As the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad was collapsing on December 8, Israel set in motion a contingency plan that anticipated the situation. In recent weeks, the military intelligence arm (AMAN) of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a sweeping situational assessment of the domestic situation in Syria—and the IDF reacted accordingly, though it had not expected Assad’s regime to fall so quickly.
The operation, Bashan Arrow, saw Israel swiftly move ground troops to occupy the peaks of Mount Hermon and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the Israeli and Syrian sides of the Golan Heights. Simultaneously, Israel launched a massive aerial and naval campaign to strike the former regime’s abandoned assets deeper in Syria.
In its first comment on Bashan Arrow, the IDF said on Tuesday that it had completed the “core” of the operation’s mission and destroyed 70–80% of the military assets belonging to the regime of deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad. On Wednesday, the IDF said it had destroyed over 90% of Syria’s surface-to-air missiles (SAM) whose locations had been identified. By Thursday, the IDF had also destroyed 80% of Syria’s SA-17 SAM systems, 40% of Syria’s fighter jets, and all of its loitering munitions. Reports also indicate the IDF destroyed 30 MiG-29 fourth-generation fighter jets (the Soviet counterpart to the F-15) and 60 MiG-23 third-generation fighters.
The IDF also clarified that it struck several Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF) bases, including the T-4 Airbase located in the city of Tiyas in Homs Province. The Israelis targeted and destroyed two SAAF squadrons: one consisting of SU-22 fighter-bombers, and another comprised of 10 SU-24 tactical bombers.
Israel also hit Ble military airport (also known as Al Dumayr Airbase), located 40 kilometers northeast of Damascus, which the IDF says was used extensively by both the SAAF and the Iranian Air Force during Syria’s civil war. The IDF said the base housed three unspecified squadrons that were destroyed, as was a SAM and rocket-storage site located 1.5 kilometers away.
The IDF also reportedly struck a central weapons production and storage facility in Homs, which its statement claimed was the “central Syrian Scud facility, and one of the most important parts of Syria’s military production infrastructure.”
The latest ground prong of Bashan Arrow
The ground aspect of the Israeli incursion continued, with troops seizing the entire 235 square-kilometer DMZ. Israeli troops occupied border positions hastily abandoned by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). For example, IDF 35th Brigade Paratroopers from the 101st Battalion were reportedly holding Tel Kudna, a strategic stronghold of the SAA, which was manned by a large number of Syrian soldiers only days before.
The IDF also deployed forces from Division 210, the 188th Armored Brigade’s 74th Division, the 474th Golan Regional Brigade, and Egoz special forces units. The IDF moved combat engineers and heavy equipment into the area and built at least 15 kilometers of obstacles where the separating fence used to be, digging a ditch and placing boulders “whose purpose is to delay the enemy for at least 40 minutes in case they want to invade Israel,” said Brigadier Gen Yair Peli. Peli, the commander of Division 210 responsible for the Golan, said the obstacles will also prevent vehicles from entering.
Peli noted the presence of unidentified militants in the area. While he stated that “no one […] is threatening our forces” and “there is no threat to our forces from forces inside Syria,” he also stressed that “this could turn on a dime, and we’re prepared for such an eventuality.” Peli also couldn’t say how long the IDF would remain in the DMZ. “Anything between four days and four years would be correct,” he said, because “we still don’t know where all this is going.”
Colonel Benny Katah, commander of the 474th Brigade, told reporters in Tel Kudnah that the IDF was “not here to occupy territory nor to impose military rule over the civilians—but to ensure the defense of the [Israeli] residents of the Golan Heights. We learned the lessons of October 7.” He stressed that his forces were positioned only a “short distance from our communities in the Golan Heights,” and, therefore, “we deployed to conduct defense with minimal friction, defend the buffer zone, and prevent [hostile forces] from establishing a presence there.”
Hezbollah’s pan-Arab Al-Mayadeen outlet continued to report additional, but unspecified, Israeli ground incursions “toward Damascus” on December 13. However, these reports seem increasingly dubious. To the extent they may have been true, it seems that the Israeli incursions beyond the DMZ were limited and temporary.
More credible reports indicate that Israeli forces moved into the village of Al Muaalaqah, located on the administrative borders between Quneitra and Daraa, and cut the road linking the village to the town of Sayda near the Golan Heights. On December 11, the Syrian Observatory For Human Rights (SOHR) claimed Israeli forces were operating in the town of Beit Jann in the Damascus countryside and near the DMZ, where they killed an unidentified armed Syrian individual.
SOHR and Israeli media sources also claimed that Israeli forces from the 7th Armored Brigade’s 77th “Oz” Battalion had moved into the towns of Hader and Humaydiyeh and the western portions of the village of Umm Batneh on December 12—where they reportedly destroyed a nearby former SAA position and conducted clearing operations in the village. Israeli forces also entered the village of Kouwya in western Daraa Province and met with local leaders. The Israelis requested an end to an armed presence in the area and the surrender of arms, just as they did in other locales in areas near the DMZ, the Yarmouk Basin, and Quneitra Province. Al-Mayadeen claimed the IDF informed the residents of the town of Maarieh in the Yarmouk Basin, west of Daraa, of its intention to enter the locale and seize weapons.
