Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s last speech, delivered on Monday, was his most defiant to date. Qassem spoke one day after the expiration of the November 27 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire deal’s 60-day timetable for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from south Lebanon.
The prior day had witnessed tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of predominantly Shiite south Lebanese defy Israeli orders and seek to return to border towns and villages still occupied by the IDF—a human procession reportedly instigated by Hezbollah. Qassem’s combativeness was likely encouraged by this massive turnout and its overall pro-Hezbollah character. The group’s continued ability to mobilize the Shiite masses was a demonstration of strength not only to the Israelis but also to Hezbollah’s domestic Lebanese opponents, who would contemplate exploiting the group’s current military degradation to move against it.
Qassem described his speech, which coincided with the 27th of the Islamic month of Rajab—traditionally believed to be the date of the Islamic prophet Mohammad’s “Night Journey”—as an “accounting” and a “narrative.” Qassem began in a typical formulaic manner, recounting recent events and offering salutations, with a special dedication to “the struggling [al-mujahid] Palestinian people and their resistance in Gaza, the West Bank, and the ’48 Lands [Israel] on achieving a ceasefire.” He also lauded the “partners to this victory, the Islamic Republic of Iran … dear Yemen … and dear Iraq’s people and Shiite religious authority [marja’iyya] and [Popular] Mobilization [Forces]” and praised “Lebanon, which bravely offered blood and sacrifices, including the most eminent of the ummah’s martyrs, sayyedHassan Nasrallah, in support of Gaza.”
Qassem continued to frame “Al Aqsa Flood”—the war begun after Palestinian armed factions attacked Israel on October 7, 2023—as a momentous victory that restored the centrality of the Palestinian cause “even in the West” and exposed Israel as a weak and “murderous warring gang working towards the extermination of humanity” that will eventually be swept away “God willing … as this Palestinian people achieve the liberation of its land from the river to the sea.”
Qassem broke down the remainder of his speech into six points. The first two, recounting the recent war and Hezbollah’s losses, were interrelated. He began by exaggerating the magnitude of the group’s recent fight with Israel. Qassem described the fight as an “aggression with global, American, Western support” that “respected no law, brooked no sanctity, killing humans and destroying stone and tree and life with no limits,” stressing the “tremendous gap between the vast American-Israeli military capability and that of the Resistance—no matter the capabilities it acquired.” Qassem drilled down on this contrast between the “Israeli-American exceptional military superiority” and Hezbollah’s comparatively meager military means but argued that Hezbollah’s ultimately superior strength rested upon the inevitable “triumph of justice over injustice.”
Having thus framed the contest between the two sides—overwhelming, American-backed Israeli military might vs. a plucky resistance organization whose strength is derived from the power of belief and the justice of its cause—Qassem conceded that Hezbollah had indeed suffered tremendous, unprecedented military setbacks during the last war.
“Some of this [Hezbollah support] base has questions and was surprised by what happened,” Qassem said. “This was a tremendous event and war, and some of its outcomes were unexpected,” he explained before offering Hezbollah’s closest-ever admission of a military defeat at Israel’s hands.
Because of the capabilities that Hezbollah had amassed over the years, Qassem said, “many assumed we would defeat Israel and deal it a mortal blow.” Many, he said, also assumed that Hezbollah’s accumulated deterrence against Israel and its unbroken record of prior military victories—as the group’s narrative frames all its past engagements—would hold and continue. Hezbollah’s supporters, Qassem said, were, therefore, shocked at the spate and extent of the organization’s losses in materiel and men, “chief among them the greatest of the martyrs, sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.” He also admitted that Israeli intelligence’s successful penetration of Hezbollah’s organizational apparatus had facilitated these losses.
But while Qassem’s words approximated an admission of defeat, they were far from one. He employed rhetorical sleight of hand, lowering his audience’s expectations. “We must understand … that the Resistance cannot be military stronger, and we can never assume that its victory is military,” Qassem said. “The Resistance’s victory over Israel is [through] its faith, youth, women, children, elders, offerings, blood of its leaders, in the sacrifices it offers,” he explained. “That is how the Resistance prevails,” Qassem continued, insisting that the military component was but one element of victory, with the more important aspects being faith, belief, and the ability to withstand and offer great sacrifices.
Here, Qassem claimed, Hezbollah had delivered in spades. Not only had it achieved “the two best things, martyrdom and victory … victory because we remained in the battlefield and the Resistance will persist,” but the group had also dealt Israel heavy blows and foiled its plans. Despite Israel, as he claimed, “deploying five divisions comprised of 75,000 soldiers,” Hezbollah “confronted them with legendary steadfastness, exceptional bravery, and the determination of martyrdom.” Israel’s massive war machine was thus denied entry into Lebanon, “save for some hundreds of meters”—its goals of destroying Hezbollah and stoking domestic Lebanese strife foiled. Meanwhile, it was Hezbollah that inflicted “massive losses among the ranks of the Israeli army, and throughout the Israeli entity, denying them safety or stability, with economic, social, political, operational, and psychological consequences,” until “Israel asked, through America, for a ceasefire.”
It was at that point, Qassem said, “[Hezbollah] agreed with the Lebanese state to a ceasefire.” “This,” he claimed, “was a victory.” Qassem concluded with a particularly obnoxious phrase—“Record this as a victory”—that he kept repeating throughout his speech, likely intending for Hezbollah’s propaganda apparatuses to turn it into a popular meme, much like they did with his predecessor Nasrallah’s phrases and gestures.
