Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem delivered two speeches—one on November 29 and another on December 5— after the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon that took effect on November 27. Most of the content was predictable, with Qassem claiming that his group had emerged victorious from the conflict with its Israeli nemesis and even scored a triumph greater than that of the 2006 war. But amidst all the pomp and bluster that is the organization’s hallmark, Qassem’s speeches contained hints—sometimes contradictory—on how Hezbollah intends to move forward.
To withdraw or not to withdraw?
Perhaps the biggest question is whether Hezbollah intends to comply with the terms of the ceasefire, or whether Lebanon will force it to do so. Qassem’s answer has been inconsistent.
Qassem briefly addressed the ceasefire agreement in his November 29 address. He made no explicit mention of Hezbollah’s intention to withdraw north of the Litani River—as the deal requires (see full text here)—or how precisely the group intended to comply with the agreement. Instead, his comments were ambiguous, leaving considerable room for Hezbollah to maneuver around the ceasefire’s terms. Qassem claimed that Israel’s “defeat:”
[…] resulted in a ceasefire agreement to end the aggression. This agreement is not a treaty or new agreement that requires countries to be signatories. This agreement is a form of a program of executive measures that are related to the implementation of Resolution 1701.
The agreement’s focal point is south of the Litani River. This agreement requires the Israeli army to withdraw from all of the areas that it occupied and that the Lebanese Army deploy throughout all of the south, south of the Litani River, to assume its duties over security and remove the Israeli enemy from this area. With thanks to God, the coordination between the resistance and the Lebanese Army will be high-level coordination to implement the obligations under the agreement. No one should bet on problems or disagreements. We view the Lebanese Army as a national army—its leadership, officers, and individuals—and it will deploy in our joint nation. These are our people who embody a sacred mission, which is to preserve security in Lebanon and on the border with the Israeli enemy.
Qassem also vowed that Hezbollah would continue to “support Palestine in different forms,” a defiant stance but one that was, nevertheless, a far cry from the group’s insistence on tying a ceasefire on the front in southern Lebanon to a prior one in the Gaza Strip.
Qassem’s December 5 speech was somewhat less defiant. He said that Hezbollah:
[…] agreed to the ceasefire deal to end the aggression while God’s men were on the battlefield from a position of strength and glory. This deal was a deal to end the aggression and an executive mechanism to implement Resolution 1701. It is nothing new. The deal is an implementation mechanism for Resolution 1701. It is under it and not above it. It [the ceasefire deal] is a part of it [Resolution 1701] and does not exist independently of it. Nor is it a new agreement. What does this agreement call for? It calls for Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory and an end to its aggression. In exchange, the presence of armed individuals and the weapons of the resistance are banned south of the Litani River—where the Lebanese national army will deploy as the sole armed force.
These statements are the first time Qassem or any other Hezbollah figure has officially committed to Hezbollah’s withdrawal north of the Litani River. It should be noted that Qassem and Hezbollah have not precisely said what this will mean in practice.
In all likelihood, Hezbollah will undertake a temporary and tactical withdrawal—an entirely predictable scenario—until international attention inevitably diverts elsewhere. But even this change was precipitated by Hezbollah’s characteristic pragmatism. To the group’s south, its Israeli enemy is still raring for a fight. Since the November 27 ceasefire, continued Israeli operations meant to ensure compliance with the deal’s terms have killed an additional 24 Hezbollah fighters. Even in accepting this deal, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reserved his country’s right to resume hostilities on their former scale—and Israeli officials have subsequently threatened to return to war and “go deeper” into Lebanon—if Jerusalem’s security needs aren’t met.
Israel may also have a legal right to do so. The November 27 ceasefire agreement, temporary by its very nature, interrupted but did not conclusively end the legal state of war between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel’s right to restart hostilities is, therefore, not governed by peacetime rules requiring another prior Hezbollah armed attack. Some scholars would say this permits Israel to resume hostilities “at will.” In contrast, others interpret matters more restrictively, while a third current, viewing ceasefire deals as contracts modifying international law, would allow Israel to act unilaterally in case of a “serious violation” of the ceasefire’s terms and under those terms. This means that Hezbollah’s continued presence south of the Litani River and Lebanon’s ongoing refusal or failure to distance the group—though falling short of an armed attack that would justify going to war in peacetime—could justify Israel reinitiating hostilities under the ceasefire deal since they are serious violations of its terms.
Qassem is seeing Israel implement this approach in practice, noting what he called dozens of Israeli “violations” of the ceasefire deal—a deflective euphemism for Israel’s continued attacks on Hezbollah’s presence in south Lebanon. He doesn’t want to give the Israelis room for more action, especially since the civil war in neighboring Syria has reignited in the intervening week between Qassem’s speeches, threatening to topple Hezbollah’s ally Bashar al-Assad and possibly demanding the group’s military commitment there as well. Qassem already promised on December 5 to assist Assad to the extent possible for his group, and reports indicate these efforts are already underway. The last thing a battered Hezbollah needs is to fight a war on two fronts.
