Analysis: Lebanon’s new government, the absent “resistance” Clause, and Hezbollah’s fate

Lebanese government
The new Lebanese government headed by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. (Council of Ministers of Lebanon)

Lebanon officially has a new government. On January 13, 2025, Nawaf Salam was appointed prime minister-designate and tasked with cobbling together a cabinet. He accomplished this task by February 8, after which the Constitution of Lebanon required him to gain a parliamentary vote of confidence within 30 days. On February 26, Salam submitted his cabinet lineup and his government’s policy statement for the constitutionally required parliamentary vote of confidence, and lawmakers approved them the same day.

In a mid-February interview with Lebanon’s public broadcaster TeleLiban, Prime Minister Salam noted that the policy statement—which is not a legally operative document but reflects the government’s vision—was a product of political compromise. “This government needs to gain the confidence of parliament to govern,” he said, “and parliament is comprised of political blocs” with whom he engaged in negotiations and compromise both in cobbling his cabinet and formulating the policy statement.

As a result of those negotiations and two extended parliamentary sessions to discuss the policy statement, 95 of Lebanon’s 128 parliamentarians granted the government their confidence on February 26.

The parliamentarians and blocs that granted Salam and his cabinet their confidence are as follows:

  • Deputy Speaker of Parliament and MP Elias Bou Saab, of the Independent Consultative Gathering—a four-member faction that broke away from the Free Patriotic Movement in August 2024.
  • MP Paula Yaacoubian, the only MP of the National Alliance reformist party—part of the Forces of Change reformist bloc.
  • MP Mohammad Raad, representing Hezbollah’s 15-member Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc.
  • MP Hadi Abu Hassan, representing the eight-member Democratic Gathering parliamentary bloc affiliated with Walid Joumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party.
  • MP Sethrida Geagea, representing the 19-member Strong Republic Bloc affiliated with the Lebanese Forces party.
  • MP Michel Moawad, the only parliamentarian of the Independence Movement—part of the three-member Renewal Bloc.
  • MP Fouad Makhzoumi, the only parliamentarian of the National Dialogue Party—also part of the Renewal Bloc.

Parliamentarians and parties that denied Salam’s government their confidence:

  • Twelve of the Free Patriotic Movement’s now-13-member Strong Lebanon parliamentary bloc voted against the government.
  • Four MPs abstained from voting.
  • The remaining 17 parliamentarians did not attend the voting session.

The policy statement noted the government’s intention to deal with several of the challenges confronting Lebanon. A key US priority in supporting Beirut and its official institutions is “counter[ing] Hizballah’s narrative and influence” and “countering and delegitimizing Hizballah’s false narrative and justification for retaining its arms in Lebanon and the region.” In light of that stated US objective in Lebanon, it is important to highlight the new Lebanese government’s intended posture on Hezbollah and its arms, as stated in the Salam Government’s policy statement. The policy statement reads, in relevant part:

We seek to build a State that assumes total responsibility over the country’s security and defense of its borders and porous boundaries [literally, “gaps”]. A State which deters the aggressor, protects its citizens, fortifies independence, and mobilizes Arab nations [“the Arab family”] and all states to protect Lebanon. The government, therefore, stresses its adherence to its obligations, particularly the implementation of [United Nations] Security Council Resolution 1701, completely and entirely. It reiterates what appears in the aforementioned resolution and related resolutions regarding the integrity of Lebanon’s territory, its sovereignty, and political independence within its internationally recognized borders, in accordance with the text of the March 23, 1949, General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon. 

This constitutes an ostensibly sharp departure from Lebanon’s previous posture on Resolution 1701—and a direct response by the current government to that former posture. In the past, Beirut interpreted the resolution, which requires Hezbollah’s disarmament but does not specify it by name, to exclude the group from the ambit of 1701’s requirement for “the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that […] there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.” This appeared to dovetail with Prime Minister Salam’s February 12 interview with Lebanese state broadcaster TeleLiban. In that interview, he decried Lebanon’s track record of disregarding its obligations under the resolution and the disastrous consequences Beirut had invited upon itself by avoiding its responsibilities through “play[ing word] games.” He said, in contrast, Lebanon was now serious about implementing the resolution’s terms.