On Friday, December 13, reports suggested Israeli tanks temporarily entered and then withdrew from an abandoned SAA military position in Khan Arnaba, administratively part of Quneitra Province and located in the Syrian portion of the Golan Heights. Other reports indicate Israeli troops advanced towards Samadaniyeh in this area. Days earlier, the IDF notified Samadaniyeh’s residents to remain in their homes in light of its intent to operate in the area.
On December 16, Israeli forces reportedly destroyed former SAA weapons and ammunition depots on the outskirts of Baath City, Quneitra Province’s administrative center, on the Damascus-Quneitra road.
Bashan Arrow’s latest aerial prong
After a brief hiatus on December 11—perhaps to conduct a battle damage assessment—Israeli airstrikes reportedly continued, with Israel seemingly determined to destroy the remainder of Assad’s abandoned arsenal. The IDF has yet to comment on these continued attacks or their targets. However, other sources, such as SOHRand various media outlets, have cataloged the Israeli strikes and their alleged targets. A compiled list of these reports follows:
December 8-12, 2024
Reported Israeli airstrikes between December 10-12 and December 8-12 (the latter strikes not documented in Long War Journal’s previous entry on Bashan Arrow) include:
Damascus Province:
- An airstrike on an unspecified site in Tel Al Shiar.
- An airstrike on Mt Qasioun, possibly targeting positions belonging to the SAA’s Republican Guard.
Latakia Province:
- An airstrike on an unspecified target in Latakia Port.
- An airstrike on an unspecified target in Dahr al Zawba in Baniyas.
- An airstrike on an unspecified target in Dahr Safra in the Tartous countryside detonated several missiles.
- A strike on a radar Site in the village of Bileh, an electronic warfare and early warning site 7 kilometers north of Tartous.
- A strike on an aerial defense site housing a radar and missiles in al Balatah, 4 kilometers north of Tartous.
- An airstrike on a radar site in the area of al Radar, 5 kilometers south of Tartous.
- An airstrike on an unspecified site in Burj al Islam.
- A strike on a radar in the Latakia countryside.
Quneitra Province:
- An airstrike on the 90th Brigade in the Quneitra countryside, in which past reports indicate Hezbollah and Iranian forces had embedded. The Brigade was previously reported to possess heavy and light caliber weapons, an R-330Zh Zhitel electronic warfare jamming communication station, four ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” lightly armored self-propelled, radar-guided anti-aircraft weapons system (SPAAG), Shahab missiles, an unspecified number of T-72 main battle tanks, SA-18 Grouse man-portable infrared homing SAMs, and North Korean missile trucks.
Deir Ezzor Province:
- A strike on the Al Talaeh Barracks in the al Joura neighborhood of Deir Ezzor city.
December 13, 2024
Damascus Province:
- An Israeli airstrike on Mezzeh Military Airport in Damascus.
- Airstrikes destroyed missile launch pads on the summit of Mount Qasioun, possibly targeting former positions of the SAA Republican Guard.
- Airstrikes on unspecified military sites.
- Airstrikes on the 295th Department HQ, south of Damascus along Highway 110 leading to Suwayda. The 295th Department, reportedly comprised of 2,322 personnel, was Syrian State Security’s “counterterrorism” branch. It was headed by Brigadier General Izzam Istanbouli. Previous strikes on the 295th Department had targeted arms caches belonging to embedded Iranian forces and destined for Hezbollah.
- Strikes on the Electronic Warfare Administration’s 1st Regiment.
- Strikes on the Fuel Administration near Najha in the Damascus countryside.
- An airstrike on SAA warehouses in the Qalamoun Mountains.
- Airstrikes on SAA military sites and warehouses in the areas of Nasiriyah and Jeyrud.
Homs Province:
- An airstrike on Syrian air defenses in Wadi Hanna on the Syria-Lebanon border.
Latakia Province:
- Airstrikes on SAA sites in Tartous and Latakia countryside.
- Airstrikes targeted SAA warehouses in the Latakia environs.
Hama Province:
- An airstrike on defense laboratories, research centers, and production facilities in Masyaf in the Hama countryside.
Deir Ezzor Province:
- An airstrike in Deir Ezzor city.
Suwayda Province:
- A strike on Khalkhaleh Airport in the Suwayda countryside.
- Airstrikes on unspecified military sites.
- An airstrike on unspecified military sites in Tel Qulayb.
- An airstrike on several unspecified military barracks in the vicinity of al Kafr, along route 109 northwest to Swayda city.
- An airstrike on Hursh al Sahwah barracks in the Suwayda countryside.
December 14, 2024
Damascus Province:
- SOHR claimed Israel conducted 24 airstrikes on former SAA sites in Damascus Province.
