After years of Turkey progressively asserting its position in the central Sahel, recent months have seen Jamaat Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, JNIM), Al Qaeda’s West African branch, single out the country in its public statements and propaganda.
JNIM’s depiction of Turkish involvement in the central Sahel has been anything but positive, with the jihadist group portraying Turkey as one of its major enemies and alleging that it is complicit in the deaths of civilians.
JNIM’s external messaging offers insight into its perceptions and strategic goals. These statements also indicate that the group could broaden its violence and begin attacking Turkish nationals, economic projects, or organizations. Such a development could have long-lasting effects on regional conflict dynamics and potentially coincide with an overall escalation in violence in the Sahelian theater.
‘Bayraktar diplomacy’—the central role of Turkish drones
Initially centered around providing cutting-edge weapons and other security assistance, Turkey’s so-called ‘Bayraktar diplomacy’ jumpstarted its sizeable influence in the region. Bayraktar-TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and, more recently, the Bayraktar Akinci drones, remain a cornerstone of the country’s bilateral relations with the central Sahelian states.
Known for their relative ease of use and comparatively low cost, Bayraktar-TB2 drones have become ubiquitous across Africa. Introducing these UAVs in the Sahelian theatre, where junta forces have particularly favored them, broadly coincided with the withdrawal of Western militaries and their air power.
Turkish-made drones were an obvious alternative for the Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien militaries seeking to maintain operational advantages in their increasingly difficult counterinsurgency campaigns against actors such as JNIM and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province.
At times, these drones have been deployed with devastating effect. For example, the UAVs reportedly played a key role in major victories such as the Malian Armed Forces’ capture of the town of Kidal from Tuareg rebels on November 14, 2023, the Burkinabe military repelling a major JNIM attack on Djibo on November 26, 2023, and Mali’s military killing eight high-ranking Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) leaders near Tinzaouaten on December 1, 2024.
The military success achieved with these drones is frequently highlighted in local media outlets, with aerial operations among the few consistently positive battlefield developments for the juntas. However, local media seldom publicize frequent reports of non-combatant deaths caused by the indiscriminate use of these UAVs.
JNIM’s external messaging has increasingly been drawing attention to civilian casualties in an attempt to push back against the narrative that only terrorists are targeted in these drone strikes. Not only is the group trying to raise awareness of potential warfare violations internationally, but it is also attempting to bolster its local backing at the expense of the juntas and their armed forces.
Turkey’s progressively more central role in the Sahelian security landscape is underscored by the numerous occasions it has found itself targeted in JNIM’s propaganda this year. The Al Qaeda branch has publicly accused Turkey and its defense companies of complicity in civilian deaths due to their provision of drones and munitions.
JNIM’s staunch opposition to Turkey’s security assistance in the region is evidenced by the first appearance of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and TB2 drones in a propaganda video released this summer. The declaration that Turkey is now considered as much of an enemy as Russia is perhaps even more telling of JNIM’s displeasure with the role Ankara plays in supporting the juntas and hindering the jihadist group’s territorial expansion.
Will Turkey seize an opportunity to expand its security role?
Cooperation between Turkey and the region’s juntas extends beyond weapons deals. Turkish personnel and private military companies have instructed security forces in the region for some time, with recent reports suggesting that training programs are likely to expand over the coming years.
The deep inroads Russia has made in the central Sahel since the West’s departure have been well-publicized, yet Moscow’s position as the region’s primary security partner currently looks more tenuous than ever. The devastating failure of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries at Tinzaouaten, troop redeployments to more strategically important arenas, and the uncertainty surrounding the future Russian military bases in Syria—which serve as a key node for supplying operations in Africa—have raised significant questions over the future of Russian military support across the continent.
Ankara is best positioned to exploit this potential power vacuum in the central Sahel. A deeper involvement could see Turkish private military companies begin to provide more kinetic assistance—particularly as the security situation continues to deteriorate across much of the region.
There have been numerous reports throughout the year suggesting that SADAT—one of Turkey’s largest private military companies—has been involved in the quiet deployment of Syrian mercenaries to the central Sahel. The BBC even reported that some of these men found themselves fighting against jihadist extremists under Russian command in the tri-border zone intersecting Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
There has been no definitive proof confirming these reports, most of which suggested that mercenaries are protecting Turkish-funded economic projects in Niger and possibly Burkina Faso. However, Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels have recently mentioned losses suffered by Turkish-linked mercenaries in Niger. And perhaps more tellingly, JNIM has explicitly referred to the presence of SADAT in the region.
Throughout its history, JNIM has been diametrically opposed to almost all forms of external influence in the Sahel, particularly the presence of foreign troops, as it seeks to conquer territory and implement its version of Sharia law. A large-scale deployment of Turkish-backed mercenaries to the Sahelian theatre would undoubtedly lead JNIM to reorient more of its focus toward Turkey.
Indeed, recent years have seen the group put considerable time and effort toward targeting Wagner—in both propaganda and offensive actions on the ground—due to the Russian paramilitary’s support of the juntas.
Could JNIM target Turkey’s growing list of economic interests?
Turkish involvement in the regional security landscape has served as a diplomatic launchpad, also allowing Ankara to forge deeper economic ties. The past several months alone have seen the completion of bilateral deals that will allow Turkish mining and hydrocarbon companies to expand their work in Niger. In Mali and Burkina Faso, Ankara also holds economic interests in mining, petroleum, and agriculture projects.
Should JNIM seek to violently dissuade Turkey from becoming further involved in the region, the growing number of Turkish nationals, commercial organizations, and affiliated projects would all serve as potential targets.
The group has deployed similar tactics in the past. When the wider international community maintained a more significant footprint in the region, JNIM launched a series of attacks on Western interests in Bamako and Ouagadougou. It has also previously sought to deter investment and impose financial costs on commercial operators by attacking their personnel and assets.
Similarly, kidnapping-for-ransom was once a significant source of revenue for JNIM. The number of foreigners who have been kidnapped by the group has decreased in recent years, owing largely to the comparatively smaller presence of international organizations and foreign nationals. However, while JNIM has now released many of its remaining foreign hostages (most recently, an Italian couple and their son taken in Mali in 2022) in return for fees up to several million dollars, the capture of two Russian geologists in Niger this summer signals that this threat remains to those operating in the region, particularly if they are from an ‘enemy’ state.
JNIM’s evolving warnings against growing Turkish influence
Despite Turkey’s increasingly prominent role in supporting the juntas and their attempts to stop JNIM’s territorial expansion, JNIM has yet to attack Turkey’s interests in the region. However, the jihadist group often projects its worldview and long-term ambitions to local and international audiences via its propaganda. And this messaging has recently indicated that if Turkey continues to further its position in the central Sahel, it will find itself at odds with the militant group.
A concerted campaign of violence by the group against Turkey’s interests would likely be preceded by further condemnations and other warning signs—reiterating the value of listening to what JNIM is saying, rather than simply reacting to its violent actions.