In the interview, however, Salam seemed to suggest that Lebanon had “done its part, completely, by deploying the [Lebanese] army” to the south and, as a result, Beirut was “not falling short at all in carrying out our obligations.” However, both Resolution 1701 and the November 27, 2024, Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement demand more of Lebanon—namely, to disarm Hezbollah, dismantle its military infrastructure, and seal its borders to the reentry of arms and related materiel destined for the group.

In slight contrast to the prime minister’s words to TeleLiban, the policy statement did discuss the Lebanese State’s monopolization of force:

The government commits, pursuant to the National Reconciliation Accord reached in al-Taif [The 1989 Taif Agreement] to undertake all necessary measures to liberate all Lebanese lands from the Israeli occupation and impose the state’s sovereignty over all of its lands, exclusively through its own forces [emphasis own], and to deploy the [Lebanese] Army along the international recognized Lebanese borderlands.

The policy statement’s text deliberately echoed Section III, Paragraph C of the Taif Agreement, which states that “restoring the State’s sovereignty up to the internationally recognized borders requires the following […] undertaking all necessary measures to liberate all Lebanese lands from the Israeli occupation, imposing the sovereignty of the state over all of its lands, and deploying the Lebanese Army in the internationally recognized Lebanese border area.” The inclusion of this clause echoed a promise made by Salam during his TeleLibaninterview.

However, the policy statement included an important modification. Section II, Paragraph A of the Taif Agreement required all “militias” in Lebanon to be disbanded at the conclusion of the country’s 1975-1990 civil war. But the clause “all necessary measures” in Section III, Paragraph C was used—under the influence of Syria, which then controlled Lebanon—to exclude Hezbollah from the agreement’s obligation to disarm all militias. The policy statement’s inclusion of the modifying phrase, emphasized above, “exclusively through its own forces” was seemingly meant to close this gap. However, the policy statement did not explicitly mention disarming Hezbollah or any other armed group. This echoed Salam’s silence on the matter during his TeleLiban interview.

The policy statement implicitly addressed previous Lebanese governments’ “misapplication” of the Taif Agreement’s terms:

We seek a state loyal to the Constitution and the National Reconciliation Accord, which we adopted in Taif. This dedication requires us to implement what remains unapplied from this document. It also requires correcting the incorrect applications that marred it throughout the years.

The Salam government’s policy statement continued to discuss its concept of Lebanese self-defense:

[The government] affirms Lebanon’s right to self-defense in the case of any aggression, pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations. It will also work on executing what President Joseph Aoun said in his inaugural speech regarding the state’s monopolization of carrying arms.

We want a state that possesses the decision of war and peace. We want an army that possesses a defensive fighting doctrine that protects the [Lebanese] people and will prosecute any war pursuant to the terms of the constitution.

Seemingly absent was the now-traditional explicit or implicit mention of a right to “resistance” in some variation.

All cabinets since 1989 included some explicit or implicit mention of the right to “resistance,” which Hezbollah has used to legitimize its possession of a private arsenal and armed activities. However, the current policy statement did include at least one potential nod to the right to “resistance”—a clause that several previous government policy statements used as a basis to justify that right, namely the “affirm[ation of] Lebanon’s right to self-defense in the case of any aggression, pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations.”

This clause can admittedly be interpreted in one of two ways. In light of its uses by several previous governments as a basis to justify “resistance” as being a right enshrined in international law, this could have been Beirut’s tacit way of acknowledging that right in a manner that would grant it plausible deniability at a time when Lebanon’s relationship with Hezbollah is under closer international and Israeli scrutiny, when Lebanon needs maximal international goodwill to obtain desperately needed reconstruction aid, and after that relationship invited a disastrous war upon the country.

Mohammad Raad, in granting his confidence to the government, suggested he read the clause as justifying “resistance” by stating, “In relation to the Israeli occupation and aggression, the government decided on the right of the Lebanese [Al Lubnaniyeen, i.e., the Lebanese people] to self-defense, as indicated by the legal reference in the policy statement’s formulation.” Under previous governments, “the right of the Lebanese” has been used to legitimize “resistance.”

Alternatively, and equally plausibly, in the context of the rest of the policy statement, self-defense pursuant to the UN Charter, could have been a reference to Article 51 of the charter. It guarantees Lebanon’s right—like the right of all states—to use force in self-defense in the case of an armed attack.

