign occupation has also been in existence for many centuries, and even pre-dates the advent of Islam. Take, for example, one country–Afghanistan–whose suicide attacks are examined in Pape and Feldman’s book. It was first occupied twenty-six centuries ago, by Cyrus the Great. Thereafter it has been occupied by Alexander the Great, the Greek empire, the Kushan empire, the nomadic “White Huns,” the Persians, the Arabs, the Ghaznavid empire, the Ghorids, the Khwarezm, the Mongol army, the Safavid and Afsharid empires, the British, the Russians, and finally the United States. Though Afghanistan is unique in the large number of conquerors it has experienced, it is of course not alone in having been occupied. Muslim armies occupied Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Sicily, and many other areas; Ottoman armies occupied the Arab world; Western countries occupied most of the Muslim world, as well as Africa; Nazi Germany occupied France, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Serbia, and Ukraine, among others; after World War II the U.S. occupied both Germany and Japan; the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and many others. The list goes on. For Pape and Feldman to claim that Islamic extremism cannot explain suicide attacks because it has existed “almost since the inception of Islam itself” ignores the far, far longer history of occupation. Indeed, under the standards by which Pape and Feldman refute their strawman, their own occupation theory cannot be true.
So too do Pape and Feldman, in describing how occupation triggers suicide attacks based on nationalist sentiment, provide an explanation that applies equally well to religious extremism. “National identities rest on the idea of a primary division of the world between ‘us’ and ‘them,'” they write, “a boundary that tends to harden under the circumstances of a foreign military occupation” (p. 49). But this division of the world into “us” and “them” is equally true of a pronounced religious identity. In Islam, the concept of kafir (unbeliever) signals this division. (There are, to be clear, similar “us” and “them” divisions within Christian and Judaic thought.) But consonant with the unequivocally forced conclusions that characterize Pape and Feldman’s book, they believe without justification that nationalism is the “taproot explanation” (p. 11) for how foreign military occupation might drive suicide attacks.
Read the whole review here.
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9 Comments
Daveed:
Congrats on a thoughtful and objective review.
The compulsion to develop
There was a story of a Japanese soldier who was upset that he survived the Russo Japanese and the only way an officer was able to console him was to say that there will be other wars. I have wondered how wide spread that mentality was in the Japanese army and if it was the cause of their very sucidal tactics during the Second World War. Since sucide bombing has been a feature of 20th and 21st century warfare among the Japanese (Shinto), Tamil (buddist) and Jihadist (Muslim) warriers, I suspect it has more to do with culture of the country and indoctrination of its children than either religion or ‘occupation.’
@Daveed, you left out the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh who conquered Afghanistan before the British. Graveyard of the empires, indeed!
As for the prevalence of suicide terrorism arising in the past 30 years, it is simple; the explosives technology made it small enough for a lone bomber (or the delivery technology in the case of the truck bomber) to conveniently use. However, the goal of suicide terrorism – primarily political and military assassinations – has been associated with Islam from its very beginnings. Critics of Mohammad, whether they were poetesses or tribal elders, were savagely silenced. And the Hashashins took this to a new level of organization in the middle ages. This propensity, along with the “us versus them” mentality that you mentioned, and, just as importantly, an afterlife theology that appeals to young, sexually-inexperienced males has led to the modern use of suicide terrorism. The Sunnis, long accustomed to dominating Islamic territories, now find themselves on the defensive and resort to an old playbook.
I read the original Dying to Win and thought it was a hard stretch, because it rested on two unlikely premises: (1) suicide terrorism requires a stronger motivation than other kinds of terrorism (does it? frustrated young men love the idea of dying in a blaze of glory, and always have) – (2) there must be a common, single cause to explain suicide terrorism in both Sri Lanka and the Muslim Middle East (why must there?).
Without demonstrating either of those, or even giving the reader a reason to think they were true, his tallies of where suicide bombers came from didn’t make a strong case for his “taproot” thesis, and I do not feel inspired to spend time on the newer book.
I am willing to bet a number of sappers in Vietnam went up with their payload. I will agree with the premise that the invention of easily carried high explosives would eventually lead to suicide bombers. Finding willing participants doesn
So according to the “review” the two points of refutation are that “occupation” has been there for a long time without any “suicide” attacks.
And second, that not just national identity but religious identity also plays a role.
This review makes me wonder wether Daveed actually read the book or not. Both the points actually strengthen Pape’s argument.
Occupation by DEMOCRACIES are more likely to create suicide attacks because it will be strategically more likely to enforce a withdrawal that way. The fact that suicide attacks were not widespread before (except the stray Jewish zealots in the 1AD or the Iranian assassins) was precisely because there were no democracies that occupied other lands.
