In an unprecedented move, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, visited Tehran on April 17 for high-level talks with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces and a senior member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
While the symbolic nature of the visit drew attention, it was Khalid’s meeting with top Iranian military leaders that stood out—most notably, Bagheri. Bagheri pointedly referenced the United States and Israel, stating that joint naval exercises between Iran and Saudi Arabia would help deter “external interference” in the region.
Echoing this sentiment, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, secretary-general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, called for enhanced military coordination and emphasized the need for unity among Islamic states in countering Israel’s “destabilizing” role in the Middle East.
The primary purpose of Khalid’s trip was to deliver a letter from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. During their meeting, Khamenei stressed the importance of “regional cooperation,” asserting that “helping each other is better than relying on others”—a thinly veiled reference to Riyadh’s longstanding security ties with Washington.
Khamenei promptly shared details of the meeting on his X account, posting seven updates in total. One urged the two nations to “overcome the hostile motives” of those opposed to warming relations. Another offered Iranian support to Saudi Arabia “in areas where the Islamic Republic has made progress”—a likely allusion to Iran’s expansive drone and ballistic missile stocks, which form the region’s largest arsenal and are exported globally.
Strategic timing amid escalating regional tensions
This highly choreographed diplomatic overture unfolded against a backdrop of mounting tensions between Tehran, Washington, and Jerusalem. On the same day as Khalid’s visit, bunker-busting munitions and other advanced US military hardware arrived at Nevatim Airbase near Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, Israeli defense officials reportedly prepared for a potential strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure as early as May. Former President Donald Trump, responding to such reports, refused to rule out a military response to Iranian nuclear proliferation.
The timing, seniority of delegation, and unusually warm reception in Tehran suggest that Riyadh was not merely extending reassurances but seeking them from Iran in return. The Kingdom likely conveyed its intent to remain on the sidelines should a direct confrontation between Iran and the West unfold—potentially assuring Tehran that Saudi territory and airspace would not be made available to the US for launching attacks. This posture would align with earlier reporting from April 1 suggesting that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait privately informed Iranian officials of their refusal to support American military operations against the Islamic Republic.
The thaw in relations follows the March 2023 China-brokered agreement to restore diplomatic ties between the two countries, ending a seven-year rupture. Under this framework, Iran and Saudi Arabia committed to reopening embassies, respecting mutual sovereignty, and abstaining from interference in each other’s internal affairs. They also agreed to revive bilateral accords, including a 2001 security cooperation agreement and a 1998 memorandum on collaboration in trade, technology, and culture.
Strained ties during the Obama era
Tensions between Riyadh and Tehran worsened during the administration of President Barack Obama. Just two days after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015, then–Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir warned that sanctions relief could embolden Iran to ramp up its destabilizing activities. “We hope that the Iranians will use this deal to improve their economy […] not for adventures in the region,” Jubeir cautioned.
That concern proved prescient. As early as 2009, Iran had begun channeling increasingly advanced weaponry to the Houthis in Yemen, including ballistic missiles and small arms. This robust support substantially enhanced the Houthis’ ability to challenge Saudi military operations. Despite a sustained air campaign by Riyadh, Tehran’s arms pipeline kept the conflict alive with no clear Saudi victory in sight.
In an attempt to mollify Saudi apprehensions over the JCPOA, the Obama administration authorized a $1 billion arms package for Riyadh’s anti-Houthi campaign—part of a broader strategy to balance engagement with Tehran by bolstering the US’s Gulf allies’ military capabilities.
Closer ties but limited action under Trump
Relations between Washington and Riyadh tightened during the first term of President Donald Trump, who selected Saudi Arabia for his first foreign visit in 2017. That trip culminated in a $110 billion arms deal, part of a broader $350 billion, 10-year defense and investment package aimed at countering Iranian influence.
During this period, Riyadh grew more vocal in its condemnation of Tehran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman likened the Islamic Republic’s supreme leader to Hitler in 2017 and, in 2018, pledged the Kingdom would pursue nuclear parity if Iran acquired atomic weapons.
When Iran downed a US surveillance drone in June 2019 and Washington opted against retaliatory strikes, the Islamic Republic escalated its posture—striking Saudi Aramco’s facilities in September 2019 with 18 drones and three missiles, showcasing its offensive capabilities and Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability.
Riyadh’s calculated shift
These developments appear to have shaped Saudi Arabia’s reassessment of its strategic posture. Tehran’s message to Riyadh during the April 17 visit was clear: the US is no longer a reliable guarantor of regional stability, and de-escalation with Iran and its proxies is in the Kingdom’s best interest.
Saudi Arabia’s military campaign against the Houthis has markedly subsided since the UN-brokered ceasefire in April 2022. By 2023, diplomatic normalization with Tehran was underway. In 2024, the Kingdom extended an invitation to an Iranian delegation to participate in the World Defense Show, signaling an unprecedented level of defense-sector openness between the two former rivals.