However, the final formulation of the policy statement was reached after extensive negotiations between Nawaf Salam and Hezbollah, as with other political parties. By granting their confidence to the government, the group was suggesting that it saw the policy statement as containing or guaranteeing their priorities. Otherwise, Hezbollah could have joined the Free Patriotic Movement in refusing to vote in favor of the incoming government—just as the Shiite organization refused to nominate Salam for the premiership. Their change in position, therefore, suggests that the premier at least ameliorated their concerns.

Furthermore, the policy statement included other potential nods to Hezbollah’s positions—chief among them was the statement’s call for a national defense strategy. The policy statement said that “the defense of Lebanon requires setting a national security strategy on the military, diplomatic, and economic level.” While the Salam government’s policy statement didn’t say so explicitly, the traditional position—expressed in both previous policy statements and in other documents or declarations by officials—has been that such a strategy would be set through domestic dialogue and consensus. However, this national dialogue would be advantageous to Hezbollah, which can leverage its continued massive social support among Lebanese Shiites to channel the outcome of this dialogue to the group’s advantage.

Such an outcome could officially authorize Hezbollah’s retention of its private arsenal. Alternatively, Hezbollah could push for passing a Lebanese version of Iraq’s 2016 Popular Mobilization Forces Commission (PMF) law, which integrated the largely pro-Iranian PMF militias into the Iraqi state as an auxiliary of the armed forces, securing their fighters state-funded salaries and benefits equal to regular military personnel while allowing the militias to maintain their arsenals and internal cohesion. If Hezbollah succeeds in adapting the PMF Law model to Lebanon, it could secure itself access to the Lebanese state’s budget while enshrining the legitimacy of its arsenal in law.

The other Hezbollah priority highlighted in the policy statement—admittedly, also a natural Lebanese-state priority—was the matter of post-war reconstruction. The statement noted the “government commitment to speedily rebuild what the Israeli aggression destroyed and removing debris, to be subsidized by a fund specialized for this urgent matter that will be marked by transparency, and which will aim to convince all citizens that the state stands by them and does not distinguish between them.” This natural Lebanese state obligation dovetails with Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s demand on February 16 that Beirut assume primary responsibility for reconstruction.

Meanwhile, senior Lebanese officials, like Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, have said Lebanon will not condition reconstruction aid on Hezbollah’s disarmament. This combined approach—the state assuming responsibility for post-war reconstruction without conditioning it on Hezbollah’s disarmament—would effectively alleviate Hezbollah’s financial burden for post-war reconstruction and reduce or forestall any anger bubbling against the group from within its traditional Shiite support base for inviting the recent destructive war with Israel without demanding a quid pro quo from the group on its arms.

For points of comparison, the policy statements of the Lebanese governments that arose after the civil war—the relevant time period for this discussion—included the following statements (portions used to legitimize Hezbollah’s armed resistance are bolded):

Second Government of Salim al-Hoss (November 25, 1989 – January 24, 1990):

“At the same time, the Government will spare no effort to liberate the land from the Israeli occupation in the South and the western Beqaa through all available means, including supporting the heroic resistance and the insistence to fully implement the [United Nations] Security Council’s Resolution 425 requiring the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese lands.”

First Government of Omar Karami (December 24, 1990-May 16, 1992):

“First, regarding domestic affairs:

1) As an extension of the comprehensive security plan that aims to extend the state’s authority gradually over all Lebanese lands through its own armed forces […] the government will aspire to: B) the dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and handing over their weapons to the state pursuant to the National Reconciliation Accord.

2) Liberating south Lebanon and the western Beqaa from the Israeli occupation, the reclamation of the state’s sovereignty up to the internationally recognized Lebanese borders, through working to implement Resolution 425 and all other Security Council resolutions concerning the total removal of the Israeli occupation and adhering to the March 23, 1949 [General] Armistice Agreement. Confirming the right of the Lebanese people to lawful national resistance pursuant to the United Nations Charter and undertaking all necessary measures to [achieve] liberation and spreading the sovereignty of the state.

