Recent diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Iran reflect a broader shift in the Middle East: Turkey has filled the vacuum left by Tehran, much to the Islamic Republic’s discontent. After Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s critical remarks on Tehran’s regional policies sparked media uproar, both Turkey and Iran’s foreign ministries summoned their envoys for urgent discussions.
In an interview with Al Jazeera Arabic on February 26, Fidan stated that Iran’s reliance on militias had come at a great cost, with Tehran losing more than it gained. When asked about Iran’s potential support for Syrian Kurdish forces—whom Turkey considers a terrorist group—Fidan responded sharply: “If you try to create unrest in another country by supporting a group there, another country might support a group in your country to create unrest for you.”
“Nothing can remain hidden,” Fidan continued. “The capabilities you have, others also possess. Therefore, if you do not want stones thrown at your window, you should not throw stones at others’ windows.”
Iran swiftly rebuffed Fidan’s comments. “We were the first country to oppose and confront the coup against the Turkish government,” Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei wrote on X, also asserting that Iran had not pursued regional ambitions over the past five decades.
Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani acknowledged ongoing differences between Turkey and Iran on March 4, labeling Fidan’s remarks as “unconstructive” and cautioning against similar statements in the future. “We have issues with Turkey regarding Syria, and we hope that these issues will be handled wisely,” Mohajerani said.
Diplomatic tensions escalated further when Iran “invited” Turkish Ambassador to Tehran Hicabi Kirlangic for a meeting on March 4. While not officially summoned, the invitation was likely Iran’s attempt to de-escalate while still delivering a stern message. Kirlangic met with Iran’s assistant to the foreign minister and the director general of the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe Department, who stressed that “sensitive regional conditions necessitate avoiding inappropriate remarks and unrealistic analyses that could lead to disputes and tensions in bilateral relations.”
Turkey remained firm in its stance. In response, the Turkish foreign ministry invited Iran’s charge d’affaires in Ankara for a meeting, noting that Iranian officials had recently criticized Turkey. The ministry also confirmed that a formal file on the matter had been sent to the Iranian side. Turkish foreign ministry spokesperson Oncu Keceli emphasized Ankara’s preference for direct diplomacy: “We believe that, in any case, foreign policy issues should not be used as material for domestic politics. In this framework, we prefer to convey critical messages directly to their recipients.”
The rivalry between Ankara and Tehran dates back centuries, with Iran historically aligning with European powers against the Ottoman Empire. However, it was Fidan’s specific threat about external actors supporting separatist groups inside Iran that provoked the strongest reaction. Iran’s diverse population, including ethnic groups like the Azeris, has long been sensitive to such issues. While Azeri Iranians, who make up about 16% of Iran’s population, do not suffer from significant socio-economic grievances, Turkey’s pan-Turkism ambitions have nonetheless sought to mobilize separatist movements within Iran. However, this has not yet escalated into armed conflict, as seen with the Kurdish and Baluch separatists.
In return, Tehran has supported the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist group by Turkey and the United States. Ties between Iran and the PKK date back to the 1980s, gaining momentum in the 1990s. In January 2025, the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, known for its pro-Erdogan stance, reported that Iran had sent 1,500 “kamikaze” drones to the PKK, referring to the HESA Shahed 136 suicide drone. While Iran denied the claim, the fact that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) operates a division focused on Turkey lends significant credibility to the accusation.
However, Tehran now faces an unexpected turn of events. Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, called for the group to disarm and dissolve itself. In a letter read by his political allies in Istanbul on February 27, he wrote, “I take on the historical responsibility for this call. […] All groups must lay down their arms, and the PKK must dissolve itself.” PKK’s executive committee declared a ceasefire in its struggle against the Turkish state shortly after.
Iranian state media quickly characterized this development as a significant defeat for Tehran. Indeed, it marks another instance in which Turkey has gained the upper hand in the region.
In the September 2023 clash between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Baku emerged victorious with Turkish support. Armenia, long reliant on Iranian and Russian military aid, was left vulnerable to the superior capabilities of Turkey’s Bayraktar drones. This victory not only secured Azerbaijan’s access to the Zangezur Corridor—connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and potentially linking Turkey to mainland Azerbaijan—but also reduced Armenia’s reliance on Iran for energy and transport, further diminishing Tehran’s influence.
The collapse of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria followed swiftly after the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the Turkish-backed Hayat Tahrir al Sham bringing down a regime that Iran had spent significant resources protecting. Damascus’s new leaders have repeatedly opposed Iranian regional ambitions, all while holding Turkish passports.
