As always, the din from the rotors of the Black Hawk was overwhelming. As though the whole picture were on mute, the rotorwash drowning out all other noise, I watched as Col. Mike Meese, my professor this past spring, climbed silently into the helicopter and buckled up across from me, followed by three more soldiers in their bulky armor. Then Col. Meese’s voice crackled loudly over the intercom: “Sir! This is Wes Morgan!” I couldn’t see who the colonel was talking to, the cabin was so cramped, but I knew a moment before I heard an easily recognizable voice reply: “Good to have you with us, Wesley. Glad to finally meet you.” As the officer next to me pushed back to make way, another gray-clad, armored soldier leaned across the crowded space of the cabin to shake my hand. It was him alright: four stars on his hat, four more on his armor, the face you see on the news, and a nametag that read Petraeus.
Change of plans
I’d gotten up Saturday morning at Forward Operating Base Union III, home of 1-14 Cavalry, expecting a long morning before heading over to the embassy landing zone to get going for the day. I’d learned the previous afternoon that I was going to spend Saturday afternoon with Petraeus on a “battlefield circulation” – a tour of a unit’s area of operations with the general, some of his staff, and space for four or five members of the media, including me.
The plan was for me to get a ride over the International Zone landing zone around noon, where Petraeus’ two helicopters would stop on the way up to the day’s battlefield to pick up me and the other reporters. At 0900, though, as I sat in the Union III hajji caf
8 Comments
Awesome posting, Wes! I can picture you now, some day long down the road, a grandson on your knee, you going through a photo album…your finger pointing to a warrior with 4 stars and saying, “That, my boy, is General Petraeus, I shook his hand and rode on a helicopter with him!”
I’m curious about the apparent disbursement of al qaeda into all of those areas you mention…does there appear to be any coordination of al qaeda operations anymore? It seems to me they have been scattered to the four winds and I wonder as to how one cell knows anything about how another is operating?
Again, thanks for all the insights and updates, Wes – you’re doing an outstanding job over there – be safe.
Great report Wes – you are going to be a great Public Affairs Officer for the United States Army someday.
thanks Bill for making this stuff happen.
I so much wish this Petraeus heavy footprint strategy of getting US troops out into the community had been instituted two years ago.
The strategy is working wonders in both Sunni and Shia areas. The militias operate like gangs, if you don’t have police forces in the area no one will snitch on the gangs or be killed along with their family.
“I so much wish this Petraeus heavy footprint strategy of getting US troops out into the community had been instituted two years ago.”
I used to wish the same thing, ECH, but another post some weeks ago pointed out that the Sunnis had to come to their own conclusion that we were a lesser evil than Al Qaeda. And seemingly that conclusion was not reached until about August/September 2006.
It is a sobering thought that, perhaps, no strategy would have worked in 2004 and 2005 so long as the Sunni were convinced that Al Qaeda was their friend. Thankfully, we kept slugging away at Al Qaeda, did not give in to calls for retreat and defeat, and then Al Qaeda kept hacking people apart.
Hopefully we will see the same thing with the Shia: keep the pressure on the roge JAM units while supporting friendly shia leadership and then wait for the shiite population at large to get sick and tired of the imported, Iranian version of islam that Mookie Al Sadr is trying to impose.
Not too comfortable with all the specifics on future targets.
TSA,
IIRC, the strategy that’s currently working in Anbar was floated fairly early on in the occupation but was shot down by the CPA. This left most of the Sunni leaders in Anbar who weren’t fighting us to simply sit things out. So it could have worked earlier, but Bremer et al. did something of a sub-optimal job in that area.
Great report and thanks for supporting this Bill, as soon as I stop smarting from political donations I plan to send some money. I would not count AQ out completely in urban Baghdad, they are very keen at following our press and know the only way they win is there — some have undoubtably gone into standby/quiet mode.
I expect these will reappear with a tet-style offense complete with press agitprop campaign just as General Petraeus releases his report. Everyone needs to be ready to vette all stories closely and triple check everything the closer we get to mid-September.
I used to wish the same thing, ECH, but another post some weeks ago pointed out that the Sunnis had to come to their own conclusion that we were a lesser evil than Al Qaeda. And seemingly that conclusion was not reached until about August/September 2006.
Yes. As far as I’m concerned, for the whole Iraq-as-flypaper strategy to work we had to convince the locals to fight, rather than just U.S. forces. That way Iraq would experience liberation, not occupation, and the U.S. would gain a fighting ally, not a passive one. (I outlined this strategy in the inaugural post of my blog back in 2004.)