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Iraqi & Coalition forces Order of Battle as of June 1, 2007. |
The Jun 2007 updates to the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle are now available at the ISF OOB Page. The significant changes to the Order of Battle are summarized below.
On May 30, 2007, the Kurdish Regional Government went to Provincial Iraqi Control. That makes 7 of 18 provinces turned over. (Muthanna, Najaf, DhiQar and Maysan in south; Dohuk, Arbil and Sulmaniyah in the North.)
In Baghdad, the second rotation of troop augmentees is underway with no reported difficulties. Elements of the 2-1 Iraqi Army (IA) Brigade are reported in the western Rasheed District of Baghdad. The 2-1 Brigade is normally at the Fallujah , and Fallujah is still IA battlespace. The 4-1 IA was due to complete its 90 day deployment and rotate back to Anbar in April. We estimate elements of the returning 4-1 Brigade relieved the 2-1 in Fallujah on completion of the Baghdad Deployment.
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The May 31 briefing slide on ISF deployments. Map courtesy of MNF-Iraq. Click map to view. |
The IA 4-2 Brigade was reported operating back in Ninawa Province indicating a return from Baghdad. Since the 1-2 Brigade and the 3-4 Brigade preceded the 4-2 Brigade in deployment to Baghdad, they are also listed as back in home areas. The May 31 brief slides from MNC-I place the 4-1 IA Brigade in Baghdad and Anbar at the same time and does not list the 4-10 Brigade in Baghdad (estimate that is a typo). There is a distinct shift of ISF forces to the outer belts illustrated in these slides. Notice that both 2-9 and 3-9 Brigades are illustrated as Tank Brigades indicating that 9th Mechanized Division may be converting to 9th Tank Division. On 29 May “Iraqi soldiers and U.S. paratroopers joined forces to conduct Operation Al Nasir Al Ahmar (“Red Eagle,” in English), a battalion-sized cordon and search operation in the northern section of the Adhamiyah District May 26. The 3rd “War Eagle” Battalion, 1st Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division was the main effort for the operation, with support provided by paratroopers from 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment.” This is the first report of an IA 11th Division element operational and is likely to be a re designated Battalion.
In Diyala, “forces from the Iraqi 2nd and 4th Divisions, backed by U.S. troops, started on Monday a wide-scale security campaign to track down armed groups all over the (Diyala) province,” as forces start to augment Diyala’s 5th IA Division instead of Baghdad. Four days after a Commanding General, Iraqi Ground Forces Command inspection and meeting where the 5th IA Division’s CG was reported unsure of his Division’s readiness to transfer to Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the 5th Division’s Commander was relieved. “Iraqi military officials also said the commander of Iraqi troops in Diyala province had been replaced after allegations that he was biased against Sunnis. Maj. Gen. Shaker Hulayel, commander of the Iraqi 5th Division, was replaced by Brig. Gen. Abdul-Hussein al-Timimi, according to another Iraqi general, Saman Assi Talabani. “I think it is a good decision and the replacement should have taken place months ago,” Talabani said, citing “a lot of mistakes” that had “made the security situation worse and out of control.” This did not delay the transfer of 5th IA Division to the IGFC. The 7th IA Division in western Anbar is the last remaining under US command.
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Progression of Iraqi Army units ‘in the lead’ as of June 2007. Map courtesy of MNF-Iraq. Click map to view. |
Al Sabaah reports that the Iraqi “Minister of Defense has announced that the Iraqi forces are studying now the state of rising their military maneuvers at a level of airborne brigade with all their supplies in the hot areas, after were on level of airborne battalion which have been supposed to fill any security gap taken place as soon as sudden withdrawal happened by the multi-national forces.” Al Sabaah’s machine translator has consistently used Brigade for IA Divisions. This indicates the planned expansion of Iraqi Special Operations Forces to a Division or the formation of an Airborne/Airmoble/Air Assault Division.
During the May 31 MNC-I brief, the General indicated which of the 10 active IA Divisions were most capable: “The 8th Iraqi army in the center of the country, the 10th Iraqi army in the south, and the 2nd and 3rd Iraq armies in the north are performing well and providing security for the populace.” He also indicated that he thought the IA needed further expansion: “We have 150,000 coalition forces here right now — or, excuse me, 150,000 U.S. forces here right now, and they’re going to have to — they don’t need 150,000, but they’re going to need some — a number above what they have now. So my guess is they’re going to have to increase the size of their army in order to accomplish the mission.”
