On January 25, a new Iraqi militia, Kataib Awliya’ al Haq (Guardians of Truth Brigades), announced its formation. So far, the group has issued a single statement displaying its full name, logo, and justification for its establishment.
The statement reads:
Islamic Resistance —Kataib Awliya’ al-Haq
In the name of God, the Merciful
“We seek vengeance against the criminals.”
As part of our ongoing mission to defend the oppressed and resist oppressors, we condemn the crimes committed by Jolani’s terrorists [a reference to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)] in Syria against Alawite Shiites—blatant violations of human rights.
Therefore, Kataib Awliya’ al Haq remains committed to resisting these Takfiri groups. We will launch military operations as soon as possible and enter Syria from all directions to protect the Alawite sect.
God is the Supporter of the Believers
Little is known about the leadership of this group, as it has only released one statement and did not name any of its leaders or release pictures or videos. However, a close look at Kataib Awliya’ al Haq’s logo shows a distinct similarity with other Iraqi militias, namely, Saraya Awlia’ al-Dam (Companies of the Guardians of Blood).
The logos of Kataib Awliya’ al Haq and Saraya Awlia’ al Dam both display a fist holding an AK-47 springing from the map of Iraq and a circle surrounding the map marked with the words of each militia.
Saraya Awlia’ al Dam first gained attention on August 24, 2020, when it claimed responsibility for an attack on an Iraqi convoy allegedly transporting US goods and released dramatic footage of the incident.
The extent to which Kataib Awliya’ al Haq is genuinely preparing to enter Syria remains uncertain and cannot be determined by a single statement. However, one thing is clear: the Syrian coast—where clashes have repeatedly occurred between HTS-led forces and Syrian Alawites, as well as remnants of the Assad regime—could see further escalation.
Clashes have also erupted on the outskirts of Homs, a region with a significant Alawite, Shiite, and Sunni population. On January 24, more than 13 officers from the Assad regime’s Syrian Arab Army were killed in the village of Fahel in the Homs countryside. The ongoing violence in these areas will only fuel the growth of armed groups.
Calls for violence among former Assad loyalists have driven many Alawites to take up arms against HTS-led forces in the Syrian coastal governorates of Tartus and Latakia, as well as in Homs. Meqdad Louay Fatiha (Abu Jaafar), an Alawite and former officer in the Syrian Republican Guard, has been urging the Alawite community to resist HTS since the Assad regime’s downfall on December 8.
In his latest video on January 27, where he appears masked, Fatiha said, “From this day, I call on the community to not hand in their weapons, and whoever attacks the villages for military sweeps, kill them, kill them, kill them, and we will be supportive of you, god willing. And I will cooperate with a group of our brothers to do vengeful military operations in Latakia and its countryside in retaliation for the killing of our sons in Homs Governorate and what the members of HTS are doing in terms of stealing and looting in Jableh and Latakia.”
Other armed groups operating on the Syrian coast include the “Syrian Popular Resistance,” a pro-Assadist militia created in December 2024. The group vowed to kill HTS leaders in response to the extrajudicial killings of Christians, Alawites, and Shiites after the fall of the Assad regime.
Since December 8, the Syrian Popular Resistance has killed the following HTS and HTS-affiliated commanders:
- Ahmad al Wazeer (Abu Akar)
- Muhialddin al Turki
- Akram al Siyah
- Abdulrahman Qazali
- Mohammad Khaled al Safadi
- Salem Janbaz
- Mohammad Abdul Qader Khalil (Abu Abdo Talbiseh)
Western Syria will be a key area to watch, as Assad loyalists remain trapped there but with access to weapons. It is highly likely that external actors will seek to exploit this chaos, particularly Iran, which has been accused of fueling the insurgency against HTS. Additionally, the region holds strategic value for the Islamic Republic’s broader ambitions, as it provides direct access to Lebanon, where its key proxy, Hezbollah, is eager to rearm and rebuild. A destabilized border corridor creates the ideal conditions for Iranian influence.