Nevertheless, Qassem spun the deal in a way that allowed maneuvering room for Hezbollah—including a potential future return to the frontier area—by insisting that the agreement requires a “complete” Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Thus, an open question is what will happen if Israel remains in the northern part of Ghajar and other frontier areas claimed by Lebanon, as these have been used as justification by the Lebanese government and Hezbollah for the latter group’s presence in south Lebanon in the past.
Perfidious Lebanon
Qassem’s speeches also reveal that Lebanon did not negotiate the November 27 ceasefire deal in good faith. In October, senior Lebanese officials, represented by caretaker Prime Minister Najib Miqati, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and mercurial Druze chieftain Walid Joumblatt, reversed their prior stance and decoupled a ceasefire in Lebanon from the Gaza Strip. Rather than signaling an abandonment of Hezbollah, this gave—and was perhaps meant to give—the group a coveted face-saving off-ramp from a war with Israel that was decimating the organization and bleeding its host state.
Hezbollah could then claim that Israel wasn’t militarily forcing it to abandon its commitment to Gaza—an imposition of terms that would call into question the group’s utility as a resistance force by its supporters—but was doing so in compliance with the Lebanese state’s orders. Indeed, on November 29, Qassem said, “This agreement is under the rubric of Lebanese sovereignty, to which we agreed while the resistance was strong on the battlefield and our heads were held high with our right to defense.” No wonder, also, that Qassem spent the weeks since October 2 endlessly praising Berri’s efforts, as the Lebanese parliament speaker was using his legitimacy with Western interlocutors to play the political side of the coin while Hezbollah operated on the military side.
The joint goal here was, then, to get the Israeli bombs to stop, and for Lebanon to resume its old foot-dragging on Hezbollah’s weapons—secure in the knowledge that if Beirut could take the issue of enforcement away from Israeli military action and back to the realm of international diplomacy, it would soon become moot.
Indeed, not a week has gone by since Lebanon has returned to its old prevarications on the matter of disarming Hezbollah. On December 5, Miqati insisted that the matter would be resolved through “national consensus” and dialogue—meaning, given Hezbollah’s substantial public support, that Beirut would ask if the group was willing to disarm, to which Hezbollah would predictably respond in the negative. Those paying attention to Lebanese discourse since October 2 saw this all along.
Qassem echoed Miqati on December 5, saying:
Therefore, this [ceasefire] is an agreement for south of the Litani River. But the related resolutions [Resolution 1701 or Resolution 1559] and their various mechanisms are noted in Resolution 1701. The ceasefire deal didn’t address [Resolution 1701 or related resolutions] in its implementation mechanisms, because the implementation mechanisms deal only with the area south of the Litani River and nothing else. Any indication otherwise is a reference to returning to the relevant resolutions and the other detailed content [of Resolution] 1701. Those related resolutions have their own mechanisms, part of which is Lebanon regaining its full borders and the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Chouba Hills during a specific time period. However, anything related to the domestic Lebanese scene—and to the relationship between the resistance and the state and the resistance and the army—this is connected to the mechanism that will be agreed upon domestically in Lebanon. Neither Israel nor any committee [a likely reference to the ceasefire deal’s oversight committee] has any right to look at it or involve themselves in it because it is a domestic issue.
Meanwhile, Lebanon and Hezbollah appear to be working hand in glove to blunt Israel’s ability to curtail the group’s resurgence. A December 4 report in the pro-Hezbollah Al-Akhbar suggested that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Joseph Aoun had pushed American and international interlocutors to abandon “Israel’s interpretation of the ceasefire deal”—a likely reference to the US letter of assurance to Israel (see full text here)—for otherwise, the LAF could not undertake any enforcement of the deal. Doing so, an associate of Aoun’s said, according to the report, would be “pushing the LAF and its commander towards suicide.” Aoun instead pushed for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and an end to what he termed “Israeli violations.” At the same time, officers within the LAF’s command expressed their opposition to “Transforming the army into a military tool to confront Hezbollah” or “clash with the group.”
While alleged revelations in a Hezbollah mouthpiece like Al-Akhbar should normally be taken with a grain (or more) of salt, this report carries more weight because it overlaps with other independently verifiable information from credible sources. That same day, Al-Joumhouria—a publication as credible as any other in Lebanon, but whose mercurial political stance follows that of its publisher and owner Elias al Murr—published a similar report on the LAF and Hezbollah’s continued “keenness to continue coordination and communication […] on the ground” and stating confrontation was off the table.
Meanwhile, the day prior, Reuters reported that Lebanese diplomats and senior officials were urging officials in Washington and Paris to restrain Israeli action against Hezbollah in Lebanon. On December 2, US envoy Amos Hochstein was pressing the Israelis to “calm down,” with one of the most “prominent violations” being a “return of Israeli drones to the skies of Beirut.” This admonition suggested an American about-face on one of the terms of its letter of assurance to Israel that stipulates “Israeli flights over Lebanon will be conducted for the purpose of intelligence gathering, interdiction, and reconnaissance only—and will remain unseen to the naked eye as much as possible and will not break the sound barrier.”