The Iraqi Army grew by a Division’s worth of personnel during the month of May:
May 2, 2007: 137,800
May 9, 2007: 141,000 [+3,200]
May 16,2007: 151,800 [+10,800]
May 30, 2007: 152,500 [+700]
Total gain: 14,700
While the ISF added 14,700 personnel (12%) to its operational force, no new Iraqi Army units have been officially announced. Part of this increase will be for the planned 10% overmanning and probably half of this is new IA Brigades formed.
The IA is training 70,000 new troops per year (growing to 90,000) with 18,000 per year needed to replace attritional losses. The cadre requirements for the new forming units is causing fluctuations in IA unit capabilities and ratings. Approximately 200 experienced personnel and 550 new Junji are required to form a new IA Battalion. The experienced leaders are pulled from lead battalions. On 9 May, General Pace briefed that: 10 IA Battalions were independent, 88 in-lead, 27 partnered and 29 still forming. Yet one week latter Brigadier General Wiggens said “Currently there are 89 battalions where Iraqi forces are either in the lead or are independent; more specifically, there are nine independent battalions and 80 battalions in the lead.”
While the 1st IA Division and to lesser extent 7th IA Divison are reported coming on line for Logistics self-sufficiency. Approximately 36,000 more IA nationwide are needed for logistics support (12,900 current). The FY2007 Supplemental Bill (finally passed into law) includes funding for IA Force enhancements to include equipping and training 33,000 more personnel for Logistics, Sustainment, Maintenance & Support elements (Engr, EOD, MI, MP). Weapons including assault rifles, machine guns, night-vision devices, howitzers, mortars, airlift, air assault, UAVs and Offshore Patrol Vessels are also funded by this law, as is the requirement to form an I SOF utility helicopter squadron and initial acquisition of a turboprop trainer (T6 like) with counter-insurgency capabilities. Reports of elements of 8th IA Division receiving Forward Artillery Observer training at Kalsu indicate that the 8th will be first to receive the new howitzers and mortars.
Other announced acquisitions and weapons deliveries include:
• The 2nd delivery of 5 Huey IIs to 2nd Squadron. (10 operational. 16 total planned for 2nd Squadron.) which is to get a “counter-terrorism configuration introduced in near future.” This indicates that 2nd Squadron will be employed as I SOF support.
• The first M4/M16 issue at Taji to the IA 3-9 Tank Brigade.
• An engineering contract for expansion of IA Barracks and facilities to support the new forming forces.
• An FMS sale of medical supplies, equipment and training (a major weak point in the IA).
• There is reports of plans to purchase anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles by the MoD.
In the Ministry of Interior forces:
• The only active INP not accounted for on the 31st MNC-I brief slide is the 6th Brigade, confirming they are the INP Brigade at Numaniyah (off the map) for Phase II training.
• The Department of Border Enforcement is reported to still have serious logistics problems (and, in my opinion, could use expansion and motor/mechanized elements).
• In Anbar, the Provincial Security Force has expanded to a MoI light paramilitary Division organized into a three Brigade structure: “Provincial Security Force 1” and “Provincial Security Force 2” based in and around Ramadi plus a “Quick Intervention Brigade” based in Fallujah:”
Format changes to the OOB include:
• Page 9 is now the Joint IA/INP page with all ISF units assigned to the Joint Baghdad Operational Command (BOC) Districts listed there.
• Page 7 (IGFC Baghdad) retain Iraqi Army elements in Baghdad Province
• Page 10 retains the INP elements outside of the Baghdad City Districts.
Note: OPSEC in military press releases has tightened up considerably over the last month.
29 Comments
Any word on the Iraqi Army getting the M60s or other heavy or medium weapons?
That was M60 Tanks if anyone was wondering.
I am not sure i like the idea of giving the IA M16/M4. Are guys are already clamoring for a “heavier” weapon so why give these to our allies?
As for old M60’s..
I know they have T-72’s so why should we spend more time training them on a new system? I am sure we can find an old Soviet trading partner that would off load them for a pretty penny.
Bill, DJ and Chris do an amazing job compiling all “public” equipment procurement by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF):
http://billroggio.com/multimedia/OOBpage15-Equipment.pdf
The Iraqi Army (IA) is receiving a lot of M60 tanks late this year. The exact number is not known. Presumably, the Iraqi government and MNF-I got a good deal on them.