Second Government of Rachid al-Solh (May 16, 1992-October 31, 1992):

Second, the south: The government strongly condemns the continuation of the Israeli occupation of part of Lebanese lands, and the continuation of attacks against our [otherwise] secure people and will, therefore, work to liberate all Lebanese lands of this occupation, continue demanding the implementation of Resolutions 425 and 426, work to spread the sovereignty of the state over all of its lands, and complete the deployment of the Lebanese Army up to the internationally recognized borders. The government adheres to the approved Lebanese principles and to Lebanon’s right—as a government and peopleto confront the occupation and work to liberate its land through all means based on the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

First Government of Rafic Hariri (October 31, 1992-May 25, 1995):

“The continuation of Israel’s occupation of a portion of Lebanese lands and its continued attacks on our [otherwise] secure people remain at the top of the government’s priorities, which considers the matter of liberating the nation’s land its top priority among its national and political goals. The government adheres to Lebanon’s right, as a government and people, to confront the Israeli occupation and work to liberate the Lebanese land through all means based on the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The government […] will pursue, adamantly, the implementation of Resolution 425, work to spread the sovereignty of the state over all its lands, and finish the deployment of the Lebanese Army up to the internationally recognized borders. It will also work to support the steadfastness of our people in the south and the western Beqaa.”

Second Government of Rafic Hariri (May 25, 1995-November 7, 1996):

Our right to resist the occupation will remain a national and political principle. Confronting the occupation with all available means is a right and obligation, a right enshrined in international covenants and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

Third Government of Rafic Hariri (November 7, 1996-December 4, 1998):

“The great challenge obligating us all is liberating our land from the Israeli occupation, implementing Resolution 425, and affirming our right to resistance [against] Israel with all lawful means. We will continue to consider this matter our chief priority. […] Lebanon insists upon its right to resist the occupation, strengthening the ties between the state and its institutions and our people in the south and the western Beqaa, and supporting their steadfastness through all available means.”

Third Government of Salim al-Hoss (December 14, 1998-October 26, 2000):

“Supporting the resistance acting against the Israeli occupation to attain the unconditional implementation of Resolution 425 and supporting the steadfastness of the people of the occupied lands with whatever will extend to them the ability to remain and cling to their land.”

Fourth Government of Rafic Hariri (October 26, 2000-April 17, 2003):

Our government launches today based upon the most important national accomplishment in Lebanon’s history, which is the victory of the resistance, the resistance of all Lebanese to the Israeli aggression and occupation, and forcing the enemy to withdraw and admit defeat [Israel’s May 25, 2000 withdrawal from south Lebanon and Hezbollah’s claim to have forced Israel to withdraw]. From this starting point, the government salutes the resistance and the steadfastness and patience of the Lebanese people generally and the people of the south and the western Beqaa, particularly over the past two decades, in light of the suffering they endured and the sacrifices they offered. […] The government considers preserving the resistance’s accomplishments and investing it in all areas one of its priorities—while also stressing that the Israeli position of continued aggression against Lebanon through continuing to occupy the Shebaa Farms, detaining Lebanese prisoners, occupying the Golan Heights, denying the rights of the Palestinian People including the right of return and exercising the worst kinds of cruelty against it, is the reason for the open escalation of unlimited possibilities in the region.

It, therefore, interests the government to stress that it will continue to operate based on the conviction that our victory in the south is a victory for all Arabs and the fruit of joint Lebanese-Syrian struggle and endurance. […] This principle [of Lebanese-Syrian unity] will act as a main propelling force, on the one hand, aiding Lebanon to complete the liberation of its lands and prisoners […] and on the other, the advancement of the Arab position and evolution of joint Arab action in confronting Israel, especially in light of the Palestinian people’s heroic intifada and the Arab position insisting that the peace process must implement international resolutions and international law and not Israeli diktat. This position will not be abandoned under the pressure of threats employed by Israel.

Lebanon, which served as an example of resistance, can also serve as an example for permanent, just, and comprehensive peace based on the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from its lands, the liberation of the Golan Heights, and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people pursuant to the resolutions of the United Nations. Lebanon will continue to pursue peace within the ambit of national principles, no matter how stubborn Israel becomes in its positions or how low the chances of peace appear these days. For this country, small in territory, great in sacrifice, knows how to confront occupation with resistance, but also knows how to insistently pursue the spread of justice and comprehensive peace in the region—this peace that remains a strategic goal, which we will pursue with our Arab brethren and friends around the world.”

