“Bloodlust” is a term cascading across the Iranian media space this week:
“Bloodlust is commanded,” declared Jam-e Jam newspaper, connected to Iran’s state-sanctioned broadcaster.
“All of Iran seeks your bloodlust,” touted the Tehran daily Hamshahri.
“Iran with one voice seeks the bloodlust of [our] dear guest,” Khorasan newspaper proclaimed.
“Behold bloodlust,” asserted the hardline Tehran daily Vatan-e Emrooz newspaper.
First called for by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei after the assassination of Hamas Political Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, the wrath invoked by the term washes away the humiliation imposed on the Islamic Republic through this targeted killing.
“They have killed our dear guest in our house and made us bereaved, but they have prepared a harsh punishment for themselves. […] In this bitter and difficult incident that happened in the territory of the Islamic Republic, we consider seeking his bloodlust as our duty,” said Khamenei.
How it happened
The New York Times and Axios are reporting that agents of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service planted a bomb in the compound that housed Haniyeh, which was guarded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and remotely detonated it. Predictably, Iranian outlets pushed back on the claim of a pre-placed bomb, which would highlight a major security services breach.
To counter this, Iranian outlets have promoted a narrative put forth by a representative of a different Palestinian terrorist group who was housed in the same compound alleging that a missile or rocket fired from outside the building hit Haniyeh’s room. The IRGC seconded this allegation in a press release claiming that a short-range projectile with a seven-kilogram warhead was fired from outside the building, killing Haniyeh.
Security service penetration
The implications of a punctured Iranian security apparatus reported in Western press coverage are apparently so damning that not all terrorist organizations could believe it to be true. For example, a Taliban official in Afghanistan recently went so far as to claim Iran and Israel are “two sides of the same coin,” implicating the IRGC and Khamenei in the death of Haniyeh.
Conspiracies aside, never before has the head of a member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance been killed on Iranian soil. However, the assassination brings to mind a history of the Islamic Republic’s security services fumbling on the home front against foreign intelligence services. At least six Iranian nuclear scientists, including the former head of Iran’s military nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, have been killed on Iranian soil over the past decade and a half. This track record—coupled with a host of cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and explosions at military and nuclear sites over the years and the theft of Iran’s atomic archive by Israel—previously prompted a former Iranian intelligence minister to claim that “officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran should fear for their lives.”
Iran’s current minister of intelligence has implicated both Israel and the US in Haniyeh’s assassination. This point was also made at the Friday prayer lectern in Tehran. Since these allegations were made, the regime has reportedly begun mass arrests targeting security and intelligence personnel tied to guarding the compound.
Haniyeh in Tehran
Lest the debate over how Haniyeh died obscure everything, it is worth recalling that he was in Tehran attending the swearing-in ceremony for the country’s ninth president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Since the October 7 terrorist attack on Israel, Haniyeh reportedly traveled to Tehran at least twice, once in November and once in March. On both occasions, he met with senior Iranian officials.
Hours before his death, Haniyeh had again met with Iran’s supreme leader, who praised the Palestinian resistance as “the tallest flag of Islam.” Haniyeh also met with Pezeshkian, who similarly lauded the Palestinian resistance against Israel, declaring, “We are certain that the resistance of the Palestinian people and fighters will lead to ultimate victory and the liberation of the land of Palestine.”
Pezeshkian later noted the speed at which the events surrounding the killing of Haniyeh took place, proclaiming, “Yesterday, I raised his victorious hand, and today I must carry him on my shoulders [for burial].” Pezeshkian’s comments were followed by a threat indicating Iran would make “the terrorist occupiers regret their cowardly act.” Both statements by Pezeshkian, as well as a photo of him holding up Haniyeh’s hand, were plastered across a billboard in Tehran’s Vali Asr square.
Symbology—is past prologue?