If any of you come across information regarding future equipment purchases by the ISF, consider e-mailing it to Bill/DJ/Chris. They will update the ISF OOB (Order of Battle) with it:
http://billroggio.com/oob/index.php
I suspect few readers have gone through the OOB in detail. It has an stunning amount of valuable information, that is constantly updated. There is nothing remotely as informative or comprehensive available to the public anywhere.
Thanks again the Bill, DJ and Chris for building and maintaining the ISF OOB for the rest of us. I know you don’t get to hear this nearly enough.
Mike, regarding buying more T72s . . . no doubt the IA would love to buy them second hand and update/refit them. T80s also for that matter. GoI (Gov of Iraq) is likely to spend close to 9 ½ billion dollars this year on the ISF. American taxpayers are likely to chip in another 4 ½ billion dollars this year. If you want the ISF to acquire more equipment faster, please lobby Congress to increase the grants they provide GoI, including the ISF. [Note that the life-cycle costs of building T72 brigades include the cost of maintaining them (including buying updates) over time, the equipment that would involve, ammunition, and the cost of training Iraqi soldiers to do all this independently.]
Congress is penny wise and pound stupid. They would rather spend $10 billion 50-130 GI lives a month for a much longer period of time than provide funding to the ISF. Many in Congress have no confidence in Iraqis, their government, or their security forces . . . and don’t think they are worth another penny of American taxpayer assistance.
So don’t hold your breadth.
Mike,
You are demonstrating the Pentagon’s old view about the Iraqi Army that cost us lots of time and lives. The mindset that we shouldn’t trust the Iraqi Army so lets just give them light weapons and some Warsaw pact junk and call it a day. I believe that mindset still exists in parts of the Pentagon, but it has been losing ground.
ECH, I couldn’t agree more. If we “we shouldn’t trust the Iraqi Army,” then we should just pack up and redeploy to Kurdistan and Kuwait. And launch frequent airstrikes and SOF raids against Al-Qaeda linked targets from there. We should also give money to Iraqi factions that target Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
i.e. The Jack Murtha solution.
So far, however, Bill’s reporting, and the reporting of a lot of other sources in Iraq suggest that most of the IA (Iraqi Army) can be trusted, and is loyal to the Iraqi chain of command.
Iraqis still have a shot at success.
Mike,
I don’t understand your post. Are you arguing that the IA “should receive” heavier weapons than M4/M16s? If so, then the IA needs M4/M16s and heavier weapons. Note that the ISF are expanding rapidly in size. The IA is keeping their old AK-47s, and reissuing them to other units.
Maybe an infantry rifle expert can enlighten me. How do other infantry rifles on the market now compare on price, performance, reliability and other metrics to American M4/M16s? For example, Russian AK-74Ms, Venezuela’s AK-103s, Chinese Type 81 Assault Rifle, G36, etc. Is the M4/M16 the best choice for the IA when measured against its specification requirements?
ECH
– Two-three armor/mech divisions worth of M60s/M113s are being purchased by Iraq, not the USG. Which of the 29 countries that use them and is selling them is unannounced ATT.
Mike
“I am not sure i like the idea of giving the IA M16/M4. Are guys are already clamoring for a “heavier” weapon so why give these to our allies?”
– We are not “giving” them. The Iraqi MoD held a test and decided to buy US personal weapons with thier own money. Those are part of the 9 billion GoI ISF security budget spent thru FMS this year. They stayed with former Warsaw Pact designs for their light and heavy machine guns.
“As for old M60’s..
I know they have T-72’s so why should we spend more time training them on a new system? I am sure we can find an old Soviet trading partner that would off load them for a pretty penny.”
– I thought the same but, apparently GoI found a seller of at least two divisions worth of M60s/M113s. We are not the source and this is their budget decision. Those are funded by GoI, not the USG. Note that they only have 77xT72 and 72xT55 ATT, all in 9th Div…
Note: The USG budget for ISF is focused on support troops and initial FA/Mortars in the FY07sup and FY08 budget.
One more thought.
The decision by MoD to buy M60s was at end-06/start-07 at latest. Yet they do not get delivered until late-07. Sounds like some upgrades/rework is intended to me. Maybe even upgrade to 120mm guns from GM…
M60’s from South Korea?
