Improving Mosul’s security and the road to Tal Afar

Click the image to view the slideshow of a battlefield circulation to review the traffic control points along the key highway leading from the Syrian border to Tal Afar.

MOSUL, IRAQ: Just two months ago US and Iraqi security forces were openly slugging it out with al Qaeda in Iraq and allied insurgent groups in western Mosul in neighborhoods like Yarmouk. Suicide car bombs, suicide vest attacks, improvised explosive device attacks, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and small-arms attacks were a common occurrence.

But the security situation is slowly improving. Senior Iraqi generals are now conducting numerous battlefield tours of the combat outposts to assess the situation and shore up the weak points in the defenses. “Just one month ago, [Brigadier General Taha Askar, the commander of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division in western Mosul] did not venture out into the city,” said Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Meeker, the Military Transition Team chief adviser for the 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Division commander and several senior generals from the Ninewa Operational Command have been on the battlefield almost daily to assess the situation in Mosul.

Recent attacks

Yet while attacks are still high in Mosul, the quality of the attacks has decreased, according to the US officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the Military Transition Team. Al Qaeda continues to attack, but they are now hitting weaker checkpoints manned by the Iraqi police or newly established combat outposts and traffic control points manned by the Army, timing the attacks to occur almost immediately after they open.

On March 13, a suicide bomber wearing a vest attacked Combat Outpost Rat in western Mosul. The suicide bomber and two other attackers were stopped and killed by vigilant Iraqi soldiers before the vest was detonated.

On March 14, al Qaeda attacked two newly established traffic control points — only six hours old — in western Mosul with suicide car bombs. Again, Iraqi soldiers were able to stop the attacks.

On March 19, an al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bomber rammed a dump truck packed with 2,000 pounds of explosives into a new outpost established by the 2nd Division’s 1st Brigade south of Mosul. One Iraqi soldier was killed, and 16 soldiers and three civilians were wounded.

The March 23 suicide truck bombing inside Combat Outpost Inman in western Mosul is the exception to recent attacks. An al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bomber drove a dump truck packed with explosives into the heart of the outpost and detonated the explosives. Thirteen soldiers were killed and 42 wounded. While the other recent attacks had been unsuccessful in closing down the outpost and checkpoints, the attack on Combat Outpost Inman has temporarily rendered it unusable. US and Iraqi Army officers believe the strike was an inside job, but the battalion operating there was negligent in providing adequate defenses. Al Qaeda struck a poorly defended target manned by what some US officers consider the worst battalions in the 2nd Division.

To conduct major suicide attacks such as these recent strikes, al Qaeda in Iraq is committing significant resources to the fight, said Meeker. “A SVBIED [suicide car bomb] is like a tank company for al Qaeda,” Meeker explained. Al Qaeda must gather the resources, recruit and deploy a suicide bomber, and build an explosive device big enough to shatter the defenses of a reinforced combat outpost or traffic control point. Al Qaeda is reorganizing their attacks to destroy these outposts as the Iraqi Army and police are disrupting their supply lines, Meeker said.

The purpose of the strikes is to demoralize the Iraqi troops. “Al Qaeda is trying to break the will of the Iraqi soldiers and force them to abandon their outposts,” said Major Paul Eberhardt, the operations officer for the 2nd Brigade’s Military Transition Team, during a briefing at Spear Base in southwestern Mosul. But al Qaeda has failed to do that.

Making changes

With a renewed focus on securing Mosul, the 2nd Brigade and the Ninewa Operational Command have begun to focus on integrating police into Army traffic control points and shoring up the defenses in the western outskirts of Mosul. Ten combat outposts and numerous traffic control points have been established in the outer ring of western Mosul. The Iraqi police control the inner city. The Army and police seek to shut down al Qaeda’s ratline from Syria through Tal Afar.

To accomplish this, the key highway from the west must be secured. Brigadier General Taha has worked to address the problem by relieving Lieutenant Colonel Favil, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, and his executive officer from their leadership positions. The 1st battalion is responsible for securing the portion of the road to Tal Afar inside Mosul’s city limits. Favil was absent from the unit after being arrested for shooting his brother, and his executive officer had not stepped up to lead; their soldiers were failing to patrol the road.

The March 23 suicide truck bombing was a major setback for the 2nd Brigade’s efforts to secure the road to Tal Afar. Colonel Atyia, the new battalion commander, will have a difficult job in restoring morale and discipline to the unit. And he must quickly re-establish the battalion’s headquarters as Combat Outpost Inman suffered major damage in the attack.

The setback at Combat Outpost Inman has not stopped the 2nd Brigade from working to improve security on the outer stretch of the road. Taha and Major General Hassan, the deputy commander of the Ninewa Operational Command, have begun to focus on the outer stretch of the road from Mosul to Tal Afar. Taha is working to improve the discipline of his troops and correct gaps in security at the traffic control points to ensure al Qaeda suicide bombers do not destroy the check posts dotting the highway.

Hassan seeks to integrate police and Army operations. “We have to work together, we have to work to block the terrorists from coming in Mosul,” Hassan said. “We must be united to defeat this threat.” Hassan said the Ninewa Operational Command would provide the needed resources to integrate the police and Army units in and around Mosul. This will be needed as supplies such as Hesco and concrete barriers, engineering support, latrines, and other life support materials are short in Mosul.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

Tags: Iraq