A false narrative has emerged claiming Lebanese authorities searched an Iranian plane last week at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport over suspicion the aircraft was smuggling funds to Hezbollah and seized the funds. Many saw this as the long-awaited action by the Lebanese state to restrain Hezbollah and prevent its regeneration after the group’s adventurism invited yet another destructive war upon the Levantine country. One Lebanese propagandist described the event as “historic, confirming Hezbollah’s end.” However, closer inspection reveals that, though this is the impression Beirut wanted to create out of the incident, it could not be farther from the truth.
A routine Iranian Mahan Air flight did indeed make its way from Tehran to the Beirut airport on January 2. While en route, widespread reports began circulating that the flight was carrying cash destined for Hezbollah’s coffers. Nevertheless, Lebanese authorities allowed the plane to land in Beirut, and afterward, they claimed to have conducted an extensive inspection of the aircraft. Lebanese activist opposition mouthpiece Nidaa Al Watan’s sources claimed Beirut’s airport security intended to prevent the plane’s alleged illicit cargo from leaving the airport. The newspaper reported that Lebanese officials had informed Iranian counterparts they would inspect the plane, and if confirmed to be carrying funds for Hezbollah, those funds would be confiscated by the Lebanese state.
Lebanese Interior Minister Bassam Malwali promoted that version of events during his appearance on Lebanese MTV’s Sar al-Waqt talk show, which broadcasts live at 9:30 pm. At approximately 9:47 pm, Malwali claimed that airport security authorities were, at that very moment, thoroughly inspecting a Mahan Air flight in accordance with “necessary protocols.” However, flight data reveals that the minister’s comments were a dramatization of events misaligned with the Mahar Air flight’s timeline.
Mahan Air Flight 1152 departed from Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport at 2:30 pm Tehran time. It was scheduled to arrive at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport at 3:55 pm, well within the 2 hours and 45 minutes it typically takes this particular flight. Instead, Flight 1152 landed in Beirut at 6:30 pm, a 4-hour-and-54-minute flight that took almost double the usual time. Flight data reveals the plane circled over the Iranian city of Tabriz for approximately two hours, with unconfirmed speculation that it landed in Tabriz without reporting doing so.
Flight 1152’s return journey from Beirut to Tehran took off at 8:15 pm Beirut time. Therefore, when Mawlawi stated that the plane was “currently undergoing an inspection,” it had long departed Beirut’s airport and was already almost halfway back to Tehran. Furthermore, based on this timeline, Flight 1151 spent approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes on the tarmac after landing in Beirut. It was scheduled to depart at 7:30 pm, but between its delayed arrival, deplaning, reboarding passengers, and potential refueling, the plane took off 45 minutes after schedule—only 10 minutes longer than the average delay for this flight. In light of this sequence, there was insufficient time for the thorough inspection alleged by Mawlawi to have occurred.
Mawlawi further claimed that the bags of an Iranian diplomat onboard Mahan Air Flight 1152 were held up at the airport for inspection. The diplomat allegedly refused the inspection, citing his diplomatic status. While Mawlawi asserted that Lebanese authorities would inspect all individuals at the airport, including diplomats, Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon later insisted that the diplomat’s bags left Rafic Hariri International Airport without an inspection, describing the Lebanese authorities’ actions as a result of “lack of awareness.” On January 6, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise said that “the Iranian plane was not inspected at the airport in Lebanon.”
Indeed, Mawlawi later appeared to backtrack on these assertions, and even the Lebanese Foreign Ministry later confirmed the Iranian version of events. In a January 3 statement, the ministry said that after the Iranian embassy verbally clarified the contents of the diplomatic pouch—which the ministry said contained documents and cash to be used for the embassy’s expenses—“the two bags were permitted to enter pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” In relevant part, Article 27(3) of the convention states, “the diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained,” while Article 27(5) extends the same “inviolability” to the person of the diplomatic courier, who “shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.”
In other words, the Iranian diplomat was not searched, nor were his bags inspected, scanned, or opened. According to a report from Hezbollah’s Al-Manar satellite TV station, the only bags that underwent any inspection belonged to Lebanese passengers who returned from a visiting the Imam Reza Shrine in Iran—after they had been taken off the plane.
Mahan Air Flight 1151 flies regularly between Tehran and Beirut, having made the journey 17 times since the November 27 ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. In 2011, the US Department of Treasury, while designating Mahan Air, said the Iranian airline “has transported personnel, weapons and goods on behalf of Hizballah and omitted from Mahan Air cargo manifests secret weapons shipments bound for Hizballah.” Yet, none of these flights underwent an inspection, let alone one so highly publicized—even though both Hezbollah and credible reports indicate Iran has already begun sending the group fresh infusions of cash since the November 27 ceasefire went into effect.
The reason, it seems, had more to do with Israel’s activities and less with Beirut trying to assert its sovereignty or finally mustering the will to restrain Hezbollah. Earlier that day, Israel launched the highest number of airstrikes in a single day inside Lebanon—three—since the onset of the ceasefire on November 27, 2024. That deal requires the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy in Lebanese territory occupied by Israel during the course of the war as Israeli troops withdraw over 60 days.