SK is producing their own new tank now.
“T80s also for that matter”
That would not be a good idea. Gun aside they have very little in common, in terms of mechanical systems and spare parts, with the
T-72 line so there is no prior experience to draw upon; at the same time they share the same problems of the T-72 (cramped etc.).
As I see it a counterinsurgency tank should have the following characteristics
1)Good, all around, protection against RPG-7, mines and such;
2)Gun with good HE shells available.
3)Decent FC and good night vision.
4)relatively cheap, so that it can be bought in numbers without competing too much for resources with the others needs which have to be fulfilled.
Uber tanks with massive front armor, FCs capable of hitting a rabbit at 3Km on the move etc are superfluos, unless you plan to go at war with conventional forces . At which points it depends on what you enemy has.
Staying with the T-72 line a slighty modified T-72S would meet most of those requirements, plus it would be able to duke it out on equal terms with the best iranian tanks, which are T-72S. If you are willing to spend more a modified T-90 (which is still a T-72) will fit the bill too and be able outfight a
T-72S by a considerable margin. For pure CI even an old T-55 or M60 will do of course, but items like armor, fire controls and night vision will need to be substantially updated if you want a truly effective vehicle.
“There is reports of plans to purchase anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles by the MoD.”
The link does not work for me. What’s the info on that? TOW & Stinger or something else? Or not decided yet?
Well I can tell some of you have not served in the military.
My comments about not giving the IA M4/M16 had nothing to do with not trusting them. It had everything to do with most of our infantry guys not liking the M16(especially the M4) because of its lack of stopping power. I was in Fallujah when Abu Grahab was attacked and when I talked to some guys there they said that they were hitting the drugged up muj with there M16 and it did nothing. Finally someone fired a confiscated AK and it stopped some of the cold in their tracks.
It has even been mentioned in the Marine Corps Times that grunts have been asking for a heavier caliber weapon.
I take back what I said about the T-72’s. I talked to my brother (a former tanker) and he convinced me that the M60 is better than the T-72.
“I talked to my brother (a former tanker) and he convinced me that the M60 is better than the T-72.”
It may be the case if you are pitting the latest M60A3 with thermal sights against the early versions of the T-72. Otherwise the T-72 is at least an half generation ahead of the M60.
Mike
I am wondering what the bribe was to the MoD for the M16/M4 purchase.
5.56 is too light…
Sheikh al-Sattar was saying the other day the Islamic State in Iraq is very well armed, perhaps with more and better weapons then the Iraqi Army. In terms of medium and heavy weapons he may be right. Rockets and mortars are certainly what the Iraqi Army needs.
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/06/6-swa/swa-040607.asp
DJ, Ha Ha Ha 😉 You’ve been acquainted with that part of the world too long!
ECH,
Sheikh al-Sattar is at least partly right IMHO. I believe that our nominal “allies” are giving very significant assistance to sunni arab militias in Iraq. Some of this help finds its way to the Islamic State in Iraq.
Congress should appropriate an additional $1 billion in economic and military grants for Al Anbar province to be dispersed as per Gen Petraeus’ and our Ambassador’s whim ASAP. Al Anbaris would be deadly allies against Al-Qaeda globally. We need to cement our friendship while the iron is hot.
For that matter, Congress should appropriate an additional $50 billion in military and economic grants for Iraq to be spent however our Ambassador and Gen Petraeus regard appropriate. It would enormously increase their leverage, respect, prestige and popularity within Iraq. And it would be spent far more cost effectively now than it would have 2003-2006, and Gen Petraeus would cement his figurative status as king Daoud (David).
I have far more confidence in the current crew than any other that preceded it.
How many of these troops only exist on paper? How many refuse simple orders if they deem them too dangerous?
I’ve learned enough of this war to know that raw numbers are meaningless from the Iraqis. There are good units and bad units, obviously. The real shock of this whole thing is how apathetic a lot of Iraqis really are when they are supposed to be defending their own nation against an enemy that likes to set off carbombs in markets full of women and children.
There is a major clash of cultures (quite literatally) in trying to get the Iraqis to stand up so we can stand down. The average Iraqi footsoldier seems to have no problem sleeping on watch even when the threat of being knifed by an insurgent and his comrades bombed in consequence are quite real. How do you train someone like that? That fatalism is like a disease. The old Arab officers and NCOs from Saddams time have been laughing up their sleeves at us trying to modernize the Iraqi military. The only way they got the (admitedly pathetic) results they got was with their fists or letting a rifle do the talking.
