Israel seems set on liquidating Hezbollah. Beginning with its assassination of the group’s chief of staff, Fuad Shukr, on July 30, the Israelis have been decimating Hezbollah’s senior leadership in rapid succession—culminating in the previously unimaginable assassination of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27.
The unceasing blows have put Hezbollah on its back foot, inflicting losses on the group that may not be easily replaced. Since June 2024, Israel has conducted a series of targeted strikes that have severely weakened the Hezbollah’s command structure, delivering a significant blow to the organization. What follows is a breakdown of the officials assassinated, those who remain, and the impact on the organization and its durability.
Assassinated political officials:
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary general, was killed in an airstrike on Dahiyeh on September 27.
Nabil Qaouq, former deputy head of the Executive Council, was killed on September 28.
Assassinated military officials:
Ali Karaki, commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Unit, was killed in the same strike as Nasrallah on September 27.
Mohammad Srour, commander of Hezbollah’s UAV unit, was killed on September 26.
Ibrahim Qubaisi, commander of Hezbollah’s missile array, was killed in a strike on September 24.
Ibrahim Aqil, senior operations commander and member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council, was killed in an airstrike on September 20.
Ahmad Wahbi, former leader of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force, was killed on September 20.
Fuad Shukr, chief of staff of Hezbollah, was killed in an airstrike on Dahiyeh on July 30.
Mohammad Nasser, commander of Hezbollah’s Nassr Unit, was killed on July 3.
Taleb Abdullah, commander of Hezbollah’s Aziz Unit, was killed on June 12.
Mohammad Jaafar Qasir, commander of Unit 4400, tasked with transferring weapons from Iran to Hezbollah, was killed on October 1.
Dhulfiqar Hennawi, commander of the Imam Hussein Division, responsible for combat engineer duties in the Aziz Unit and Hezbollah forces in the area of Aleppo, Syria, was killed on October 1.
Hassan Khalil Yassin, head of a unit within Hezbollah’s intelligence apparatus tasked with identifying military and civilian targets inside Israel, particularly after October 8, worked closely with the UAV and Missile Units and was killed on September 28.
Ibrahim Hussein Jezzini, head of Hassan Nasrallah’s Security Unit, was killed with Nasrallah in an airstrike on Dahiyeh on September 27.
Samir Tawfiq Dib, military Operations Advisor, a long-term confidante of Hassan Nasrallah, according to the IDF, was also killed on September 27.
Abdelamir Mohammad Sablini, head of Hezbollah’s force build-up, was also killed on September 27.
Ali Ayoub, responsible for coordinating Hezbollah’s firepower, per the IDF, was also killed on September 27.
Yet, while Hezbollah’s command structure has been significantly weakened because of these strikes, some key leaders remain at the helm on the military and political levels:
Remaining political officials:
Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, is a philosopher/idealogue figure.
Mohammad Yazbek is head of Hezbollah’s Judicial Council.
Mohammad Raad is head of Hezbollah’s Parliamentary Council. The group’s entire parliamentary list remains intact, as well.
Ibrahim al-Amine is head of Hezbollah’s Political Bureau. None of the Politburo’s sub-body heads have been assassinated. Critically, Mohammad Kawtharani, Hezbollah’s Iraq and Arab Affairs official, and Hassan Hoballah, in charge of Hezbollah’s relations with Palestinian groups, remain alive.
Wafiq Safa is head of Hezbollah’s Security Committee and liaison to the Lebanese Government.
Abdallah Safieddine is Hezbollah’s liaison to Iran.
Remaining military/security officials:
Talal Hamyeh was appointed, along with Ali Karaki (later killed), as the most senior operational commanders to replace Ibrahim Aqil and Ahmad Wahbi, who were also killed. Hamyeh has served, and may still serve, as the commander of Unit 910, Hezbollah’s external operations unit responsible for planning terrorist attacks outside of Lebanon targeting Israelis and Americans, according to the US State Department.
Abu Ali Reda (Ali Reda Abbas), commander of the Badr Unit, one of Hezbollah’s regional units in the south, has been reported by Israeli sources to have succeeded Ibrahim Aqil as the new Radwan Force commander. He previously survived an assassination attempt in the 1990s, alongside Ibrahim Aqil.
Ali Musa Daqduq was appointed as the new deputy commander of the Radwan Unit. He previously served as the head of the “Golan File” unit, a Hezbollah cell formed near the Golan Heights in Syria to operate against Israel. Daqduq was convicted of involvement in the killing of five US soldiers in Karbala, Iraq, in 2007.
Haytham Ali Tabatabaei, who previously led the Radwan Unit, has operated in Syria and Yemen and is reported to be Hezbollah’s most senior commander in Syria. He has worked alongside other pro-Iranian proxies in training and supplying arms to further their objectives. In 2016, the US Department of State designated Tabatabaei as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to Executive Order 13224.
Mohammad Ataya is head of Hezbollah’s Unit 133, responsible for operations inside Israel, including the Palestinian Territories.
Mohammad Haydar, aka Abu Ali Haydar, is a former Lebanese parliamentarian (2005–2009), senior security advisor to former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, and responsible for Hezbollah’s forces in Syria and security-military affairs in south Lebanon.
Khudur Yousef Nader is commander of Unit 900 “Security Unit” and formerly responsible for Nasrallah’s personal security.
Munir Ali Naeem Shaito, aka Hajj Hashem, is Hezbollah’s commander of the southern front in Syria. He oversees military coordination between Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian regime, with a focus on the Golan Heights.
Hajj Khalil Harb is head of Hezbollah’s Unit 3800, which is responsible for recruitment and training of allied militias, primarily in Iraq and Yemen.