Fifth Government of Rafic Hariri (April 17, 2003-October 26, 2004):

“First, the government stresses that Lebanon is committed to implementing international resolutions, including those aiming to achieve comprehensive, just, and permanent peace in the Middle East—while refusing to accept in any shape or form Israel’s diktats and its behaviors and maneuvers aimed at imposing its hegemony on the entire region. Likewise, Lebanon insists on solving all international conflicts through the auspices of the United Nations and making the entire Middle East region free of weapons of mass destruction.

Lebanon, more than at any time in the past, is committed to adhering to international laws, charters, human rights, and the rights of peoples to self-determination and defend their independence, sovereignty, and integrity of their lands through all means available to them, including the legitimate right to resistance until the complete liberation of the land. […] The current challenges lead us to more cooperation and coordination with Syria to jointly confront the challenges of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the coming phase, just as it was confronted in the previous stage which saw the victory of Lebanon and its national resistance over Israel and forcing it to unconditionally withdraw from most occupied Lebanese lands. […] It must also be emphasized that the government remains adamant about completing what Lebanese lands remain occupied.”

Second Government of Omar Karami (October 26, 2004-April 19, 2005):

“This government also stresses the importance of exceptional relations between Lebanon and Syria, especially regarding their durable and stable partnership in confronting the Israeli enemy, conducting the struggle against it, and adopting resistance to confront aggression and liberate the land. […] As it relates to international relations, this government clings to the Charter of the United Nations, respecting international law, and striving to achieve the best cooperative relationships with all friendly nations. […] As an extension of adhering to international law, and respecting its sources and decisions, this government adheres to the Charter of the United Nations, which enshrines the respect for the sovereignty of member states. It, therefore, rejects any interference in our affairs that contradicts the Charter of the United Nations, and which puts our security, national unity, and domestic stability at risk.

First Government of Najib Mikati (April 19, 2005 – July 19, 2005):

“This government grants its complete confidence to the Lebanese Army and its ability to carry out its assigned national task. […] This government stresses its [commitment to] abide by the Charter of the United Nations and other international resolutions and documents that Lebanon has signed or joined. It also stresses its adherence to the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the right of peoples to self-determination, to defend their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and the lawful right to resist occupation. The government also stresses Lebanon’s respect for international legal resolutions and calls for implementing them all and [their terms] completely. The government is also committed to the Taif Agreement and its implementation in letter and spirit, in all its contents, considering it the cornerstone of national accord expressing the consensus of the will of the Lebanese.

The government also considers the Lebanese resistance and all its weapons a just and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese people to defend its land and dignity in confronting Israeli aggression, threats, and greed in order to complete the liberation of Lebanese lands. […] [T]he government [also] stresses its complete adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which requires an international investigative body to investigate the crime of assassinating the martyred Prime Minister [literally, president] Rafic Hariri and his companions.

First Government of Fuad Siniora (July 29, 2005-July 11, 2008):

“This is the first policy statement of the first government after elections, the first in light of Lebanon regaining its democratic system [after Syria’s 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon] […] this statement [represents] preserving the heroic resistance, the statement of calm dialogue regarding the options available to us all within the ambit of a persevering Arab strategy [lit. “equation”] confronting Israel, its occupation, and greed, and simultaneously fortifies Lebanon. It is a statement [representing] adherence to Arab solidarity and stressing commitment to the Beirut Summit’s initiative for just and comprehensive peace, and for respecting international legal decisions.

The government stresses its keen desire to adhere to respecting international law and maintaining good relations with international bodies and respecting their decisions—within the ambit of sovereignty, solidarity, and national unity. […] The government considers the Lebanese resistance to be a just and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese people to liberate their land and defend their dignity in the face of the Israeli aggression, threats, and greed and to continue the liberation of the Lebanese land.

Second Government of Fuad Siniora (July 11, 2008-November 9, 2009):

“This government affirms its commitment to the principle of the unity and supremacy of the state in all matters related to the country’s general policies, including preserving Lebanon and safeguarding its national sovereignty. […] Our government commits to implementing the Taif Agreement in all of its clauses. […] Today, we must increase trust in the lawful armed forces and provide them political support to carry out their duties on a level that can assure the Lebanese that it is guaranteeing their right to security and protecting them from any aggression. […]

Based on the state’s responsibility for preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence and its territorial integrity pursuant to the constitution, the government stresses the following:

First: Lebanon’s right—through its people, army, and resistance—to liberate or reclaim the Shebaa Farms, Kfarchouba Hills, and the Lebanese portion of the occupied village of Ghajar, to defend Lebanon in confronting any aggression, to guard its right to its waters, and that [will be done] through all lawful and available means.