The agreement requires Lebanon to ensure that its official security forces and LAF are the only armed entities carrying weapons or deploying forces in south Lebanon below the Litani River—meaning Hezbollah must vacate that area, and its military infrastructure must be dismantled. The deal additionally requires Lebanon to deploy its security forces and the LAF across all borders and border crossings, sealing them off from weapons shipments to Hezbollah. As far as can be determined, these terms and Lebanon’s performance are meant to take effect immediately. Hezbollah’s violations of the deal would be submitted to a US-led oversight committee, which would task the LAF—as the army of the sovereign country of Lebanon—with first responsibility of remedying the violations before theoretically permitting Israel to act unilaterally in the event of the LAF’s inaction.
Yet, save for a cosmetic deployment of LAF troops to south Lebanon, Lebanon is not acting and appears to be refusing to comply. In its statement on the airstrikes, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said it was targeting rocket launchers belonging to Hezbollah, including near Nabatiyeh in south Lebanon. The Israelis noted they had “first sent a request to LAF to neutralize the launchers,” and “struck the launchers after the threat was not dealt with by LAF.” This was the first time that Israel undertook military action against Hezbollah after the ceasefire went into effect while exclaiming LAF’s inaction and, implicitly, the ineffectiveness of an oversight committee that would rely on the Lebanese state or LAF to restrain the group or dismantle its military infrastructure.
Israel has, therefore, begun pressing to extend the duration of the state of ceasefire and for the IDF to remain in Lebanon beyond the 60-day withdrawal period. Israel has taken this approach in light of Lebanon’s continued demonstration of its inability and/or unwillingness to fulfill its obligations and act against Hezbollah—and because the IDF has noted the group is already reorganizing its ranks.
Hezbollah, for its part, responded with threats. Mahmoud Qmati, the deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political bureau, said the group would attack any Israeli troops that remained in Lebanese territory after the 60-day period had passed. Meanwhile, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem—who has delivered contradictory messages on the group’s interpretation of the ceasefire deal—said Hezbollah could begin attacking the Israelis even earlier. In his January 2 address, Qassem said:
There is no timetable determining the resistance’s action, not during [lit. with] the agreement or after the 60-day period in the agreement. We said we will be patient, giving an opportunity to prevent the Israeli violations and implement the agreement. But this does not mean we will remain patient for 60 days or that we will remain patient less or more than 60 days. Our patience is tied [only] to our decision regarding the appropriate time for us to confront the Israeli aggression and Israeli violations. Our patience could run out before 60 days or could continue. The resistance’s leadership will decide this matter.
Qassem also stressed, ambiguously this time, that the “agreement’s terms are limited to south of the Litani River” and seemingly only to “obligating Israel to withdraw.” Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz vowed in response that “there will be no [ceasefire] agreement” if Lebanon fails to fulfill its obligations.
This is no idle threat. The November 27 ceasefire agreement’s entry into effect interrupted, but did not conclusively end, the legal state of war between Israel and Hezbollah and possibly Lebanon. While scholars differ on the precise impact of ceasefire agreements on the right of belligerents to resume full hostilities, they generally agree that ceasefire agreements are temporary and can be a preliminary step toward a peace treaty or a permanent end to the existing state of war. Thus, such agreements regulate the level of violence in a conflict rather than determine one’s existence. As such, they are governed by a distinct body of international law—jus in bello—that relates to the conduct of hostilities rather than the legality of their initiation. Israel’s right, then, to resume hostilities is not governed by a peacetime jus ad bellum requiring Hezbollah to commit another prior armed attack.
A middle-of-the-road scholarly opinion on ceasefires considers such agreements “contracts to manage the relationship and conduct of parties during a ceasefire, layered on top of the existing law of armed conflict.” This would thus prohibit Israel from resuming active hostilities against Hezbollah subject to the latter party’s compliance with the terms of the agreement. As with a contract, serious violations of a ceasefire agreement’s terms by one party entitles the other party to employ self-help measures “and even, in cases of urgency, [recommence] hostilities immediately”—but under the terms and conditions of the ceasefire itself rather than about peacetime jus ad bellum.
Either forceful acts by Hezbollah or Lebanon’s failure to enforce the ceasefire’s terms would constitute serious violations justifying Israel’s resumption of hostilities, even if Hezbollah falls short of an armed attack. If Lebanon entered the ceasefire deal in bad faith—as a ruse meant merely to stop the harm Israel was inflicting upon Hezbollah but with no intention of compliance with the deal’s full terms—then Beirut could be deemed a co-belligerent responsible for Hezbollah’s actions, inviting unpleasant consequences for Lebanon.
The longer the state of affairs between Lebanon and Israel remains a ceasefire, rather than a return to the status quo ante bellum, the more time Israel will have to resume hostilities at this lower threshold. Therefore, Lebanon, as far as can be determined, put up what amounts to a diplomatic theater performance at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport—to convince the international community and the ceasefire oversight committee that Beirut is indeed fulfilling its end of the bargain to restrain Hezbollah, and thus deprive Israel of justification to either extend its stay in Lebanon or resume fighting. However, such cosmetically stringent measures should not be expected to extend beyond the ceasefire’s duration.
