On April 15, the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) announced that it “foiled plans aimed at targeting national security, sowing chaos, and sabotage within Jordan.” The GID further specified that it “detained 16 suspects after close intelligence monitoring since 2021.”
In its statement, the GID reported that the thwarted plans included “cases related to manufacturing rockets using local tools as well as tools imported for illegal purposes, possession of explosives and firearms, concealing a rocket ready to be deployed, planning to manufacture drones, and recruiting and training operatives in Jordan as well as training them abroad.”
The Jordanian government revealed that some of the individuals involved in the plot received training abroad, and a key planner, Ibrahim Mohammad, is a member of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Al Arabiya reported that the cell’s organizational leader is based in Beirut and the terrorists had established weapons storage sites and begun manufacturing rockets using both locally sourced materials and parts imported from abroad. The materials discovered with the cell could produce up to 300 rockets, and one rocket seized from the group was prepared for use within Jordan.
The Jordanian intelligence agency released a video showing confessions by the accused and imagery of the storage facilities and their locations. In the video, the accused discuss the transfer and storage of approximately 30 kilograms of highly explosive materials, including TNT, C4, and SEMTEX-H. Mohammad, the cell’s leader, organized trips for two cell members, Abdullah Hisham and Muath al Ghanem, to Lebanon to meet with the group’s organizational leader in Beirut for further planning and training. The task of transporting money from abroad was assigned to a third member, Mohsen al Ghanem.
The video further explained that the cell operated in two locations across two governorates. In Zarqa, the plotters set up a manufacturing plant, while in Amman, they established a storage depot. Authorities discovered a range of metal pieces in the homes of those involved, including tube-like and conical shapes, as well as other parts. When assembled, these parts formed a short-range rocket structure inspired by the munitions used in a Russian BM-21 “Grad” multiple rocket launcher. The rockets were awaiting specialists to fit them with explosives, propulsion systems, and impact detonators. The video confirmed that the confiscated rockets had a range estimated between 3–5 kilometers, posing a serious threat to targets within Jordan.
One member of the rocket-manufacturing cell, Abdullah Hisham, stated that his relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood began in 2002, during his time as a student. In 2021, he began working with a Brotherhood member named Ibrahim, who informed him of a plan to manufacture rockets in Jordan. Abdullah was tasked with identifying suitable locations for production and recruiting an assistant. He chose his cousin, Muath al Ghanem, to join the effort. Ibrahim later instructed them to travel to Lebanon to meet a man named Abu Ahmad, who was described as the group’s leader. In Lebanon, Abdullah and Muath received training in rocket production. Upon returning to Jordan, they rented a warehouse to store the materials they had managed to procure.
Muath al Ghanem, the second member of the cell, said his affiliation with the Brotherhood began in 2010 and that he remains an active member to this day.
The third member, Mohsen al Ghanem, claimed he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1994 and is still active. He said he met Ibrahim—who resides in Lebanon—and received $20,000 from him to purchase the materials needed for rocket production.
Jordanian intelligence later released a second video containing confessions from other cells, including one focused on drone manufacturing and another on recruitment.
In the recruitment cell, an individual named Kheder Abdel Aziz stated he joined the Brotherhood after graduating high school in 1975. He currently serves as the administrative manager of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front in Zarqa. Aziz admitted selecting two active Brotherhood members to join the terrorist cell.
Another individual, Anas Abu Awad, said he joined the group in 2010. Awad claimed that a senior Brotherhood figure in his circle, Marwan Mabrouk, instructed him to recruit individuals for the terrorist plot and advised him to use Telegram for communication. He added that during a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, he was directed to meet a Lebanese Brotherhood representative named Abu Saleh. Awad later traveled to a third, undisclosed country, where he underwent training and received assignments. One of these was to deliver a flash drive containing a list of names and scout hidden sites in Jordan capable of storing weapons—among them, graveyards in Amman.
In the drone-manufacturing cell, Ali Qasem stated that in November 2023, he met with two other members—Abdullah Saqer al Hadar and Ahmad Ibrahim Khalifeh—to discuss drone production. They decided to involve a fourth individual, Abdul Aziz Haroun, an aerospace engineer, who would provide technical studies and source the drone’s external frame. Khalifeh was assigned responsibility for electrical systems and programming.
In his confession, Haroun said he found that “foam board” was effective in drone manufacturing and had been used by Ukrainian forces in the Russia-Ukraine war. He also recalled that Ahmad Khalifeh once asked him about gliders, noting that he had previously built one for personal use on his farm. Haroun added that he considered asking his father to help secure materials, given his father’s connections to weapons smugglers.
The Islamic Action Front previously called for the release of some of the cell members, claiming that they were political prisoners, prior to the announcement by the GID that these were part of a terrorist plot. The demand included freeing Abdul Aziz Haroun and Ali Qasem from the drone manufacturing unit, Muath Ghanem and Abdullah Hisham from the rocket manufacturing unit, and Kheder Abdel Aziz and Ayman al Ajaoui from the recruitment cell. This shows a direct link between the Islamic Action Front and the cell.
Over the past 18 months, particularly following the October 7 attacks in Israel, Jordan has faced significant internal challenges. Domestic voices, including the Islamic Action Front, have sharply criticized the kingdom’s role in the conflict, organizing protests and openly supporting Hamas. However, recent revelations regarding the involvement of key figures from this organization in terrorist plots within Jordan could imperil the survival of the Islamic Action Front as a political entity.