- Airstrikes on SAA bases containing several tunnels dug into the mountainside housing storage units for, according to SOHR, “large missiles, ammunition, mortars, projectiles, and other military equipment.” The strikes also hit a military barracks in the area of Ain Minin, administratively part of Tel in Damascus’s northwest countryside, 3 kilometers away from Saydnaya. SOHR tallied a total of 10 sorties that hit the area 35 times.
- Airstrikes destroyed a scientific research center and metal casting plant at the CERS facility in Barzeh in the Damascus countryside.
- Strikes on Al Nasriyah Military Airport, 17 kilometers east of al Nabak city in Damascus’s northern countryside.
- Airstrikes reportedly destroyed warehouses containing Scud and ballistic missiles and modern launchers near Qastal in Al Qalamoun in the Damascus countryside.
- Two airstrikes on the Radar Battalion in al Rheiba in the Damascus countryside.
Quneitra Province:
- An airstrike on an unspecified location near the Golan Heights.
Aleppo Province:
- A second airstrike on a CERS facility and a defense production facility in Al Sferah in Aleppo’s southern countryside.
Hama Province:
- Airstrike on a CERS facility in Masyaf.
December 15, 2024
SOHR claims Israel carried out 33 airstrikes on Saturday night, hitting 75 different targets:
Homs Province:
- Israel reportedly hit warehouses belonging to the SAA 3rd Corps’ 18th Armored Division in Homs’s eastern countryside.
Damascus Province:
- Seven new airstrikes on the 55th Brigade near the village of Hala in the area of Qalamoun aimed to destroy missile warehouses built into the mountain.
Hama Province:
- Strikes on aerial defenses located on the southwestern side of Hama Airport.
- Strikes on the 47th Brigade south of Hama.
Daraa Province:
- Strikes on arms caches in Mahajeh in Daraa’s northern countryside.
Suwayda:
- Two airstrikes on the Fifth Warehouse near the town of al Kafr in Suwayda’s countryside.
Deir Ezzor Province:
- An airstrike on Deir Ezzor Military airport.
December 16, 2024
Latakia Province: Strikes reportedly targeted:
- The 23rd Aerial Defense Brigade and its HQ near Harisoun.
- The Isqabla Battalion in Isqabla.
- An unspecified position in Dahr al Balloutiyah.
- An unspecified position in Al Kharab.
- An unspecified position in Marsahin.
- Two positions near Dreikish.
- Surface-to-surface missile warehouses and aerial defense positions near Malka.
- Positions north of the Akkar Valley.
- Missile bases in the 107th Barracks in Zama in the Tartous countryside.
- Weapons warehouses in the Tartous countryside, which reportedly led to a massive explosion that measured as a 3.0 magnitude earthquake on nearby seismic sensors.
- Airstrikes on surface-to-surface missile warehouses in Tartous.
Hama Province:
- An airstrike on unidentified targets in Misyaf.
Deir Ezzor Province:
- Airstrikes on radars in Deir Ezzor Military Airport.
Damascus Province:
- An airstrike on SAA weapons depots in the mountains of Dumayr.
- A second round of overnight airstrikes, lasting about eight hours, hit SAA bases containing several tunnels housing storage units for, according to SOHR, “large missiles, ammunition, mortars, projectiles, and other military equipment” in the area of Ain Minin.
Israel’s posture
During a December 14 visit to the Golan Heights, IDF Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi insisted that Israel’s recent moves were motivated purely by security concerns:
We’ve been here for almost a week, and the central purpose is the security of the State. We’re here to engage in defense along the entire border on the Golan Heights—the northern Golan Heights, [Mount] Hermon. We had a country [on the other side] that was an enemy state, its army collapsed. There’s a threat that terrorist actors will come here. And we went out preemptively so that terrorist actors will not entrench themselves—extremist terrorist actors—will not entrench themselves on the border with us. We’re not getting involved in what is happening in Syria. We have no intention to administer Syria. We’re getting involved exclusively with what impacts the security of the citizens of Israel here in the communities behind us in the Golan Heights.
Meanwhile, Syria’s new de facto leader, Ahmad al Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al Jolani, has been sending pacifying signals to the Israelis. In a recent interview with The Times, Jolani insisted that he and his Hayat Tahrir al Shammilitia are “committed to the 1974 [Israel-Syria] separation of forces agreement, and we are prepared to return to the UN,” also stating, “We do not want any conflict whether with Israel or anyone else.”
Stressing that Israel’s prior justification for striking in Syria—the presence of Hezbollah and Iranian militias—was now “gone,” Jolani also insisted that “we will not let Syria be used as a launchpad for attacks. The Syrian people need a break, and the strikes must end, and Israel has to pull back to its previous positions.” These sentiments echoed paraphrased comments he made to the pro-opposition outlet SyriaTV.
Despite these assertions, HTS remains a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, and Jolani is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Further, HTS maintains an extended network of allied or collaborative terrorist groups.