So, in Qassem’s narrative, Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire from a position of strength—an agreement for which Israel had effectively begged. “We agreed to a ceasefire because we had suffered aggression and the aggressor requested to end its aggression,” he said, adding, “We agreed to the end of the aggression because we did not want it or a war to begin with,” a falsehood belied by Hezbollah initiating unprovoked attacks against Israel on October 8, 2023. Because Hezbollah had not wanted a war, he said, it was only “natural for us to accept a ceasefire.” Qassem also said his group had agreed to a ceasefire to comply with the Lebanese state’s decision to enter into such an agreement.
Now, Qassem claimed, Hezbollah had decided to strictly adhere to the ceasefire’s terms despite Israel allegedly violating the deal “almost 1,350 times by air, land, and sea.”
“We, as Hezbollah, complied. We were in constant dialogue with [Lebanon’s] political authorities. At one point, I’ll admit, we thought to respond to the violations,” Qassem said, but the Lebanese authorities advised against it. “They told us … it would be better to be a little patient … we adhered despite Israel’s violations. We thought to wait, and God would help us, and to remain as patient as possible despite the losses being inflicted and, God willing, the situation would improve.”
This patience paid off, Qassem claimed, with the immediate return of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese to their hometowns along the border, “which coincided with the [end] of the November 27 ceasefire, at 4 am.” With that event, he said, “the victory celebrations spread to all areas [of Lebanon] … while the Resistance fighters remained in the battlefield, not leaving it for one second.”
Qassem alleged that as the deal’s sponsor, the United States—which he described as a fox guarding a henhouse—failed to restrain Israel despite Lebanese governmental pressure. Here, as with every other mention of Washington in his speeches, Hezbollah’s secretary-general sought to direct his audience’s hatred toward the United States—which the group has always considered its primary enemy, with Israel merely serving as America’s “tool” or “forward military base.”
Qassem then claimed that Israel’s violations and the Lebanese state’s inability to halt them proved Lebanon’s need for Hezbollah. “It became clear that when the resistance fighters were fighting, Israel didn’t dare come forward. But after the ceasefire and the political track, it began entering villages and doing as it pleases. So, what kept [Israel] at bay? Politics or the Resistance? Therefore, this is a confirmation that the Resistance is needed to confront the Israeli enemy.”
Turning to Hezbollah’s domestic opponents, Qassem portrayed them as stooges of the United States, whose hopes of ending the group had been foiled by its victory. Indeed, he stressed, the triumph had only come through adherence to Hezbollah’s golden tripartite equation of “Army-People-Resistance.” The Lebanese Army, by protecting the throngs of Lebanese—mostly Hezbollah supporters—who returned to their border villages, had together acted as a “resistance,” thus confirming the effectiveness and durability of the tripartite equation. Bizarrely, Qassem then insisted that Hezbollah would not accept Israel remaining in Lebanon beyond the 60-day withdrawal timetable and denied that the Lebanese government had accepted an extension until February 18—despite caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati agreeing to precisely that arrangement.
Praising France’s demand for an immediate Israeli withdrawal, Qassem threatened that an extension of the IDF’s stay in Lebanon would transform the Israeli army into an occupying force in Hezbollah’s eyes—with all the attendant consequences. “Hezbollah’s position … is that we are confronting an occupation committing aggression and refusing to withdraw. And the resistance has the right to act in accordance with what it believes to be appropriate regarding the form and nature of the confrontation and its timing. This is our message to everyone; let them understand from it what they wish,” Qassem threatened. He also called upon all of Lebanon, not just “the Resistance,” to deal with Israel accordingly to end its military’s continued presence in the country.
The final part of Qassem’s speech dealt with domestic politics and the government formation process. The Hezbollah secretary-general expressed his group’s sense of ease and comfort with Lebanon’s post-war political direction. He explained that Hezbollah voted for Joseph Aoun as the president of Lebanon to promote national unity. Others, he said, had chosen a different path, and thus surprised the group by selecting Nawaf Salam as prime minister-designate over long-time Hezbollah ally Najib Mikati. This outcome, Qassem said, was intended to put Hezbollah on a collision course with Aoun. However, he stated, “We acted wisely because we want consensus, we want a country, a government, a state that can stand on its two feet, and national accord. So, we cooperated with the prime minister-designate, and thank God matters between us and him are proceeding.”
Now, Qassem added that it was not Hezbollah that was obstructing the government’s formation, but other factions that demanded specific ministries and appointments. “But our relations with the prime minister[-designate] and the president are fine, thank God, and we have no problems or obstructions,” he said.
Qassem also seemed to hint that Hezbollah may have opted not to join Salam’s potential cabinet directly. He stressed that the incoming government’s role would be to achieve unity on a national level, not the government-formation level, and that Salam alone would “choose the method of [government] formation” to best position Lebanon to “confront domestic and foreign challenges.” This statement does not necessarily suggest that Salam is seeking confrontation with Hezbollah or to exclude the group. Rather, it could be part of a quid pro quo between Hezbollah and the incoming premier: the group will support his premiership, and, in exchange, Salam will allocate the ‘Shiite share’ of the cabinet to candidates approved by Hezbollah and its allied Amal party but not directly affiliated with the maligned groups.
This political sleight of hand would satisfy both sides. By helping select acceptable ministers, Hezbollah would be assured that Salam’s government would not move against its interests or arms. In addition, those ministers not being directly affiliated with Hezbollah would facilitate the group’s and Salam’s shared goals—which Qassem enumerated in his speech—of ejecting Israel from Lebanon “by all means” and achieving post-war reconstruction. After all, a seemingly Hezbollah-free Lebanese government would be better positioned to mobilize the international community to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and seem a more worthwhile and attractive recipient for reconstruction aid.
In the meantime, Qassem concluded, Hezbollah was sparing no effort to move along the reconstruction process. He said the group had already surveyed 270,000 residential units and offered reconstruction or housing assistance to almost 200,000 people but required more time and patience from its supporters.
