US military bases in the Persian Gulf confront two problems. The first is the growing missile and drone capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The other is that some Arab partners restrict the Pentagon’s ability to use the bases as needed and may even wield the bases as political leverage to influence American foreign policy.
In response, in addition to improving air and missile defenses, Washington should replicate elsewhere in the region vital military capabilities at large Persian Gulf bases housing US forces, especially any capabilities located at Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar. That will better protect US service members, bolster deterrence, and make it more difficult for some regional partners to use America’s military presence as leverage against Washington.
Many US servicemembers in the Middle East are stationed at bases along the Persian Gulf in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. Examples include Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Naval Support Activity Bahrain, and Camp Arifjan in Kuwait.
Maintaining a forward military presence in the Persian Gulf is vital to securing American interests, but these bases are squarely within range of Iran’s increasingly formidable arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. Making matters worse, Iran and its proxies have repeatedly demonstrated in recent years that they are able and willing to use all three of these types of weapons systems to target US and partner forces in the region.
Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the region, with at least eight types of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), all of which are capable of striking US bases along the Persian Gulf from Iranian territory. Ballistic missiles are particularly dangerous, as their high speed makes them more difficult to intercept compared to cruise missiles or drones (once detected). Most of Iran’s SRBMs employ solid propellants, meaning that they require less time to prep prior to launch and can be fueled and stored for longer periods of time.
In January 2020, Iran launched its first-ever direct ballistic missile attack from Iranian territory at US positions. The attack took place in Iraq at Ain al-Asad and Erbil, featuring 16 SRBMs (Fateh-313s and modified Qiams) launched by Iran. The barrage injured more than 100 US military personnel and is a preview of the damage that US bases might sustain if a full-scale conflict with Iran erupts. Indeed, as Iran’s long-range strike capabilities and risk tolerance grow, Tehran has been more willing to conduct overt and attributable attacks, including from its own territory.
Iran and its terror proxies have also made prolific use of drones in the region, firing hundreds at US, Israeli, and Arab forces over the past several years. A drone was responsible for the tragic Tower 22 attack on January 28, 2024, which killed three US servicemembers and injured at least 34 others. Iran has made less use of cruise missiles compared to ballistic missiles or drones but used them, for example, in the 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais attack, which temporarily disrupted over half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production. Cruise missiles were also part of Iran’s first-ever direct attack on Israel in April, with Tehran launching 30 Paveh-class land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) that feature turbojet engines.
While the US military has systems that can intercept Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, a full-scale conflict with Iran could stretch interception capacity to its limits, with some Iranian weapons slipping through even a well-developed integrated air defense system (IADS). THAAD, Patriot, M-SHORAD, C-RAM, Coyote, fighter jets, and future Indirect Fire Protection Capability systems could defend US bases but may be overwhelmed in some instances by massed Iranian attacks. In such a scenario, US bases along the Persian Gulf might take heavy damage in the initial phase of a major conflict with Iran, inflicting many casualties and degrading US capabilities.
Unfortunately, the problems associated with select US military bases in the Persian Gulf region do not stop there. Some partners periodically restrict the ability of the US military to use bases in the region for certain missions. Qatar and Kuwait reportedly restricted the use of bases for operations against Iran, and the United Arab Emirates reportedly restricted the Pentagon from using bases to launch strikes on Iranian proxy groups.
There is also a danger that governments that host US forces in their countries could use that military presence as political leverage against Washington. This would have detrimental effects on other aspects of US national security, incentivizing Washington to look the other way when it comes to troubling behavior by the host government for fear of losing access to the military base.
Tens of thousands of American service members have been stationed at or deployed through Al Udeid over the years. And Doha has shrewdly recruited many American universities to establish satellite campuses in Qatar.
