The sudden collapse of the Islamic Republic’s closest state-actor ally stunned the world, as Syrian rebels captured Damascus just 11 days after launching a new wave of insurgency. To deflect this humiliating defeat, Iranian officials have claimed that the Tehran-Damascus alliance had been weakening, and Iran no longer aimed to preserve the Assad dynasty. However, leaks from Tehran and insights into Iranian regional strategy tell a different story: Iran was incapable of safeguarding the Syrian regime, and the latter’s collapse has sparked internal divisions among Iranian officials.
“Iran had no intention of getting involved in Syria”
In response to Assad’s downfall, regime officials have propagated three narratives: that Iran never intended to support Assad, Assad ignored Iranian warnings about the looming threat, and Assad never requested Tehran’s assistance in the first place.
In his first public address following Assad’s collapse, Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei sought to shift the blame onto Syrian forces. In his December 11 speech, Khamenei criticized the Syrian army’s lack of morale, stating, “[If] the army shows weakness and lack of determination, the Basij forces (militias loyal to Tehran) cannot succeed. Unfortunately, this is what happened in Syria.”
Khamenei further alleged that Syria fell due to its failure to heed Iran’s warnings: “In Syria, the enemy acted quickly, but the [Syrian government] should have foreseen and prevented this in advance. Our intelligence apparatus had conveyed warning reports to Syrian officials months prior to these events.”
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and speaker of the Iranian Parliament, echoed Khamenei’s stance on December 12. He remarked, “The developments in Syria were more inevitable than surprising. We had also warned the government of that country (the Assad regime),” while suggesting that Assad had disregarded Tehran’s concerns. Similarly, on December 13, Brigadier General Ramazan Sharif, head of the IRGC’s War Research Center, asserted, “Had Syria taken our (Iran’s) advice, they would have been victorious.”
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration and its diplomats went further, suggesting that Assad neither sought Tehran’s assistance nor had Iran prioritized defending him. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said, “The Syrian government did not expect this (military intervention) from us either,” adding that Iran’s role was limited to offering guidance and advice.
Iran’s former ambassador to the United Kingdom parroted these claims, stating, “Iran had no intention of getting involved in Syria.” Advisors to Pezeshkian amplified this sentiment in Western media. One analyst affiliated with the so-called “reformist” faction commented, “Assad had become more of a liability than an ally, which means his time had run out. Defending him was no longer justifiable, even if it marked a major setback for Iran.”
Internal rifts and the “strategic disaster” of Assad’s collapse
Other voices within the regime paint a contrasting picture, suggesting Tehran was neither prepared for Assad’s fall nor willing to abandon him. Araghchi himself described the rebel takeover of Damascus as “surprising,” while Siavash Moslemi, commander of the IRGC Karbala Base, labeled Assad’s collapse a “strategic disaster.”
Beyond public statements, leaked internal discussions among Iranian officials reveal growing dissatisfaction and blame-shifting. IRGC sources reportedly informed The Telegraph that Assad’s downfall has caused significant rifts in Tehran, with officials accusing each other of mismanagement.
“No one ever imagined seeing Assad fleeing, as the focus for 10 years had been only on keeping him in power,” said one Islamic Republic insider. A December 13 New York Times report further disclosed that IRGC members who served in Syria privately admitted that Iran lost everything in just 11 days. These officials described the regime as “disoriented,” “befuddled,” and scrambling to reassess its Syria strategy.
The IRGC’s Quds Force (QF), responsible for exporting Iran’s revolutionary ideology, is reportedly under intense scrutiny. As the QF commander, Esmail Gha’ani is facing significant internal criticism for failing to preserve Assad’s regime. According to The Telegraph, many within the regime are holding Gha’ani accountable, and Khamenei may demote him. Notably, Gha’ani has remained conspicuously silent since Assad’s collapse, raising further speculation.
Iran’s strategic priorities in Syria have always been substantial. Beyond IRGC involvement, the Iranian conventional army supported Assad during the civil war and continued deployments even during the fall of Aleppo. Additionally, Iranian lawmakers have raised concerns over Assad’s $30 billion debt to Tehran, which covered both military support and reconstruction projects led by the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters. Such investments indicate anything but weakening ties.
Interestingly, Assad himself was confident in his position and rebuffed proposals that could have ensured his survival. A former Syrian diplomat informed The Washington Post that Assad dismissed offers from global powers, including one relayed by the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the United States, that promised to lift crippling US sanctions in exchange for severing ties with Iran.
Coordinating the weakened Axis of Resistance and maintaining regional influence
Khamenei’s latest speech conveyed hope that the new Syrian government could eventually align with Iran’s interests: “The courageous Syrian youth will liberate Syria.” In contrast, Reuters reported on December 9 that Tehran has opened communication channels with Syrian rebels, a claim corroborated by the New York Times: “Iranian leaders were now resigned to accepting any level of diplomatic presence, however small, that Syria’s new leaders allowed.”
Maintaining cohesion within the increasingly fragmented Axis of Resistance has proven challenging for Tehran. Despite Iran’s efforts to direct its proxies’ focus toward Israel, Sunni factions within the axis have never favored Assad. Given that Assad’s forces were responsible for the deaths of over half a million Sunni Syrians, Islamist factions tied to Hamas have consistently expressed discontent with how Iran and Assad managed the Syrian Civil War.
After Assad’s fall, the Iran-backed Hamas terror group congratulated Syrians for achieving their “aspirations for freedom and justice.” Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal hailed the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad as a victory for the “revolution against oppression and injustice.” Similarly, Ziad al-Nakhala, head of the Iranian-supported Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reflected the same stance, expressing hope that “Syria would continue to support the Palestinian people and their cause.”