For those familiar with missile operations launched directly and overtly from Iranian territory, the “art”—née propaganda—in Vali Asr square has often served as a harbinger of things to come. In 2017, for the first time in nearly two decades, the Islamic Republic employed ballistic missiles in a public operation from its own territory. The target was Islamic State positions in Syria following a terrorist attack on Iranian soil. At the time, a billboard in Vali Asr showcased the hand of an IRGC officer with missiles being launched from each finger and a quote reading, “I am Iran’s guardian.”
Following the January 2020 US drone strike in Iraq on Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s chief terrorist mastermind and former head of the IRGC Quds-Force, the billboard in Vali Asr Square was painted red with a picture of Soleimani and a line reading, “Your blood challenges an adversary.” Days later, Iran launched what would become the biggest ballistic missile operation against US forces in history, targeting two American bases in Iraq with 16 precision-strike short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The attack led to over 140 traumatic brain injuries.
More recently, Vali Asr’s billboard has twice tipped Iran’s hand about missile operations in 2024. In January 2024, in response to terrorist attacks in Iran, the billboard again went red and promised a “hard response.” Days later, Iran fired ballistic missiles at Islamic State positions in Syria, Kurdish targets in Iraq, and allegedly Baluch terrorist groups in Pakistan. By April 2024, following the regime’s historic first direct and overt strike against Israel using medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and one-way attack (OWA) drones in response to an attack on its alleged consulate facility in Syria that killed several senior IRGC offices, Vali Asr’s billboard was covered with pictures of missiles. It also carried a written threat against Israel on the bottom right, declaring, “Israel is feebler than a spider’s web.”
Besides the latest billboard at Vali Asr promising revenge, another element foreshadowing a kinetic Iranian response has been offered: the raising of a red flag over the Jamkaran mosque in the holy city of Qom. Traditionally, the Islamic Republic raises this flag bearing the Arabic phrase, “Oh, ye avengers of Hussein,” during the Islamic holy month of Muharram to commemorate the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Hussein ibn Ali. But it has also raised it to signal the spilling of innocent blood and call for revenge. The flag was famously raised at Jamkaran in January 2020 after the US killed Soleimani but has also been raised above another prominent Shiite shrine in Iran in October/November 2022 after the holy site was subject to a terrorist attack.
What else is being said?
“Run away while you still can,” read a headline in the hardline Mashregh News Agency. In a lengthy piece drawing on reporting from the similarly hardline Farhikhtehgan newspaper—itself no stranger to trafficking in antisemitism—bold claims about several attack vectors against Israel by the Axis of Resistance were made. Chief amongst them is that a combined response from Iran and its proxies will be leveled against Israel and that the attack (be it in lethality or volume) will be greater than Iran’s April 2024 barrage, which was codenamed Operation True Promise. This point was echoed in Javan, a hardline newspaper tied to the IRGC. As a reminder, one month after Operation True Promise, IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir-Ali Hajizadeh claimed that Iran had only used 20% of the firepower it had arrayed for the operation.
The Mashregh report alleged—providing no evidence—that a munitions crisis had prompted a move by Israel to target commanders and key personnel in the Axis of Resistance. Accordingly, the targets it recommended for attack to take advantage of this alleged crisis were threefold: Israel’s defense industrial base and weaponry production plants, weapons depots and ammunition storage facilities, and security and intelligence bases to hamper intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) by Israel, as well as command-and-control (C2).
Considerable ink was also spilled on geography, including launches from sites that Israel and its allies could track but not intercept, such as Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. The Mashregh article went on to warn that the Axis could target Israeli interests outside of “occupied Palestine” as well. Some of these non-Israeli targets would include Western air and missile defense in the region, including those that were air-based, land-based, or sea-based. While the report mentioned a vast array of weapons that could be employed in the operation, ranging from ballistic missiles to rockets to anti-tank weapons, it specifically said a drone attack against the Israeli leadership was on the table. It also mentioned that terrorism was officially an option, declaring that “It is possible that Palestinian groups will assassinate Zionist officials in other countries in the near future.” Lastly, the piece contrasted the several hours-long barrage of drones and missiles by Iran on April 13–14 with the potential for an operation lasting several days.
