North Korean (DPRK) forces fighting in Russia’s Kursk region “have been pulled off the front lines after suffering heavy casualties,” though their absence may only be temporary, The New York Times reported on January 30, citing US and Ukrainian officials. This development comes as North Korea is reportedly preparing to deploy more soldiers to Russia, though the number and type of troops Pyongyang might send remains to be seen.
Despite significant losses and challenges working with Russian forces, DPRK troops have intensified the pressure on Ukraine’s defense in Kursk. But reinforcements will be needed to sustain the North Korean presence there.
The initial DPRK deployment
North Korea has already dispatched some 10,000 to 12,000 troops to Russia, according to Ukrainian, American, and South Korean officials. They reportedly consist mainly of special operations forces (SOF) from four brigades of North Korea’s elite 11th Corps, or “Storm Corps.” That formation is believed to comprise a total of 10 brigades and some 40,000 to 80,000 troops. According to US intelligence, Pyongyang suggested the deployment in the hope of securing Russian military technology and other aid.
DPRK troops began arriving in Russia by early October. They reportedly received Russian training in basic infantry tactics, including assaults on trenches, as well as artillery, drones, and electronic warfare. The North Koreans wear Russian uniforms and carry fake Russian military IDs. Though North Korean forces reportedly first saw action in early November, they apparently did not enter battle in large numbers until December.
Moscow has employed the DPRK troops primarily as light infantry for assaults on Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast, where Russia is trying to claw back territory Ukraine seized in a surprise offensive last August. In mid-January, South Korean intelligence assessed that 300 DPRK soldiers had been killed and another 2,700 wounded. Kyiv and some Western officials have claimed the figures are even higher. At this rate of losses, North Korea’s contingent would be wiped out within months, barring reinforcements.
A reported pullback
According to the officials cited by The Times, North Korean soldiers seem to have been absent from the front for around two weeks. This assessment tracks with recent reports by Ukrainian troops, though a spokesman for Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces said the pullback occurred in only one part of the battlefield in Kursk.
US officials believe the pullback may be temporary, The Times reported. They suggested that DPRK forces may rejoin the fight after undergoing further training or if Russia adjusts how it employs them to reduce their casualty rate. A battalion commander from Ukraine’s 6th Ranger Regiment, currently fighting in Kursk, similarly told Sky News that the North Koreans may be “analysing their mistakes” and receiving additional training, “tending to their wounds,” or “waiting for reinforcements.”
Whatever the case, intercepted Russian communications indicate DPRK forces will “be back soon,” he added.
Reinforcements on the way?
In recent months, Kyiv and its international partners have expressed concern that Pyongyang might send more soldiers to Russia. The Biden administration cited this threat as part of its justification for allowing Ukraine to use American missiles to strike inside Russian territory. On December 23, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said intelligence indicated Pyongyang was “preparing to rotate or increase the deployment of troops” in Russia.
On January 24, the JCS said it suspects Pyongyang is “accelerating follow-up measures and preparation for an additional dispatch of troops” following the casualties suffered in Kursk. The JCS statement came days after a senior Pentagon official told The Times that North Korea would deploy more forces to Russia “within the next two months.” The Times article did not specify the number of troops or whether they would be infantry or some other specialty. But it seemed to suggest these “reinforcements” would replace soldiers killed or wounded in Kursk.
After that story broke, however, The War Zone quoted Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, saying Kyiv does not “expect to see many new ground combat troops.” Rather, Budanov said he expects Pyongyang to deploy additional missile and artillery troops to operate and train Russian forces on DPRK-provided systems.
Budanov could not confirm the number of additional soldiers or when they would arrive. However, he did say Pyongyang has already provided about 120 170mm self-propelled guns (SPGs), another 120 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and almost 150 KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles. Budanov predicted Moscow would receive roughly the same number of each system this year. This total is in addition to the millions of artillery rounds North Korea has transferred so far. The SPGs and MLRS are useful, in part, because they allow Russia to tap additional calibers of DPRK ammunition. And while Ukrainian officials have said the KN-23s often fail midair or miss their targets, they can at least wreak havoc and tax Ukraine’s air defense capacity.
One possibility is that Pyongyang intends to rotate its forces in Kursk rather than increase the total number of North Korean troops fighting there. This would allow additional DPRK units to gain combat experience and avoid completely wiping out the units currently deployed. Officials from Ukraine and other countries have previously said they expect North Korea to rotate its contingent in Kursk every few months.
According to The Wall Street Journal, Colonel-General Kim Yong Bok, the DPRK General Staff’s deputy chief for light infantry and SOF, “is believed to be tasked with […] establishing the pipeline for future deployments” as well as “integrating North Korean troops with the Russians” and “absorbing battlefield insights to bring back home.”