Our guys are working their tails off and have had some limited success, but I really havent seen anybody come up with a good answer for this problem. Any thoughts?
IIRC, the Iraqis have been complaining that they have different equipment from the US forces, even if it is better. Better for morale to simply give them the same equipment that the Americans are using.
Mark Buehner
How many of these troops only exist on paper?
– The MiTTs are able to track that seperate from the IA. When units deploy to Baghdad, they are inspected and headcounted by the IG. Biometrics are taken. The replacement program for attritional losses went over 100% manning in March per MNSTC-I.
How many refuse simple orders if they deem them too dangerous?
– How many US refuse orders? Last report of a refusal to deploy in the IA was Aug06. Those were discharged for cause.
The average Iraqi footsoldier seems to have no problem sleeping on watch even when the threat of being knifed by an insurgent and his comrades bombed in consequence are quite real. How do you train someone like that? That fatalism is like a disease.
– Funny. I had to deal with the same problem with my first-termers on the boats (USN). You are describing junior personnel in all militaries. That is why NCOs exist…
The old Arab officers and NCOs from Saddams time have been laughing up their sleeves at us trying to modernize the Iraqi military. The only way they got the (admitedly pathetic) results they got was with their fists or letting a rifle do the talking.
– Saddam’s military elimininated the professional NCOs and politicized the Officers. And they lost every fight they fought against the US. People learn more from failure than from success. They pay more attention…
Shifting the subject slightly, to deal with IED’s. What is the Iraqi army getting in the way of armored vehicles such as Australian or South African Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP’s). I feel this is as important as tanks.
I see we are finally ramping up production.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10241461
My own view is we have been a bit slow in implementing mine resistant vehicles. I was always of the opinion that earlier in the war we should have gotten hold of as many as possible from foreign sources and adapted them in Kuwait on their way to the field. I know, that’s not the way the army procurement works and much of the time with good reason, but there are times when an ally makes something you could use immediately. Politics aside, where are things headed.
Neo
Check the equipment page.
By end-07 the IA is to be 30% mounted on armored vehicles; 60% by end-08; plan is for the Infantry Divisions to be Motor-Inf.
– The Badger is the 4×4 version of the Cougar.
And one of the varients the IA is getting includes the remote arm…
– BTRs are resistant as well. V shape hull.
– INP is going with South African Revas and M1117s
DJ Elliott,
Any word on the expansion of ERUs, Provincial Security Units, or whatever they are calling themselves outside Anbar?
Thanks DJ,
A lot of us non-military guys have to ask a few times. I have to admit a lot of the time the significance of a lot of the raw information is lost on me. It doesn’t sink in the first time or the third time for that matter.
ECH
Not beyond what is on the IP and notes pages.
They are forming them in the standard 750 man Battalion size and running them thru IP Academies after screening.
Academy space is the logjam complained about the most ATT.
Plenty of recruits…
Of note: Hillah SWAT is otherwise known as Hilla ERU.
ERU/ERB/ESU are all designations of Battalion (600-750 pers) sized IP units and exist all over the country.
PSF 1, PSF 2 and QIB are all Brigade sized formations (1800-2500).
“There is reports of plans to purchase anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles by the MoD.”
The link does not work for me. What’s the info on that? TOW & Stinger or something else? Or not decided yet?
Marcello:
– No details yet. MoD is shopping in Europe. Apparenty Italy and UK are lead contenders ATT.
“In Anbar, the Provincial Security Force has expanded to a MoI light paramilitary Division organized into a three Brigade structure: “Provincial Security Force 1” and “Provincial Security Force 2” based in and around Ramadi plus a “Quick Intervention Brigade” based in Fallujah:””
The PSFs/QIB are made up of IP Academy grads.
Screened, trained and organized.
Mosul and Sulmaniyah IP Academies have been maxed out with Anbari recruits since March…
The opening of the Habinayah IP Academy on 5 Jun will add to that training thruput…
My son was Regimental Air Controller for RCT-2 in Fallujah Nov 04. Jolan is NW corner of that city, just NE of the infamous bridge. Jolan was the toughest area to clear, with older neighborhoods and narrow streets. “Queens, the SE industrial area, was also a bitch, with lots of underground facilities, caches, etc.