Since at least February 20, Shabaab, al Qaeda’s branch for East Africa, has mounted a sizable offensive in southern and central Somalia between the Middle Shabelle and Hiraan regions. In some areas, local or federal forces were able to hold their ground and force Shabaab back. However, Shabaab currently remains in control of other locales (as of the time of publishing).
The fighting began on February 20, when Shabaab launched a coordinated assault on local militia and federal government fortifications in the towns of Ceel Cali Axmed, Cali Fooldheere, Alkowsar, and Daarunimca, all spanning southern Hiraan and northern Middle Shabelle.
At the time, both the federal government and the local Macawisley (clan militias) claimed victory, with Mogadishu stating that the attacks were repelled and over 130 Shabaab militants were killed. The US military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) also said it launched at least two airstrikes in this vicinity in support of Somali forces.
In its media releases, Shabaab claimed to have killed over 60 pro-government forces across the towns, showing dead bodies in several photos.
Shabaab also released images from Alkowsar and Daarunimca showing that its forces at least temporarily occupied the two towns on February 20. In Ceel Cali Axmed and Cali Fooldheere, Shabaab also claimed via photos to have overrun at least one defensive position in each locale. However, it did not offer any evidence of occupying the towns.
A day later, on February 21, intense fighting broke out in Ceelbaraf and Miirtaqwa in the Middle Shabelle region. Shabaab claimed to have at least briefly occupied the two towns, releasing photos showing its men in each town square. Somali officials openly communicated that the towns initially fell to Shabaab but stated that they were eventually wrestled back under government control.
However, the current status of Ceelbaraf remains unclear, as it has since changed hands between the warring sides multiple times. The US also hit Shabaab militants in the town with at least two airstrikes in recent days.
On February 25, Shabaab launched another coordinated attack across multiple locales, hitting Aboorey, Beero Yabal, and, again, Alkowsar and Ceel Cali Axmed. While it is reported that Shabaab entered the latter town unopposed, the group met stiff resistance in Aboorey, Alkowsar, and Beero Yabal.
Somali authorities stated that the militants were driven back from Beero Yabal, and the US launched an additional airstrike near Alkowsar that helped repel that assault. In Aboorey, however, Shabaab claimed to have overrun the local military base, offering additional photo evidence of this claim. Other sources have also alleged that Alkowsar eventually fell to Shabaab, though this remains unconfirmed.
Two days later, on February 27, Shabaab gunmen forced government troops to temporarily withdraw from parts of Balcad, a city just 30 kilometers from Mogadishu. Somali officials initially denied this incursion, claiming to have repelled the militants. However, Shabaab again offered photographic evidence of its men patrolling the streets in parts of the city. Balcad was brought back under government control after federal forces regrouped and counterattacked.
On March 1, Shabaab conducted an assault on the town of Biyo Cadde in the Middle Shabelle region. As in the other locales, Somali officials initially claimed to have repelled the attack, including stating forces had killed “senior” Shabaab leaders. However, Shabaab offered photographic evidence of its men occupying parts of the town and a local military base. The current status of Biyo Cadde remains unclear, though Shabaab is believed to occupy the town still.
Shabaab taking advantage of security gaps
Shabaab’s recent offensive happened against the backdrop of several security gaps in the region.
The federal government previously captured many of these areas from Shabaab during the government’s large-scale counteroffensive against the group in central Somalia from 2022 to 2023. The government’s offensive has since largely stalled, while additional planned phases have either also stalled or not yet come to fruition. Federal troops have periodically conducted operations in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle but not to the same scale or tempo as the counteroffensive’s height in late 2022.
In Hiraan and northern Middle Shabelle, Mogadishu has also relied on the Macawisley to do much of the holding operations for areas taken from Shabaab. Inter-clan fighting, which has straddled Hiraan and Middle Shabelle in the same areas, has periodically broken out, taking further focus away from the fight against Shabaab. Mogadishu has so far struggled to prevent the armed clan militias from turning their weapons on each other.
Middle Shabelle was also the responsibility of Burundian troops under various African Union mandates in Somalia. However, following disagreements with Mogadishu over Burundi’s total contingent size during negotiations over the current mission, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), Burundi stated it would not participate in AUSSOM. Burundi recently started withdrawing from Middle Shabelle, handing over bases to the Somali army, while Ugandan forces are reportedly set to take over other positions.
The situation in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle is more perilous in light of Shabaab’s ability to mount such a large fighting force over a large area—presumably hundreds of fighters, given the multi-pronged, coordinated assaults—despite the Somali government claiming to be in firm control of this axis.
Mogadishu and its allies, particularly the United States, will likely need to regroup and counterattack quickly to reverse any gains made by Shabaab in recent days. Addressing the above-mentioned security gaps and challenges may also prevent or at least hinder Shabaab from mounting such assaults in the future.
