In recent years, Iran steadily built up Hezbollah’s arsenal in Lebanon and Syria by shipping weapons, flying them in, and transporting them by truck. Weapons consignments arrived at ports and airports and were stored at warehouses in both countries before being distributed to Hezbollah units. Israel has sought to disrupt the flow of weapons, chiefly by bombing raids on targets in Syria (including the port of Latakia and the airport in Damascus). Since Hezbollah joined Hamas and opened a second front against Israel on October 8, 2023, Israel has hit targets in Lebanon as well. But Israel’s efforts to degrade and destroy Hezbollah’s arsenal and disrupt Iran’s efforts to resupply it have dramatically increased in tempo since September 28, the day after Israel eliminated Hezbollah’s late leader, Hassan Nasrallah.
On that day, Israel interdicted an Iranian cargo plane as it made its final descent into Beirut airport, forcing it to return to Tehran. Following the interdiction, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Spokesperson Daniel Hagari warned that the Israeli military would prohibit Iranian weapon transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The IDF put Hagari’s words into action as Israeli interdictions occurred twice more before October 5, when Iranian cargo was permanently diverted to Latakia in Syria.
Supplies are now landing by plane in Latakia and reaching its Syrian port by cargo ship from Iran, with Israel making no attempts so far to disrupt the air traffic. Flight tracking data available from the commercial website FlightRadar24 show that, since September 28, when a cargo aircraft operated by the US-sanctioned, IRGC-controlled Qeshm Fars Air sought to land in Beirut, the same cargo plane flew four times to Latakia. Aircraft operated by Mahan Air and Yazd Airways—both A310 and A342 Airbus passenger planes—have flown to Latakia at least 17 times since September 28. Nevertheless, once an aircraft lands in Syria, the goods it carries have an additional hurdle to overcome—supplies must then safely travel to Lebanon.
Since September, Israel also bombed land border crossings between Lebanon and Syria more than once and targeted multiple warehouses in Syria. However, what remains open for weapons transport is the sea.
That’s where a daring naval raid comes in. Snatching a key operative in Hezbollah’s maritime operation is a sure way to gather critical intelligence about Iran’s supply chain to Hezbollah and the plans and capabilities of Hezbollah’s naval unit.
In the pre-dawn hours of November 1, 25 Israeli naval commandos quietly approached the shore of the northern Lebanese town of Batrun, more than 100 miles north of the Israel-Lebanon border. The moonless night was perfect for a raid. After the commandos landed on the beach, they were already on their way out with their target safely in custody within minutes. The prisoner was Imad Fadel Amhaz, a 38-year-old officer in Lebanon’s navy and a trained pilot. The commandos seized his electronics and 10 SIM cards from foreign mobile phone operators as well.
The Israelis were clearly looking for intelligence. Hezbollah’s naval unit may be small and has seen little action over the years, but size and quality are not the same. Equipped with Russian-made Yakhont missiles, the naval unit can inflict serious harm to Israeli maritime forces. It did so in 2006, during the previous Israel-Hezbollah war, when Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles hit an Israeli frigate, crippling the boat and killing four crew.
Which brings us to Amhaz. Since his capture, the Hezbollah propaganda machine has been assiduously denying he had any official role in the terrorist group. Alongside Lebanon’s Hezbollah-appointed minister of transport, Ali Hamie, who insisted that Amhaz was a civilian naval officer, Amhaz’s family members reported the same to Lebanese media. The Israelis, in contrast, have been mum, other than confirming the raid and identifying Amhaz as a key member of Hezbollah’s naval unit.
Records obtained from Lebanon’s commercial registry and leaked files from Hezbollah’s bank, Al Qard Al Hassan (AQAH), do not reveal any direct link between Amhaz and Hezbollah. However, several members of his family, including his paternal uncles Ahmad, Jawdat, and Mohamad, are AQAH account holders, while his paternal uncle Hussein is listed as an account holder and a non-military Hezbollah member. These ties are not enough to confirm or deny what Israel claims but sufficient to suggest that his family, several members of which bank with AQAH, is within Hezbollah’s orbit.