Second: The government’s commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in all of its terms.

Third: Working to set a comprehensive national strategy to protect Lebanon and defend it, which will be agreed upon through the dialogue that his excellency, the president of the republic, will call for with the participation of the Arab League and that will occur after the government gains the confidence of parliament.

Additionally, [our] national duty calls upon us to continue working to defend our rights, especially regarding our unabridged sovereignty over all Lebanese lands, up to implementing the [March 23, 1949, Lebanon-Israel General] Armistice [Agreement] as required by the Taif Agreement. The government will continue to ask the international community to implement Security Council Resolution 1701 in all of its terms, including reaching a permanent ceasefire. The Lebanese government will also work to secure Israel’s withdrawal from the Lebanese portion of Ghajar, its withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms and Kfarchouba Hills, and their return to Lebanese sovereignty, including [through] placing them under temporary United Nations guardianship.

First Government of Saadeldine Hariri (November 9, 2009-June 13, 2011):

3-The government stresses the unity of the state, its authority, and exclusive final say in all matters related to the country’s general policies, including safeguarding Lebanon, protecting it, and preserving its national sovereignty. This principle shall guide the government’s orientation, its decisions, and its commitment. The government also stresses its commitment to the principles of the constitution and its provisions, the content of the [president’s] oath [of office] speech, the rules of the democratic system, the National Pact, and applying the Taif Agreement.

4-The government stresses its uncompromising insistence on preventing all attempts to undermine domestic peace and security. This requires security and military authority to be exclusively in the hands of the state, which will act as a guarantee for preserving coexistence. The government commits to continue supporting the lawful military and security forces and providing them [necessary] human and resources and equipment to carry out its assigned duties of protecting Lebanese residents, confronting terrorism and averting its dangers, protecting the freedoms of all citizens and their rights, not least their right to security, and combatting acts of chaos, crime, and drug dealing, all pursuant to the direction of the political authorities.

5-To safeguard Lebanon’s supreme interest, the Lebanese government reiterates [renews] its respect for international resolutions and stresses its request that the international community implement Resolution 1701 and put a total end to Israel’s violations, its constant threats, and the espionage activities it conducts. It [the government] will continue, on the basis of this resolution, to seek a permanent ceasefire and commitment to the [March 23, 1949, Lebanon-Israel General] Armistice Agreement, pursuant to the Taif Agreement. […]

6-Based on its responsibility to preserve Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial unity and integrity, the government affirms Lebanon’s right—through its people, army, and resistance—to liberate or reclaim the Shebaa Farms, the Lebanese Kfarchouba Hills, and the Lebanese portion of the village of Ghajar, to defend Lebanon in confronting any aggression, hold to its right to its waters, through all lawful and available means. It also stresses its commitment to Resolution 1701 in all its terms. It also stresses [its commitment] to work to unify the position of the Lebanese through agreement upon a comprehensive strategy to protect Lebanon and defend it that will be decided through national dialogue.

Second Government of Najib Mikati (June 13, 2011-February 15, 2014):

“Our government […] commits to applying the constitution and pursuing the complete implementation of the Taif Agreement. […] Our government stresses before this august council the unity of the state and that there is no alternative to its authority and final say in all matters related to the country’s general policies because through that [we] guarantee Lebanon’s preservation, protection, and safeguarding its national sovereignty. […] This is a task that will be taken up by the lawful armed and security forces, in which no forces [lit. “weapons”] but its own lawfully authorized forces will take part. […]

The government stresses its efforts to end the Israeli occupation of the remainder of the occupied Lebanese lands, ending the aggressive Israeli actions and espionage operations that violate Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. It commits to Lebanon’s right—people, army, and resistance—to liberate and reclaim the Shebaa Farms, Lebanese Kfarchouba Hills, and the Lebanese portion of the village of Ghajar and to defend Lebanon against any aggression through all lawful and available means. […] Working on uniting the Lebanese position around a comprehensive defense strategy to protect Lebanon and defend it remains a commitment of this government, which hopes to finish exploring it through national dialogue. The government reaffirms its commitment to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in all its terms.

