Ahmad al Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), commonly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al Jolani, has unveiled a vision for post-Assad Syria. With HTS assuming control in the aftermath of the regime’s collapse, Jolani has pledged to dissolve existing armed factions and integrate their fighters into a newly formed national army under the auspices of a unified Ministry of Defense. This restructuring, he emphasized, will centralize military authority, enforce the rule of law, and ensure that weapons remain solely in the hands of the state.
Jolani articulated this transition as a shift from the mindset of opposition to that of governance, stating, “We must adopt the mentality of the state, not that of opposition.” He has also vowed to dismantle the remnants of the previous regime’s security apparatus, signaling a decisive break with Syria’s authoritarian past and a commitment to rebuilding its institutions.
The critical question now is: who will constitute the core of this new national army?
Over the 13 years of Syria’s civil war, hundreds of militant factions emerged, each opposing former president Bashar al Assad but diverging sharply in ideology, the vision for Syria’s future, foreign allegiances, and ethnic and religious composition. Despite these differences, these factions’ shared objective was the removal of Assad’s regime, albeit through varying methods and strategies.
The conflict’s early stages saw the formation of the Free Officers Movement in 2011, founded by military defectors from Assad’s forces. This movement later merged into the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a coalition of secular and Islamist rebel groups. Alongside the FSA, more ideologically extreme factions gained prominence, including the Al Nusrah Front (an Al Qaeda affiliate) and Ahrar al Sham, an Islamist faction with significant influence.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) also rose to prominence, comprising a multi-ethnic and multi-religious alliance dominated by Kurdish groups such as the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), affiliated with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
As the war evolved, other factions surfaced, often splintering from or aligned with earlier groups. These included the Syrian Turkmen Brigades, representing Syria’s Turkmen minority, and the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army, a coalition of Arab and Turkmen fighters supported by Turkey since 2017 and later reorganized as the Syrian National Army. In southern Syria, the US-backed Syrian Free Army emerged, operating primarily in the Al Tanf region and serving as the de facto opposition force in that area.
The latest rebel offensive, which culminated in the nationwide takeover and the collapse of the Assad regime, marked the rise of the Southern Operations Room (SOR). This coalition brings together armed groups that have been active since the outset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, many of which had previously engaged in the Russian-brokered reconciliation process in 2018. Among its key constituents are the 8th Brigade, formerly known as the “Youth of Sunna Forces,” and the Central Committee, both of which have navigated shifting allegiances over the course of the conflict.
The task of unifying these disparate groups into a cohesive and professional national army faces monumental obstacles. Beyond reconciling ideological, ethnic, and political differences, it requires dismantling deep-seated loyalties to foreign patrons and resolving localized grievances. Any unified army must also contend with the legacy of competing governance models established by various factions in their respective territories, each with its own administrative structure and military hierarchies. Without addressing these foundational fractures and fostering a shared vision for Syria’s future, efforts to build a unified force risk perpetuating the fragmentation that has defined the conflict.
Another significant challenge lies in the substantial presence of non-Syrian foreign fighters within the ranks of HTS. A decisive policy will need to address the fate of these individuals, as the Syrian population has grown increasingly intolerant of foreign fighters operating on their soil. Over the past 13 years, Syria has witnessed the influx of thousands of Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters, primarily members of the Iranian-backed Liwa Zainebiyoun and Fatemiyoun militias. These groups, alongside their Iranian patrons, entrenched themselves in neighborhoods across Damascus, often assuming de facto governance roles in the areas they controlled.
While HTS is unlikely to replicate Assad’s strategy of leveraging foreign militias to secure its authority, the presence of such groups within its ranks raises serious concerns about their future role in the post-Assad era. Reports suggesting that HTS leader Jolani is open to granting Syrian citizenship to foreign fighters who have resided in the country for more than five years further complicate the matter.
A critical question remains unanswered: will Jolani incorporate the hundreds of thousands of Assad regime soldiers into his envisioned national army, or will these individuals be barred from participating? For decades, military service was mandatory in Syria, and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) was heavily manned by conscripts. The SAA was bolstered by the National Defense Forces (NDF), a paramilitary militia composed of Alawites, Shiites, Christians, and Druze, created under the guidance of the late Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in 2012. The NDF served as the army’s infantry backbone but was primarily loyal to Assad’s regime rather than any national cause.
As of December 15, HTS has begun the process of disarming former Syrian Arab Army soldiers and militia members in exchange for amnesty for their service under Assad. However, initial reports suggest that this disarmament targets SAA conscripts—individuals forced into service under threat of imprisonment. These conscripts, viewed as unwilling participants in Assad’s war, could potentially be integrated into a unified military framework, aligning with Jolani’s earlier declarations of reconciliation.
The greater challenge lies with the high-ranking SAA officers and NDF militiamen, most of whom are unlikely to join HTS forces due to both ideological and sectarian differences. These individuals not only volunteered to fight for Assad but are also implicated in atrocities committed during the Syrian Civil War. HTS’s Islamist orientation, dominated by Sunni factions, further deepens the divide, as these officers and militiamen primarily hail from minority communities historically loyal to Assad.
While Jolani has emphasized his willingness to reconcile with those who surrender their weapons, he has also maintained a firm stance that members of the Syrian military partook in crimes against the Syrian people.
For US policymakers, careful attention must be given to the next phase of Syria’s transitional process, particularly regarding the integration of a unified military. While HTS remains designated as a foreign terrorist organization, and despite reports suggesting that the US may consider delisting it under specific conditions, it is crucial to remain vigilant about other terrorist groups operating in Syria that might be included in the new military. Additionally, analysts should pay attention to groups not currently on the US sanctions list but which pose a threat due to their foreign allegiances, such as those tied to Russia.
A recent development of concern is the meeting held by al Sharaa with representatives from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army on December 16, which included Mohammad Hussein al Jasim, also known as Abu Amsha. Abu Amsha was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2022 for his direct involvement in human rights violations, including the forced displacement of Kurdish residents from Afrin, the seizure of their properties, and his involvement in kidnappings and extortion of local civilians.
