Since Turkey and Syria broke off relations in 2011, Ankara has played a prominent role in fighting Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria by supplying material support to insurgent groups seeking to overthrow Assad and maintaining forces in the opposition-held northwest. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Assad recently signaled they are interested in restoring diplomatic ties.
A proposed Erdogan and Assad meeting
At the NATO summit on July 11, Erdogan said that he would extend a formal invitation to Assad to either come to Turkey or to meet in a third country. This overture came after the Syrian leader said Damascus was open to reviving Turkish-Syrian relations “as long as they are based on respecting the sovereignty of the Syrian state over all of its territory and fighting all forms of terrorism.
Sources familiar with the discussions claimed the meeting could occur as early as August in Moscow and be mediated by Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, Turkish diplomats have publicly stated there is no official plan.
Reluctance from both sides
Recent developments, including Syria’s readmission to the Arab League, have paved the way for rapprochement between the two former allies. Erdogan is likely responding in part to increasing anti-Syrian sentiment that has resulted in riots and xenophobic violence in Turkey. As fears about Erdogan’s re-election prospects in 2028 increase, the government in Ankara is more incentivized to strike a deal with Assad to pave the way for the return of many of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey.
Assad has previously stated that a precondition for any negotiations to begin with Turkey is the full withdrawal of Ankara’s support for opposition militias and the removal of Turkish troops from Syria. However, the Syrian president is also driven by his desire to end his regional political isolation. Assad is likely aware that a meeting with Erdogan would be unlikely to result in a complete withdrawal, as Ankara continues to cite its support for opposition forces as necessary to ensure a terror-free northern Syria, where cross-border attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) have occurred.
While the likelihood of concessions from either side is unclear, the possibility of this meeting indicates some willingness to find common ground that benefits both leaders’ power projection and legitimacy. Both Ankara and Damascus have an interest in curtailing the autonomy of Kurdish groups in northeast Syria, which could be a driving force in negotiations. Both governments could also be seeking economic gains by removing barriers to the flow of official commerce and trade.
Who is at risk from a rapprochement?
While both Erdogan and Assad consider reestablishing ties based on their personal
ambitions, there are serious risks involved. In parts of Syria where Turkish-backed militia groups retain control, demonstrators have already expressed concern over reports that a key crossing between Assad-held territory and opposition-held cities would soon reopen to commercial traffic. Violent attacks on Turkish military and supply trucks by opposition groups indicate a growing fear of how new relations between Ankara and Damascus would impact their ability to defend themselves. Turkey itself could be left particularly vulnerable to this resentment, as many of these militias are affiliated with jihadist movements, have Turkish residency or citizenship, and have shown a willingness to retaliate violently.
A significant loser from the normalization of ties between Erdogan and Assad is likely to be the Syrian Kurds. Coalesced under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the United States has partnered with SDF forces to successfully thwart the existential threat posed by the Islamic State (ISIS).
Since the very beginning of the US partnership with the SDF, Turkey has feigned outrage, accusing Washington of consorting with “Kurdish terrorists.” Ankara identifies the SDF as an offshoot of the Kurdish separatist movement inside Turkey, spearheaded by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). While the SDF has organic ties to the PKK, which historically waged a bloody cessation campaign against Turkey, the Syrian offshoot has been demonstrably clear in words and actions that it bears no ill will toward Turkey. The group’s primary purpose has been to defeat ISIS.
A regional source has claimed that an Assad-Erdogan rapprochement could hinge on a joint Syrian-Turkish military offensive to rout the SDF. This would result in Turkey’s goal of eliminating the so-called “Kurdish threat,” while Assad would regain further regime control over Syrian territory. It is all hypothetical right now, as both Ankara and Damascus will likely wait to see the outcome of the US election. Erdogan’s desired result would be for a second Trump administration, which he thinks he can convince to withdraw US troops, clearing the way for a military offensive against the SDF.
A withdrawal of US forces would carry big risks, however, and not just for the Kurds. There are reports highlighting a significant resurgence of ISIS in the region. And without an SDF that is aided by the US military, it is not an unforeseeable possibility to witness another significant ISIS threat reemerge.
All this could spell an unwanted victory for Russia and Iran. Their investment in the Assad regime will have paid off if he can successfully reintegrate into the region. A US departure from Syria would also be a stark recognition of waning US influence in the Middle East and stand in direct contrast to a Syrian regime with a consolidated alliance with two major American rivals.