One thing, however, seems beyond dispute. As a naval officer and a ship captain, Amhaz could be involved in maritime shipping between Syria and Lebanon. Among friends who liked his social media posts showing a large ship’s command deck (or bridge), there are several Syrian naval officers based in Latakia and Tartous, including one who studied at MERSATI, the same maritime school where Amhad reportedly did his training.
The evidence that has emerged is quite convincing that Iran is exploiting maritime routes to conceal weapons shipments to Hezbollah, and the port of Latakia has become a critical part of this strategy. It should not come as a surprise. Hezbollah has also been using Latakia as a logistics hub for fenethylline shipments, and what moves illegal drugs can also move weapons.
One scheme involves Iran attempting to evade Israeli intelligence by using European sea ports to mask weapons shipments, which are subsequently ferried to Latakia before being transported to Lebanon, The Telegraph reported.
Furthermore, recent Israeli strikes at Latakia port lend credibility to The Telegraph’s findings.
In October, the IDF launched two strikes against the coastal city. Social media footage showed secondary explosions when a site was targeted on October 17, providing strong evidence that weapons were stored there.
While Latakia’s strategic position as a hub for Iranian arms destined for Hezbollah is evident, other ports, such as Baniyas, have also played a role in facilitating illicit arms shipments.
Baniyas is a hub for oil imports, with Iranian vessels frequently docking there. In recent years, Israel has conducted airstrikes at the port, reportedly aimed at weapons transfers and Iranian military personnel. On July 9, Syrian state-controlled media reported IDF airstrikes near Baniyas that “caused some material losses.” The attacks are yet another indication of the ongoing confrontations between Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah over these critical maritime routes.
Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 is a partner in Iran’s strategy to exploit maritime routes to arm its Lebanese proxy. Hezbollah established the special division after the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh in 2008. The unit is primarily tasked with handling Iranian weapons smuggling, including precision-guided munitions and long-range rockets. As a part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah during the current conflict, the Israeli military has carried out strikes against Unit 4400’s leadership and infrastructure.
On October 25, 2024, Israeli jets targeted Hezbollah infrastructure at the Syrian-controlled Jusiyah Border Crossing in the northern Beqaa Valley. This location had been utilized by Unit 4400 to smuggle weapons into Lebanon. According to the IDF, the strike was part of a series of attacks that month aimed at border crossings that Unit 4400 was exploiting along the Syria-Lebanon frontier.
Several weeks before the strike in Jusiyah, Israel targeted Building 14 in the al-Sheikh Saad area of the Mezzeh neighborhood in southern Damascus. The attack eliminated “Hajj Samer,” a commander in Unit 4400.
It’s clear that Iran and its partners in the region are using every method available to them to transfer illicit weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This strategy has been successful. Despite Israel’s efforts to interdict the transfer of these arms, the current conflict in Lebanon demonstrates that advanced weapons have still reached Hezbollah. Furthermore, Hezbollah has not been shy about showing off some of the arsenals it has received from its patron in Tehran. Ballistic missiles, anti-air defense systems, and drones are just some of the arms displayed by the group.
It is noteworthy that over the years, Iran has acquired significant expertise in transferring arms to its proxy in Lebanon through land, air, and sea routes. These lessons are now being mirrored with other Iranian proxies in regions such as Iraq and Yemen.
Israel’s supply chain disruption is not going to deprive Hezbollah of access to weapons completely. Hezbollah has also pursued the capabilities to manufacture advanced weapons on a large scale in Lebanon, with some measure of success. Regardless, the group remains heavily dependent on Iranian resupply, and Israel’s interdictions of air and land supply routes to Lebanon confirm this. What intelligence Israel may be able to extract from Mr. Amhaz remains to be seen. But the key to starving Hezbollah’s arsenal must include shutting down its sea lanes, and a pre-dawn raid in Batrun may have given Israel the knowledge it needs to do it.