Government of Tamam Salam (February 15, 2014-December 18, 2016):

“Our government emphasizes the unity of the state, its prerogatives, and exclusive authority over national policy-related issues to ensure Lebanon’s safety and security and to preserve its national sovereignty. The government also stresses its commitment to the principles and provisions of the constitution, the democratic system rules, the National Pact, and the Taif Agreement. […]It will work on establishing excellent relations with international bodies, respecting their resolutions, and affirms its commitment to implement Security Council Resolution 1701 in order to extend the state sovereignty over the whole of Lebanese territory, as well as [its commitment] to the United Nations and Arab League Charters. By virtue of the state’s responsibilities and role to preserve Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the safety of its citizens, the government stresses the state’s duty and aspiration to liberate the Shebaa Farms, the Kfarchouba Hills, and the Lebanese part of Ghajar village by all legitimate means as well as the right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation, repel its attacks, and regain occupied territories.

Second Government of Saadeldine Hariri (December 18, 2016-January 31, 2019):

A national defense strategy will be agreed upon through dialogue. […] [The government] affirms its respect for all international instruments and resolutions and commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1701. […] Regarding the conflict with the Israeli enemy, we will spare no effort nor hold back resistance for the sake of liberating what Lebanese territories remain occupied and protecting our country from an enemy that continues to crave our lands, waters, and natural resources. That [will be done] by relying upon the state’s responsibility and role in preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The government, therefore, stresses the responsibility of the state and its aspiration to liberate the Shebaa Farms, Kfarchouba Hills, and the Lebanese portion of the village of Ghajar through all lawful means while stressing the right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation, repelling its aggression, and reclaiming the occupied lands.”

Third Government of Saadeldine Hariri (January 31, 2019-January 21, 2020):

“[This government] affirms its respect for all international instruments and resolutions and its commitment to Security Council Resolution 1701. […] Regarding the conflict with the Israeli enemy, we will spare no effort nor hold back resistance for the sake of liberating what Lebanese territories remain occupied and protecting our country from an enemy that continues to crave our lands, waters, and natural resources. That [will be done] by relying upon the state’s responsibility and role in preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The government, therefore, stresses the responsibility of the state and its aspiration to liberate the Shebaa Farms, Kfarchouba Hills, and the Lebanese portion of the village of Ghajar through all lawful means while stressing the right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation, repelling its aggression, and reclaiming the occupied lands.”

Government of Hassan Diab (January 21, 2020-September 10, 2021):

“[This government] affirms its respect for all international instruments and resolutions and its commitment to Security Council Resolution 1701. […] Regarding the conflict with the Israeli enemy, we will spare no effort nor hold back resistance for the sake of liberating what Lebanese territories remain occupied and protecting our country from an enemy that continues to crave our lands, waters, and natural resources. That [will be done] by relying upon the state’s responsibility and role in preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The government, therefore, stresses the responsibility of the state and its aspiration to liberate the Shebaa Farms, Kfarchouba Hills, and the Lebanese portion of the village of Ghajar through all lawful means while stressing the right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation, repelling its aggression, and reclaiming the occupied lands.”

Third Government of Najib Mikati (July 10, 2021-February 8, 2025):

“[T]he national principles that will guide the government’s actions are:

— Commitment to the constitution’s requirements and the National Accord Document [i.e., the Taif Agreement], respecting international laws and documents Lebanon has signed and all the decisions of international bodies, stressing the commitment to implementing Security Council Resolution 1701. […]

— Stressing the absolute support for the [Lebanese] Army and all security forces to maintain security on the border and domestically, protecting the Lebanese and their property, strengthening the authority of the state, and protecting institutions.

— Adherence to the [March 23, 1949, Lebanon-Israel General] Armistice Agreement, seeking to complete the liberation of occupied Lebanese lands, defending Lebanon against any aggression, affirming its right to its waters and resources through all lawful means, while stressing the right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation, repel its aggression, and reclaim the occupied lands.”

David Daoud is Senior Fellow at at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs.

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