Analysis: How will the US-backed SDF be affected by PKK leader’s disarmament call?

SDF fighters training
Members of the Syrian Democratic Forces engage in a training exercise in late February. (SDF on X)

On February 27, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan called for the group to disarm and end its conflict with Turkey, according to a message he released from prison. “Convene your congress and make a decision. All groups must lay their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself,” Ocalan wrote.

The call has reverberated across Turkey and may affect PKK-affiliated groups in Iran, Iraq, and Syria in addition to the PKK itself. A key area where the Ocalan statement will be watched closely is eastern Syria. In a statement to CNN, US National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes said he welcomed the development and added that “we hope that it will help assuage our Turkish allies about U.S. counter-ISIS partners in northeast Syria. We believe it will help bring peace to this troubled region.”

Northeast Syria is in the spotlight because of the ties between the PKK and the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a PKK affiliate. The YPG comprises a significant portion of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Turkey has carried out numerous airstrikes against the SDF over the past several years while backing other Syrian groups in fights with the SDF. Ankara also launched military operations against the SDF in 2019 and the YPG near Afrin in 2018. While SDF leader Mazloum Abdi has welcomed the Ocalan statement on the PKK, he has also said it does not relate to the SDF, despite the YPG’s ties to PKK.

As Ocalan’s statement ripples through the region, it naturally raises questions about how it might affect the SDF in Syria. The SDF has an estimated 70,000 fighters and has increased its capabilities through close work with US Central Command (CENTCOM) during Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State (IS). IS was largely defeated in 2019, and the SDF continues to control a large swath of eastern Syria, where it fights IS cells when they pop up and holds thousands of the jihadist group’s detainees. With the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in December 2024, the SDF may be the most cohesive and largest distinct armed force in Syria.

The new government in Damascus is trying to organize its national security forces based on the backbone of Hayat Tahrir al Sham fighters, who were mainly trained in Idlib. Damascus faces many hurdles in securing western Syria because of numerous clashes with local groups, as well as recent Israeli airstrikes.

The most important question is whether Ankara will accept Abdi’s claim that Ocalan’s statement has nothing to do with the SDF, or whether it will provoke Ankara to continue or increase operations in Syria.

Turkey is watching how the US responds. The pro-Turkey Daily Sabah newspaper noted on February 28 that a US State Department spokesperson said, “We’ve seen the reports on Abdullah Ocalan’s statement. The United States considers the PKK a Foreign Terrorist Organization, so any move to lay down arms and remove that threat is a welcome step.” Efkan Ala, the deputy chairman of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), said, “The essence of the call is the disarmament and the dissolution of the terrorist organization. We will look at the result. Of course, we will look at whether this result will be achieved.” Ala emphasized that Ankara would not slow down its fight against terrorism.

If the PKK and its affiliates begin to disarm, will Ankara shift its policy in Syria? Over the last several years, Turkey has been clear that it views the SDF as being led by the YPG, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on the YPG to disband in mid-January. Thus, it appears unlikely Turkey will suddenly change how it views the YPG. The SDF would likely need to convince Ankara that it is definitively breaking with the YPG and, as a result, breaking with the PKK.

The SDF also faces acute challenges if the US withdraws from eastern Syria. A recent report by the North Press Agency, which closely follows developments in eastern Syria, noted that a US withdrawal from Syria was “unclear amid regional uncertainty.”

The SDF has been cognizant of this possible policy shift in Washington since at least 2018. The main difference today is that the SDF would no longer be left negotiating with the Russian- and Iranian-backed Assad regime, but rather the new government in Damascus, which is much closer to Turkey.

In January, a commander of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), part of the YPG, said her units could integrate into a new Syrian army if Damascus “embraces diversity and is democratic.” Other PKK-linked groups have made similar statements in Syria. At the same time, Kurdish parties in the country have expressed concern about not being included in a recent national dialogue conference hosted by the new Syrian government on February 25.

It appears Ocalan’s statement has created a catch-22 for the SDF, given the YPG’s leadership of the group. While the SDF has welcomed the statement, it would admit and solidify its direct affiliation with the PKK and effectively surrender eastern Syria and a decade of gains made against the Islamic State if it disarms. If the SDF doesn’t disarm, its continuation as an armed group may give Ankara justification to continue attacks on it and keep Turkish forces in Syria.

The development may also present an opportunity for the new US administration to help disentangle the SDF from the YPG or urge the SDF to formally break from the PKK to allay Ankara’s concerns. If Turkey continues to focus on defeating the SDF, it will make it harder for the SDF to engage with and work with the new government in Damascus. In contrast, Ankara withdrawing its forces from Syria could shift attention to the US role in eastern Syria and put pressure on the US to discuss the future of the SDF with Damascus.

The new Syrian government may have trouble consolidating its control of eastern Syria for the time being and prefer to have the competent and well-trained SDF stay in the region for now. If so, it would also be in Damascus’s interests to encourage a clear split between the SDF and the PKK.

Reporting from Israel, Seth J. Frantzman is an adjunct fellow at FDD and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal. He is the senior Middle East correspondent and analyst at The Jerusalem Post, and author of The October 7 War: Israel's Battle for Security in Gaza (2024).

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