Prior to 2010, northern Afghanistan’s Nuristan province was occupied by a series of US Army outposts. But after a Taliban attack on one of the outposts left eight US soldiers dead, the outposts were abandoned, and US Army and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) pulled back to bases in Kunar province.
The move coincided with General Stanley McChrystal’s implementation of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The strategy required US/ISAF forces to leave sparsely populated areas and focus on protecting more heavily populated ones. Sparsely populated and mountainous Nuristan, now referred to as the “Lost Province”, was one of the areas abandoned.
Although it has relatively few inhabitants, Nuristan does have a feature that is useful to the Taliban: a transportation route through the mountains that links Taliban safe havens in Pakistan and in northern Kunar province to the capital of Kabul. With US and Afghan Army forces gone, the Taliban turned Nuristan and northern Kunar into a staging area. This allowed them to mount a series of attacks in Kabul in April.
Returning to Nuristan?
US Army and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) troops are now returning to Nuristan. The 1st Battalion / 12th Infantry Regiment is extending its area of responsibility from Kunar into Nuristan, reestablishing outposts in the province.
It is important to note, however, that this move is is only temporary. Last year, the US established a new strategic plan for Afghanistan. Part of the plan calls for the US to draw down its forces over the summer, reducing the number of troops from 90,000 to 68,000 by October.
The 1st Battalion/ 12th Regiment will leave Afghanistan in October and will not be replaced by another US unit. Moreover, the ANSF does not have the present capability to replace the departing US troops. According to the US commander, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Green, “[W]e can transition in Kunar, but if we were to try and expand without increased combat power there, then yes, I do think that we would be spread so thin that it would start to break.” Nor is it likely that the ANSF will develop the capability to establish a significant presence in the area in the future. The ANSF is already close to its end strength goal of 352,000 troops, and US/NATO has made the decision not to grow the ANSF beyond this level.
So, in October, Nuristan will be abandoned again, opening the door to Taliban infiltration and attacks on Kabul. As LWJ predicted last September, US/NATO’s strategic decision to draw down US forces while also limiting the size of the ANSF is coming home to roost.
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10 Comments
Shaking my head.. why? Temporary block of the Taliban does not stop the Taliban. They will find another route to use for four months, then go back to this one.
Why even put soldiers lives at risk, if a rip date is already established?
“Nor is it likely that the ANSF will develop the capability to establish a significant presence in the area in the future. The ANSF is already close to its end strength goal of 352,000 troops, and US/NATO has made the decision not to grow the ANSF beyond this level.” Bottom line: A 350K man indigenous army cannot protect the capitol by eliminating enemy infiltration that uses a known route. If you want to know what will happen after ISAF leaves, read about the fall of South Vietnam. “It’s déjà vu all over again”. (RIP Yogi Berra)
It wasn’t that long ago that Nuristan was actually known as Kafiristan……..
@Nic
The fall of the Russian backed government after the Soviet army left is a far more apt analogy than the fall of South Vietnam. I seriously doubt the Pakistani Army would risk an all out invasion like North Vietnam in 1975. Even after the Russians had left mujahideen forces under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar did poorly against the Afghan army at Jalalabad. Look up “Battle of Jalalabad 1989” It was small unit tactics that lead to the downfall of the Najibullah regime in 1992, three years after the Soviet army pulled out.
@Nic
Not even close. Afghanistan under Najibullah collapsed for many of the same reasons South Vietnam did. In both cases the Gov’ts, USA & Soviet Union, supporting the countries in question after having physically withdrawn soon after stopped supplying their clients with weapons, ammunition & necessities of war. The USA pulled this same stunt on Chaing Kai Shek’s KMT prompting his withdrawal from the Chinese mainland.
Come 2014 there will still be 5,000 to 10,000 US military personnel in Afghanistan if not more plus a host of lesser’s (British, Eastern & Central European contigent’s, a more robust Indian presence etc.,.) The air power alone they will be able to bring to bear in support of ANSF will more than off set anything Pakistan would be stupid enough to consider.
Not even close. Afghanistan under Najibullah collapsed for many of the same reasons South Vietnam did. In both cases the Gov’ts, USA & Soviet Union, supporting the countries in question after having physically withdrawn soon after stopped supplying their clients with weapons, ammunition & necessities of war. The USA pulled this same stunt on Chaing Kai Shek’s KMT prompting his withdrawal from the Chinese mainland.
Read more: https://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/06/us_army_returns_to_afghanistan.php#ixzz1y4lss14o
Isn’t it possible (or likely) that forces are back in that area to deploy listening devices and to perform other activities in preparation for downsizing and transitioning?
We don’t just go somewhere for no reason. The Taliban have other routes into Afghanistan, so I have to ask the same question as Rogg, why go for 4 months? What’s there, besides semi-precious stones? What is worth risking lives for, for 4 months? Argue the downfall all you want, it’s going to happen, but what’s there that we want so badly?
@ Cass,
I almost see another Restrepo type documentary in the making here. Send in troops, watch them suffer and make little to no progress, and then pull out when the survivability rate becomes to low to handle. I became bitter at the end of that movie when it was stated we pulled out of the region with really no gains at all.
Sadly, history repeats itself, and this is a sequels credits i have already seen.
NATO Training Mission Afghanistan had originally planned for over 1,600 Afghan National Police personnel in the Fielding Plan for Nuristan.
We had over 20 Police infrastructure projects worth over $60M USD planned for Nuristan.
Virtually every construction project has been cancelled and all those units were sent to other locations, due to lack of security.
The odds of the Afghan Ministry of Interior establishing these units & facilities after ISAF leaves are slim to none.
The pitfalls of a “a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy” … which is leaving massive tracts of this country with no national presence…