And Pape also indicates the correlation of religious differences not just ethnic. For example, the Buddhist Lankans vs the suicide attacks by the Hindu Tamil LTTE.
Currently in Pakistan, the largest no. of suicide bombers are from the FATA region. Is it any surprise then that in Pakistan, the residents of FATA are not allowed to participate in national elections and national laws don’t apply there. In other words, the Pakistani army is basically occupying FATA.
Excellent Daveed. Furthermore, one could argue, the phrase “islamic extremism has been with us since the birth of the faith” is perhaps the biggest truism that is tossed around these days by self-described pundits. Tekfiri Jihadism or other “uber-extreme” strands of Salafism are a relative novelty (say end of 1960’s beginning of 1970’s) and the diffusion and “globalisation” of the narrative of global jihad is really the byproduct of the anti-soviet jihad and the afghan civil war that followed – both formative experiences which acted as a melting pot of ideas and contributed significantly to the radicalisation of many local militant groups around the world in the 1990’s. This historical evolution of islamic militancy – and the different nature of the threat represented by groups like AQ and Allied Movements – is something many still fail to grasp.
regards
Luca
Anita:
You actually make a fair point in your response, which I’ll address below — but your contention that I offer only two points of refutation to Pape and Feldman is inaccurate. The review itself is, in fact, multifaceted, and includes the following six points:
1. I argue that Pape and Feldman’s book is centered around refutation of a strawman opponent — that “many” assume suicide terrorism is caused by only religious hatred, which is “not related to any foreign or military policies by the United States or its allies.” They thus center their attack around an extreme and clearly incorrect version of their opponents’ argument.
2. Pape and Feldman assume that robust multicausality is impossible: If a certain explanation does not constitute a “taproot” cause, it has little explanatory value. They do this to religion as a causal factor, arguing that “it functions mainly as a recruiting tool in the context of national resistance” (p. 20).
3. Their own refutations of other explanations also undercut their own theory. This is where you take issue with my argument, and I will get to your response momentarily.
4. The definitions that Pape and Feldman utilize actually disprove their theory by showing that it — like the other explanations they critique — is over-predictive. Under their definition of “occupation,” the U.S. in particular is occupying a significant number of countries, and we should consequently expect a greater number of suicide campaigns directed at it than have emerged.
5. The book uses cherry-picked biographical and historical evidence, and their discussion of al Qaeda is the clearest example of this phenomenon. The book frames al Qaeda as a national resistance movement dedicated to what it defines as “the primary reason for supporting suicide terrorist campaigns”: that is,
“safeguarding the local way of life” (p. 13). Though Pape and Feldman concede that religion plays a factor in the group’s goals and recruitment, with respect to recruitment its success “derives not from any intrinsic feature of Sunni Islam, but rather from the difference in religious culture between Islamic populations and Western occupying forces” (p. 188).
6. Underscoring the relevance of religion, bin Laden’s opposition to the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia can only really be understood if one incorporates religion into the analysis as a significant factor.
You write that my analysis is flawed because “occupation by DEMOCRACIES are [sic] more likely to create suicide attacks because it will be strategically more likely to enforce a withdrawal that way.” As I said, this is a fair criticism of the review. I pointed to the long history of occupation because I don’t consider this history irrelevant to Pape and Feldman’s argument. But the strength of your response is that it rightly suggests that it’s fairer to focus on occupation by democracies rather than simply foreign occupation, since that is the explicit criterion that Pape and Feldman establish: If I wanted to focus as much on occupation in general, I should have spent more time justifying why doing so is relevant to their thesis. (I plan revise the section to make it clearer in this regard.)
The problem with your response is that even if we focus on foreign occupation carried out solely by democracies, we still end up with both a historical and also contemporary landscape that would predict many more suicide bombing campaigns. The era of colonialism was frequently a story of democratic powers directly occupying lands that do not share their religion. Yet we did not see suicide campaigns against the British in any of the three Anglo-Afghan wars, or in Barbados, Fiji, Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Sudan, Zimbabwe, or its other colonial holdings; against the Dutch in Indonesia or Suriname; against the French in Algeria, Benin, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, the French Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, or its other holdings; against the Portuguese in Angola, Macau, Mozambique, or Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau); or against the U.S. in the Philippines. The list of occupation by democratic powers goes on; it was likely more extensive during the period of colonialism than it has been in the past thirty years, but certainly occupation hasn’t increased in the past thirty years compared to the era of colonialism. So to say that “the fact that suicide attacks were not widespread before” the past thirty years “was precisely because there were no democracies that occupied other lands” is patently false. There were in fact democracies that occupied other lands, and I have just listed a number of lands that were directly occupied by democracies.