What we know about how DPRK forces are operating
Ukrainian officials and soldiers have described the North Koreans as highly motivated, disciplined, and well-trained. North Korean troops are said to doggedly press forward in the face of heavy losses and have apparently been ordered to commit suicide rather than surrender. Whereas many Russian recruits nowadays are aged 40 or older, the DPRK soldiers are young and physically fit. Moscow seems to have equipped them relatively well.
Documents recovered from slain North Korean troops and translated by NK Insider indicate that each DPRK infantry battalion in Kursk includes an “assault team” that is “organized into approximately 9 assault units, each consisting of 18 personnel.” Each battalion also has various support units, including medical, mortar, and anti-tank units, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) teams for reconnaissance and fire correction, the documents and other evidence suggest. “Each battalion should organize at least 2-3 UAV teams,” with every company having “at least one UAV team,” one document says.
According to that document, Russia is responsible for “logistical supply” for “battalion-level units,” but “units below the battalion level must organize their own supply systems.” Accounts from US and Ukrainian officials and troops indicate North Korean forces also receive some artillery and drone support from the Russians. When the North Koreans capture a position, Russian forces follow to secure it.
In general, coordination between Russian and DPRK forces seems to be poor. It is unsurprising, given the language barrier and their lack of experience fighting alongside one another. During training last fall, Russian troops apparently taught the North Koreans some basic Russian words to help with communication. But communication challenges have led to multiple friendly-fire incidents, according to accounts from Ukrainian troops and Russian POWs. To try to address this issue, Russia has reportedly put translators equipped with a radio in each North Korean assault group. DPRK units, like many of their Russian counterparts, evidently have received a mix of Russian sixth-generation “Azart” radios and Chinese commercial-grade radios.
In October-December, Ukrainian and American officials indicated that Russia was integrating North Korean units into Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and motor rifle brigades and regiments—even attaching individual North Korean platoons to Russian companies. However, subsequent evidence suggests Russian and North Korean units generally operate independently in the field, with coordination mainly occurring at higher echelons.
Captured DPRK documents seem to indicate that DPRK brigade, battalion, and company commanders maintain control over North Korean units during attacks. One document stated the attack in question was coordinated with a Russian command post in Korenevo. North Korean generals are reportedly posted at Russian headquarters, where attack objectives are determined. These officers “decide when they need artillery and how long to wait before ground forces maneuver,” and they “synchronize with the [DPRK] troops in the field, so that the troops are not talking to their Russian counterparts, to try to reduce miscommunication,” The New York Times reported recently, citing a senior Pentagon official.
One Ukrainian serviceman operating on Ukraine’s left flank in Kursk told the Long War Journal that despite initial reports that Russian VDV and naval infantry units in that area had received DPRK troops, he had seen no evidence that this actually happened. The Russians continued attacking on the left flank, but his unit did not encounter any North Korean soldiers. He said DPRK forces have mainly operated at the northern part of the salient.
North Korean infantry tactics have made them especially vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery fire and drone strikes. Video footage, backed up by accounts from Ukrainian troops, has shown DPRK soldiers moving in platoon-sized formations, at times walking through open fields in close proximity to one another. Russian infantry, by contrast, often attack in smaller groups and hug tree lines.
However, accounts from Ukrainian servicemen and captured DPRK documents suggest the North Koreans have sought to adapt. One document, apparently intended to distribute lessons learned, described an attack in the southeastern part of the Kursk salient by several battalions from North Korea’s 94th Brigade. It said that although DPRK forces had been warned to employ “dispersal tactics” due to the threat of artillery and drone strikes facilitated by “real-time” UAV reconnaissance, “many soldiers gathered and moved together, resulting in heavy casualties.” Going forward, soldiers should move in “smaller units of 2-3 members,” the document said.
The document also instructs North Korean forces that to “neutralize” UAVs, “drone surveillance and strike units should be organized into combat teams and companies.” The North Koreans reportedly shoot down drones by having one soldier serve as bait while others fire at the threat with marksmanship praised by Ukrainian servicemen. Like their Russian counterparts, some DPRK troops have been found to carry handheld drone detectors and shotguns to counter UAVs.
Maintaining the pressure
In part thanks to the North Koreans, Russia has gradually recaptured some 50-60 percent of the Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk. The Kremlin likely aims to retake the rest before beginning potential peace talks with Kyiv, while the Ukrainians hope to use that territory as leverage in negotiations.
Ukrainian servicemen acknowledge that the DPRK forces have put Ukraine’s defense under greater stress. “The Koreans are starting to push the front lines, targeting less defended areas and wearing out our troops that way,” one Ukrainian platoon commander said.
However, Pyongyang will need to dispatch more troops to sustain its impact in Kursk. If it does not, Moscow could be forced to pull additional units from Ukraine or divert a larger share of fresh Russian recruits to Kursk, potentially undermining Russia’s ongoing offensive in eastern Ukraine.