Expanding on some of these points, the hardline daily Kayhan newspaper brandished the notion of Israel facing multidirectional threats and simultaneous attacks by Iran and its proxies as being part of a new type of “360-degree” effort. The report similarly contrasted the impending kinetic operation with Operation True Promise, claiming that “the upcoming operation will be more diverse, dispersed, and more difficult to intercept.” In early July, Hajizadeh said that he anticipated the chance to engage in a ‘True Promise-2’ type of operation, and alluded to a much greater amount of munitions to be expended than the 300-plus fired in April, saying, “I don’t know how many missiles must be employed in that operation.”
Layered and multidirectional projectile fire lies at the heart of the Islamic Republic’s “ring of fire” strategy against Israel. While neither Kayhan nor Mashregh referenced this term, it is used by analysts to describe the forward-deployed, long-range strike capabilities in the hands of Tehran’s proxies, as well as any local production capacity for these munitions that can be used to overwhelm Israeli defenses.
To be clear, as of this writing, no Iranian official has confirmed any of these prospective vectors of attack as definite, and the attempt to publicize them by Iranian hardline media outlets could be rooted in the desire for self-aggrandizement, to bolster deterrence, or engage in denial and deception through the media.
Thus far, Mohammad Bagheri, the head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), has stated that “Various measures must be taken and the Zionists will surely regret it” but exactly how Iran and the Axis would respond was still “under review.” In an earlier press release following the killing of Haniyeh, the IRGC promised “a harsh and painful response” against Israel from both the Axis of Resistance and “specifically Islamic Iran” but did not elaborate any further.
What follows …
A three-day national mourning period in Iran following the killing of Haniyeh ended earlier this weekend. It would have been exceptionally unlikely for Tehran to have launched overt and direct attacks from its territory against Israel during that time.
Israeli English-language outlets citing Sky News Arabia are reporting that the Iranian attack will likely come on the 12–13 of August, which coincides with Tisha B’Av, a Jewish holy day of mourning. If that is the case, it would afford Iran a 12-day period to coordinate—or else choose to telegraph its response. The timing would similarly afford Washington, its European and Middle Eastern partners, and especially Israel an opportunity to mount an impressive defense, the likes of which were seen in April, as well as limit any political fallout. As a reminder, 12 was also the precise number of days between the targeting of a property housing senior IRGC officials in Damascus by Israel and the Iranian military’s response. In contrast, there was a five-day period between when the US killed Soleimani (January 3) and when the Iranian military response commenced (January 8).
Given that an Iranian military response is now a question of when and not if, two outsized factors loom large. First, Iran clearly does not think its True Promise operation in April was sufficient to deter Israel from taking bolder action—as Israel’s targets escalated from a purported diplomatic facility in Damascus to the Iranian capital city. This means Iranian firepower is likely to increase, either in quality—such as more solid-propellant MRBMs and more LACMs over drones—or quantity, such as the volume behind each volley. This scenario will pose greater risks when married with proxy firepower and be a test of Iran’s ability to coordinate long-range firepower against targets during wartime. Iran’s April attack employed 100 MRBMs, 50% of which reportedly failed to launch or fell short of their targets. Should Iran swap in other, more advanced MRBMs or test its allegedly “hypersonic” Fattah missile during the next round, the results may be different.
Second, despite Israel’s precision strike on a radar facility in Isfahan on April 19 and its recent assassination in Tehran, Iran remains undeterred from picking a fight with conventionally superior and even nuclear-armed states. For a regime that has perfected the art of proxy warfare, the Islamic Republic is increasingly seeing the political utility of overt and attributable conflict in the Middle East. While this affords some states opposing the Islamic Republic the chance to lure Tehran into more military engagements that might expose the regime’s conventional shortcomings over time, the growing efficacy and the diminishing threshold for the use of drones and ballistic missiles by the Islamic Republic will make these matchups exceptionally dangerous for all sides involved.