Moreover, there is still the problem that under Pape and Feldman’s definition of occupation, their theory would predict many more suicide campaigns directed at the U.S. today. In my review, I point out that under their definition, the U.S. is occupying South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, as well as every country that took part in the Multi-National Force-Iraq (because they give a higher priority to American goals than national interest alone would warrant). These include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Tonga, and Ukraine. So even under the justifiable correction that you offer, Pape and Feldman still offer refutations of other explanations for suicide bombing that also undercut their own theory. Their theory is just as over-predictive as other theories that they discard on that very basis.
You are correct that Pape and Feldman do indicate that religion can be a factor in suicide campaigns “when the predominate religion in the occupier’s society is different from the prevailing religion in the occupied society” (pp. 23-24). I did not say that they consider religion irrelevant to suicide campaigns, but rather that they consider it marginal, and subordinate to nationalist motivations. My interpretation is clearly correct from any fair reading of their book.
Hi Daveed, Thanks for responding, I don’t regularly read here but I would like to make a few points as well.
1. I argue that Pape and Feldman’s book is centered around refutation of a strawman opponent — that “many” assume suicide terrorism is caused by only religious hatred, which is “not related to any foreign or military policies by the United States or its allies.” They thus center their attack around an extreme and clearly incorrect version of their opponents’ argument.
Well it might strawman argument to you, but there are many people who are misguided and believe that “Islam” is the sole and only cause of suicide bombings. We are only looking at suicide bombings and Islam only at present. An example is the first Moorthy Muthuswamy post with a link to a paper that builds a full thesis on this exactly same argument.
So Pape and Feldman have done a pretty good job to counter this wrong view.
2. Pape and Feldman assume that robust multicausality is impossible: If a certain explanation does not constitute a “taproot” cause, it has little explanatory value. They do this to religion as a causal factor, arguing that “it functions mainly as a recruiting tool in the context of national resistance” (p. 20).
And that makes sense as I exaplined in point one. This point would only be correct, if there was no one who linked only Islam as the cause of suicide bombings. This has been the convetional thinking in the USG for the past decade. Sure we mask with radical Islam or extremist Islam but the strategy has had little to no returns because clearly we had a wrong understading of the “taproot” cause.
6. Underscoring the relevance of religion, bin Laden’s opposition to the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia can only really be understood if one incorporates religion into the analysis as a significant factor.
As I mentioned earlier, religion plays only a secondary role according to Pape. And that is why you have the example of Sri Lankan Buddhists vs Tamil Hindus who used suicide bombings. Religion, ethinicity, nationalism e.t.c. are used as a moral boaster but the end goal is the same.
Your other points are not new positions but repitions of the same view so I will ignore them for now. But I will address another point you mentioned at the end.
The era of colonialism was frequently a story of democratic powers directly occupying lands that do not share their religion. Yet we did not see suicide campaigns against the British in any of the three Anglo-Afghan wars, or in Barbados, Fiji, Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Sudan, Zimbabwe, or its other colonial holdings; against the Dutch in Indonesia or Suriname; against the French in Algeria, Benin, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, the French Congo….and so on
Now if you read his book, you would know that suicide bombings is used as strategy of last resort. And ofcourse the technology to actually create suicide bombs was availble only in the late 70s and early 80s when the first suicide bombs actually began.You can only reastically start comparing your data about suicide bombings once the tech is availble.
And where the native population has the ability to fight an insurgency it will do so as well. The British had to fight full scale battles and massacres millions of Indians to establish their rule. The first war of Indian Independance in 1857 lasted 4 years before the rebellion was put down by the British in India. The same was the case in other anti-colonial movements in Africa where the European armies had to face tough insurgencies. Neither did the Dutch have an easy time establishing their control over Indonesia where the natives fought quite savagely.
Bottom line is that the occupation by democracy thesis with qualifications explains the suicide bombings better than only using Islamic faith as the qualifier. Espicially since, in my research I have come across explicit religious rulings even by extremist sects like Wahabbis explicitly forbidding suicide bombings. And I am talking about people like Bin Baaz of Saudi Arabia declaring sucide bombings against Israli jews as forbidden. Ofcourse I must qualify that Shias and Khomeni have actually endoresed this but sunni religious scholars have not. But we still see more sunni suicide bombers than shias.
My FATA example can also explain this in a better way. People there are always known to be conservative, but they hardly indulged in suicide bombings against Pakistani state. But since the Pakistani army has went into FATA, the suicide bombers from that region have gone up exponentially.
Basically, we have speant a decade with a failed thesis and startegy that puts “radical” Islam as the main cause of suicide bombings. If Pape and Feldman are accurate, then its time to put their thesis to actual test and see the results. And from what I see in Iraq, it looks promising.