No wonder, then, Qassem puzzlingly insisted on the implementation of Resolution 1701, which requires Lebanon to distance Hezbollah north of the Litani, disarm the group, and control its borders to prevent Hezbollah’s regeneration. Lebanon has long played word games with Resolution 1701’s meaning, insisting that the call to disarm “armed groups” in Lebanon doesn’t apply to Hezbollah, which it considers in the distinct category of a “resistance organization.” Qassem realizes that if the matter of the group’s arms returns to the domestic Lebanese conversation and Israeli military pressure is brought to an end—and with it, any even cosmetic desire by Lebanon to implement Resolution 1701’s letter and spirit—Hezbollah will be on a secure path to regeneration.
Cooperation with Lebanon
According to Qassem, cooperation with the Lebanese government would extend beyond covering for Hezbollah’s continued possession of a private arsenal. He also unveiled Hezbollah’s reconstruction aid plan, whose wheels, greased by fresh infusions of Iranian funds, have already begun turning.
Qassem said Iranian funds had already enabled Hezbollah to prove “between $300 to $400” to each of the 233,500 families displaced from the Beqaa in south Lebanon and south Beirut for various needs, including rent, fuel, and food. “Until this past Friday, 74% of those had received payments, with a total of $57 million distributed to 172,000 families. What remains are 26% and a total of $20 million, about 61,500 families—for a sum of $77 million for 233,500, which has partially been paid, and the remainder will be paid, God willing,” Qassem said. He also thanked Iran, the Iraqi government, the religious authorities under Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the funds controlled by the Shiite sacred shrines in Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and the Iraqi people “for their financial assistance.” In addition, Qassem thanked Yemen’s pro-Iranian leadership, the Houthis, and friendly scholars—but was unclear if they, too, had aided Hezbollah financially.
Regarding reconstruction, Qassem said Hezbollah would offer anyone whose primary and sole home had been destroyed a sum of $8,000 in restitution payments. If that person resided in Beirut, Hezbollah would provide them with an additional $6,000 rental stipend to be distributed monthly over a year. Those residing outside of Beirut would receive a similar $4,000 stipend. For those whose homes or property had been partially destroyed, he said, Hezbollah was setting up a compensation mechanism and plan—dubbed “a Promise and Commitment”—whose details would become available on a dedicated website. Here, too, he said Iran had contributed the funds. This confirms a December 4 report in Asharq Al-Awsat saying Iran had transferred $1 billion to Hezbollah upon the ceasefire going into effect for reconstruction and housing aid, along with a prior Washington Post report on November 30 that stated Iran saw the ceasefire as an opportunity to help Hezbollah regroup.
Both Iran and Hezbollah realize the distribution of this aid is vital to Hezbollah’s survival. An Arab Barometer poll from September showed that 85% of Shiites—Lebanon’s fastest-growing and likely largest sect—had considerable trust in Hezbollah. A prior Washington Institute poll from January showed that 93% of Lebanese Shiites viewed Hezbollah positively; 89% of them very positively. These numbers tracked with Hezbollah’s results in the May 2022 parliamentary elections, when the group won 356,122 of approximately 1.8 million votes cast—the most of any party and beating the runner-up Lebanese Forces party by almost 152,725 votes.
There have been few signs of that support eroding considerably. Many of the displaced Shiites returning to the south, the Beqaa, and south Beirut waved Hezbollah flags and voiced their support for the group and its alleged “victory.” Hundreds, if not thousands, turned out to a November 30 vigil in south Beirut for Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s iconic secretary-general, who Israel assassinated on September 27. Now, Hezbollah is planning a public funeral for Nasrallah and his would-be successor Hashem Safieddine, also dispatched by Israel on October 4, that is meant to be a public demonstration of Hezbollah’s continued popularity.
Hezbollah’s durability and survival depend on retaining this massive popular support. And retaining that support will depend upon reversing, to the extent possible, the harm suffered by its base throughout the war. Here, Hezbollah won’t be alone. Qassem noted that the “Lebanese government too has a working plan” that would also include “rebuilding homes and reconstruction.” He continued, “[I]n other words, we will be [working] hand in hand with the Lebanese government—meaning that we will help with supplementing the assistance [provided by the government] and in giving the appropriate amounts if we consider that what the government is providing is lacking in some ways. But essentially, the restoration and reconstruction will be the government’s duty, and we will be by its side.”
Indeed, as Qassem made this statement, the Lebanese cabinet had already approved an $8 million package for the South Lebanon Council. Admittedly, this sum is a drop in the bucket of the aid required, which would strain Lebanon’s depleted budget. But here, Beirut will doubtlessly try to rely on international assistance—loans, grants, and other handouts—that may be forthcoming. French President Emmanuel Macron, whose country is always ready to run cover for Lebanese inaction and drag the international community into propping up Paris’s old mandatory holding, is already lobbying for an international effort to help Lebanon with reconstruction. This means that Hezbollah’s path to regeneration—by securing the needs of its base and retaining popular support—will be virtually guaranteed through the legitimacy granted to Lebanon by an international community that is inexplicably protective over this small Levantine country.