Many of these service members and students who have spent time in Qatar may not know that Doha is a known terror finance hub and has provided safe haven to the Taliban and Hamas. One wonders whether Washington has softened its approach toward Doha on these and other issues for fear of restrictions on the use of Al Udeid or being asked to vacate the base altogether. Such restrictions can be annoying in peacetime and deadly in wartime.
For example, Turkey’s refusal to allow the United States to use Incirlik Air Base for strikes during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in which the United States had invested billions of dollars, made military operations more difficult and put the lives of US troops at greater risk.
So, what’s to be done?
The answer is to not vacate key bases in the Persian Gulf unless forced to do so. That would leave American interests insufficiently protected and create a vacuum that America’s adversaries would fill.
Instead, Washington should add additional air and missile defense capability and capacity at these bases. As the threat from Iranian missiles and drones increases, that will protect American lives and bolster deterrence of Tehran.
But that is not enough. Congress should also press the Pentagon to replicate elsewhere vital military capabilities that currently reside solely or primarily at large, vulnerable bases on the Persian Gulf near Iran, especially at Al Udeid. Alternatives should include a number of smaller bases in the region beyond the range of some Iranian capabilities.
Bases such as King Fahad Air Base, King Faisal Air Base (both of which hosted combined US and Saudi operations in 2021), and Yanbu Port on the western coast of Saudi Arabia are beyond the range of SRBMs fired from Iran and may be suitable candidates.
Admittedly, they are within range of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and some cruise missiles and drones, but Iran likely has far fewer MRBMs, and based on their recent combat record, they have high failure rates, although that capability is likely to mature in the future. The additional time that cruise missiles or drones would need to arrive at more distant targets allows for more time to successfully detect and intercept them. That is best exemplified by the fact that no cruise missiles or drones fired at Israel by Iran on April 13-14 entered Israeli airspace.
To be sure, relocating some assets west would, in some cases, move US forces closer to the Houthis, who have, thanks to Iranian support, their own missile and drone capabilities that are quickly evolving. The Houthis are the only proxy of Iran to possess and to have used MRBMs. But the scale and severity of the Houthi threat is smaller compared to the threat emanating directly from Iran.
Replicating critical capabilities at bases farther from Iran will improve resiliency and ensure that combat operations can continue even when damage is sustained by bases along the Persian Gulf. To be sure, this is not a new problem, as the United States built an alternate Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) located in South Carolina for use in the event that the CAOC at Al Udeid was knocked out.
Additionally, the ability to operate from a greater number of dispersed bases supports the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept in which air forces flex from major regional bases to non-traditional operating sites to increase survivability and continue operations during high-intensity combat. This would have major benefits in the Middle East, as Iran would likely heavily target major airbases in the initial stages of a conflict.
In addition to operational and deterrence benefits, replicating capabilities can reduce the amount of political leverage over the United States these bases confer to a host government. If Qatar and other Arab countries know that the United States has ready-to-go alternatives for military bases elsewhere, Washington can pursue policies toward the respective government more aligned with American interests without being concerned about losing access to any one base. That could induce some partners to reconsider some of their policies and approaches that are at odds with US interests.
In short, replicating military capabilities farther from the most lethal Iran-based weapons creates targeting problems for adversaries, enhances the resilience of US forces, helps insulate US defense posture from political risk, and may provide additional deterrent effects vis-a-vis Iran. The dependence of US forces on Al Udeid makes any capabilities at that base with insufficient redundancy a particularly suitable candidate for replication elsewhere.
Congress, therefore, should press the Biden administration to inventory the operational risks associated with the current basing posture, identify capabilities in the Persian Gulf region where replication elsewhere is most needed, task the Pentagon to provide a plan to reduce those vulnerabilities, and then press the administration to implement that plan without delay.
The United States has vital interests in the Middle East to protect. Washington should ensure US forward-deployed troops are sufficiently protected and do not rely on single points of failure at any one base. Washington should also ensure that it does not permit any host government to transform US military bases from assets to liabilities. If any partner attempts to do so, this plan will ensure Americans have options.