Political vacancies with unknown replacements:
Secretary-general: A replacement is unknown—see the “Impact” section below.
Jihad Council: Formerly headed by Hassan Nasrallah, a replacement is unknown— see the “Impact” section below.
Executive Council: Headed by Hashem Safieddine, whose fate is unconfirmed. Safieddine’s replacement, if he was killed or is alive and promoted to succeed Nasrallah, is unclear. However, the council’s deputy chairman, Ali Daamoush, and Safieddine’s assistant, Sultan Asaad, appear to be still alive.
Military vacancies with unknown replacements:
Aziz Unit: Responsible for Hezbollah’s operations in the eastern sector of south Lebanon south of the Litani River. In addition to Taleb Abdullah, the unit’s commander, possible deputies Ali Salim Soufan and Mohammad Hussein Sabra have also been killed. The next potential person in line, senior commander Hussein Qassem Hamid, has also been killed, leaving—at best—the fifth-in-line officer to take charge of the unit, whose name is unlikely to be publicly known until his eventual demise.
Nasr Unit: Responsible for Hezbollah’s operations in the western sector of south Lebanon south of the Litani River. As far as can be assessed, the deputy of deceased commander Mohammad Nasser remains alive and is most likely to be heading the unit.
Jalil Unit: The purpose of this unit is, theoretically, to invade wider areas of Israel’s upper Galilee, hence its name. It was deployed to Syria, from where it was pulled back to south Lebanon in May 2017. The status of the unit and its commanders is currently unknown. Given its purpose and functions, it is a possible sub-unit of the Radwan Unit.
Imam Hussein Division: Per the IDF, this division is Hezbollah’s “power development framework,” providing “significant operational capabilities to the organization.” It is comprised of fighters drawn from different Middle Eastern countries. Since October 8, the division reportedly transferred the center of its operations to Lebanon, coordinating closely with Hezbollah’s south Lebanon territorial units. It has taken an active part in the fighting and is also responsible for launching attacks at Israel from Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—including rocket and loitering-munitions attacks. The deceased Hinawi’s unnamed direct deputy, who appears to have survived the assassination of his commander, is likely to assume his place.
Unit 910: Hezbollah’s External Operations Unit. Its last-known commander is Talal Hamiyeh, who has been promoted to the position of chief of staff. The current commander is unknown.
Missile Unit: Responsible for Hezbollah’s missile and rocket arsenal. Hussain Hani Izzeldine was killed alongside Qubaisi but does not appear to have been Qubaisi’s direct deputy. That individual remains unnamed and unknown and will likely succeed Qubaisi in heading the unit. Mohammad Ali Ismail, the commander of the Unit’s activities in south Lebanon, and his deputy, Hussain Ahmad Ismail, were killed as well.
UAV Unit: Responsible for Hezbollah’s arsenal of UAVs and loitering munitions. Mohammad Srour’s unnamed second-in-command appears to have survived Srour’s assassination and is likely heading the unit now. Ali Hussein Burji, the head of the unit’s operations in south Lebanon, was killed in January 2024.
The Impact
Israel’s spate of assassinations has certainly left Hezbollah disoriented. Nasrallah’s killing is arguably the most significant of those deaths on the group’s ability to function and perhaps also its longevity. His leadership provided Hezbollah with vision, allowing it to navigate some of its most difficult historical junctures. The cult of personality the party built up around Nasrallah was also a significant source of public support. Therefore, Hezbollah’s ability to regenerate after this conflict with Israel will be in question, or at least severely tested, without him at the helm.
As important, Israel’s assassinations have left significant gaps in Hezbollah’s chain of succession. Much will, therefore, depend on the survival of competent successors to commanders and leaders eliminated over the past 11 months, particularly the position of secretary-general. This makes the fate of Hashem Safieddine—Nasrallah’s maternal cousin and heir-apparent—especially crucial.
Safieddine has served as the head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council since 1998—a position held by Nasrallah before he ascended to secretary-general—and was one of its veteran members. Chairing the Executive Council, Safieddine oversaw all of Hezbollah’s daily operations, including managing its domestic and foreign investments, funds, and various charitable, social, and media bodies.
He established strong ties to Iranian leadership as a result of his studies in Qom, which were further strengthened by his son’s marriage to Zeinab Soleimani, daughter of Qassem Soleimani, and his brother’s position as Hezbollah’s top representative in Iran. Safieddine also assumed other critical leadership roles throughout his career in Hezbollah, including a position on the Jihad Council. This experience has given him a thorough understanding of the group’s military operations and infrastructure.
Safieddine would, therefore, be a competent successor to Nasrallah. Party officials close to Saffiedine described him to Asharq Al-Awsat as a “true leader, simultaneously firm and flexible” and open to hearing criticism from other organization members. They also described his personality as an “extension of sayyed Nasrallah’s,” and a perfect successor to the secretary general. Other associates have alleged that Safieddine is more extreme, hardline, and militant than Nasrallah.
Furthermore, his acceptance by the organization’s mass of supporters would be aided by his familial relationship to the deceased secretary-general, his physical resemblance to Nasrallah, and even their shared speech defect when pronouncing the letter “R,” which Hezbollah’s followers loved, even if he never matches his predecessor’s popularity.
Unverified reports indicate Safieddine was killed alongside Nasrallah. Hezbollah has refused to confirm his fate—including in a statement that sought to put an end to speculation about the succession process. His survival, however, would mean that Hezbollah has an opportunity to survive and regenerate, even if it never recovers the strength it had under Nasrallah.
