“Sudan is forgotten!” reads the headline of the editorial in this week’s Al Naba newsletter, the Islamic State’s weekly publication highlighting its global activities. In the commentary, the terrorist group’s editors explicitly make a call for jihad and argue that Muslims in Sudan should take up arms under the Islamic State’s banner.
The Islamic State now joins its rival, Al Qaeda, in fomenting violent jihad and encouraging Sudanese individuals and groups to join its cause. Al Qaeda first called for a Sudanese jihad in late 2022, just months before the country’s current civil war began.
“Among the wounds that are bleeding silently and without stopping are the wounds of our oppressed brothers in forgotten Sudan, where Muslims there are exposed to the most heinous crimes of murder, imprisonment, torture, violation of their honor, and the theft of their money and property,” the editorial states.
The Islamic State argues that both sides of Sudan’s brutal civil conflict are responsible for engaging in these activities, explicitly stating that “[Abdel Fattah] al Burhan and [Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo] Hemeti are enemies of Islam, as such they must be opposed, disbelieved in, and neither of them should be relied upon, no matter the outcome of the war between them.”
Burhan, recently sanctioned by the US Treasury Department, is the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the de facto leader of Sudan. Hemeti, also sanctioned by the US government, is the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a continuation of the former Janjaweed militias responsible for the genocide in Darfur in the early 2000s.
Both the RSF and SAF were instruments of power under the regime of former dictator Omar al Bashir. Following Bashir’s deposal in early 2019, a transitional government led by both civilians and the military headed Sudan until October 2021, when the SAF removed all civilian leadership and declared military rule. The SAF and RSF then vied for power and influence under the military regime until the tensions finally turned to open bloodshed in April 2023.
Both the SAF and RSF have been accused of committing mass atrocities and grave human rights abuses since the civil war began.
The two main factions of the civil war, according to the Islamic State, “are part of the infidel world order, seeking to enforce the ignorant borders that restrict Muslims and imprison them.” The editorial continues by saying that “whoever follows the steps they took under the supervision of America and Saudi Arabia knows that they are both fighting against Sharia and are only loyal to the Jews and Christians.”
According to the terrorist group’s commentary, the solution to bring back the honor and dignity of Muslims in Sudan is quite simple: jihad. “Supporting Muslims in Sudan is the duty of every able Muslim, just as in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and elsewhere,” the editorial states. “This can only be achieved through jihad and fighting, or through spending money [to support jihad], or through encouragement [of jihad].”
In addition to extolling the virtues of supporting fellow Muslims, the Islamic State doubles down on its call to arms. “This is a message to the Muslim youth and mujahideen inside Sudan about working diligently to exploit the situation for the benefit of jihad, either through recruitment or preparation, in order to establish a nucleus that confronts the short-term dangers and help establish a long-term jihad.”
Speaking to regular civilians, the Islamic State ends its rant by encouraging them to turn to Islam, announce a jihad, and support the mujahideen since, according to the global jihadist group, this is the only way to save themselves.
Working towards jihad in Sudan
Though the Islamic State is just now publicly calling for jihad inside Sudan, it has quietly operated in the country with a dedicated cell since at least 2019—though recruiters and facilitators had been active before then. Sudanese fighters were among the largest foreign component of the Islamic State in Libya during its height in 2016, for instance.
Sudanese authorities previously attempted to quash the relatively small network by periodically announcing raids or arrests of Islamic State members, such as in September and October 2021, when authorities arrested over a dozen members and killed several others across Khartoum.
Nevertheless, the Islamic State’s Sudanese network has persisted. However, it does not yet appear to be a network for attacks; rather, for finances, procurement, and logistics for other Islamic State wings.
The United Nations Sanctions and Monitoring Team has periodically reported on this network. In July 2023, its report noted that the Islamic State’s network in Sudan contains between 100 and 200 people and is headed by a veteran Iraqi jihadist, Abu Bakr al Iraqi, who is a blood relative of former Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.
Under Iraqi’s leadership, the network has been described as a “logistical and financial base […] from which transit and investment would take place.” The report also notes that Iraqi operates and maintains an array of businesses across both Sudan and Turkey, from which the profits are used to support the Islamic State across Africa, most notably its West Africa and Sahel Provinces.
Though the UN report doesn’t mention this, it is likely the Sudan cell also helps support the Islamic State’s Somalia Province, as Sudanese fighters represent a significant component of that group’s foreign fighters. The terrorist group’s Sudan network may assist additional Islamic State wings in Africa as well, though this support is unclear.
Not much else is known about the Islamic State’s activities inside Sudan. However, with the group’s now open call for jihad inside the country, a close eye should be kept on this network, as it may transition from a support role into an operational/attack one.
The Islamic State clearly already has a skeleton in place from which it could build a new so-called ‘province’ within the overall group’s structure. However, whether or not the Islamic State feels confident enough to transition to open warfare in Sudan remains the big question. Regardless, this scenario should be seen as a real possibility.
As mentioned, the Islamic State’s rival Al Qaeda has also tried to foment jihad inside Sudan. For instance, in October 2022, Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani, a veteran member of Al Qaeda, released a booklet in which he called for and incited jihad, providing a guide that prospective jihadists could use to form a unified group in his native Sudan.
So far, though, nothing has seemingly come from Al Qaeda’s call to arms, at least publicly. That said, the group has often operated more secretly than the Islamic State and thus could have some sort of clandestine cell.
It is also worth noting that Islamists are already fighting alongside the SAF, particularly the Al Baraa bin Malik Battalion, and other groups within the broader “Popular Resistance” umbrella under the tutelage of the military. Jihadists and other Islamists have also been freed in prison breaks since the civil war started. It is certainly possible that elements or individuals previously linked to Al Qaeda are already active and thus active alongside SAF—but this remains wholly unconfirmed.
Al Qaeda does have a longer history inside the country, as it was once based there in the early 1990s. The terrorist group has had various cells in Sudan throughout the years, such as a cell in Salamah, a suburb of Khartoum, in 2007; a cell in the Dinder National Park in 2012; and two organizations, Ansar al Tawhid and Al Qaeda in the Land of Two Niles, in the late 2000s to early 2010s.
In more recent years, Al Qaeda is not known to have been particularly active inside Sudan. However, as Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani’s booklet made clear, the group obviously wishes to be. Whether or not it makes a more concerted public effort in the face of the Islamic State’s separate call to arms remains to be seen.
At any rate, both global jihadist organizations have now openly called for jihad in Sudan, and the Islamic State is known already to have an existing network structure active inside the country. As the civil war continues to drag on—and deteriorate into additional chaos and atrocities—these jihadists may find more opportunities to latch onto publicly and catapult themselves into the conflict.
