By Gene E. Blanton, who is currently embedded with the Multi-National Forces West Training Center in Habbaniyah. Support for Gene’s reporting was provided by Public Multimedia Inc.
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Lt. Col. McGrath touring his battle space between Fallujah and Ramadi. Click to view. |
CAMP HABBANIYAH, AL ANBAR PROVINCE, IRAQ: To the uniformed, the term “intellectual grunt” may seem to be an oxymoron. Mr. Webster defines an oxymoron as “something (as a concept) that is made up of contradictory or incongruous elements.” Today’s counterinsurgency is full of “contradictory elements,” according to Captain Daniel H. Snyder, Company Commander of India Company, 3rd Battalion 6th Marines.
His Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. James M. McGrath described Captain Snyder’s role as that of a “finisher” – someone who puts the final touches on the construction of a house. These final touches in the elements, outlined in The Intellectual Grunt – Part One, are critical to winning this war. In a recent visit to his combat outpost, he shared with me some key concepts which may seem oxymoronic on the surface.
Lead by following. In dealing with the local leaders and Iraqi Security Forces – rather than setting an American agenda – leadership is exercised by simply asking, “What do you want to do?” In a culture where every facet of life has been dictated by a centralized government for years, there is a tendency to lean on the Marines for all the answers.
“These are not the Flintstones,” says Captain Snyder negating any notion that the Iraqis are incapable of taking the lead. By putting the onus on the local leaders and ISF, the Iraqis “own the solution.” This simple exercise develops decision-making and problem-solving skills within the Iraqi leadership.
Marine infantry commanders have been indoctrinated with Patton’s phrase, “A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.” To watch the Iraqis sort through problems and make decisions on their own can be a maddening process for Marines programmed for action. However, the Marines know that to stand up self-sustaining local government leadership and security forces they must lead by following.
Be a sensitive warrior. Now that’s not exactly how Captain Snyder stated the concept. He said, “Don’t be an asshole.” Make no mistake, the Marines are the baddest dudes on the block and are fully capable – as Shakespeare said – of letting “slip the dogs of War.”
After the torture, killing, and propaganda of Al Qaeda, the Marines are a reflection of the alternative for Sunnis in Anbar. In a culture where positive reinforcement is not the norm, a simple, sincere complement can make a friend. Listening to complaints (real or imagined), common courtesy and cultural awareness can mean the difference between a local who tells your unit where an IED is located or passively watches as your vehicle violently locates it.
As the Marines say, “No better friend. No worse enemy.” Being the “better friend” requires as much work (or more) as being the “worse enemy.”
Greater risks equal lesser risks. Taking down a house in the middle of the night with flash bang grenades may be standard operating procedure for nabbing suspect insurgents. It does not win the hearts and minds of parents listening to the wails of their terrified children.
Knocking on the door and asking permission to come in equals greater risks. Don’t get me wrong, the Marines are not ditty-bopping through towns and villages in t-shirts and flip-flops carrying the Rodney King mantra, “Can’t we just all get along?” However, they have purposely taken a less aggressive posture.
Combat outposts at greater distances, smaller patrols, more stringent Rules of Engagement and knocking on the door all provide greater risks. In one of the true “contradictory elements” of this war, these greater risks ultimately equal lesser risks.
In the coming dispatches, we will take a look at more of the challenges faced and how these “intellectual grunts” are working tirelessly toward the ultimate goal – handover.
Gene Blanton is a Marine veteran and the author of the soon to be released book, “Semper Fidelis Leadership: From The Corps To The Corporation.”
7 Comments
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The Marines have clearly excelled at counter insurgency in al-Anbar. They have taken the natural home of al-Qaida and the Baathists and turned it into one of the least hospitable places for them in Iraq. This will be addaed to the USMCs long list of small war success.
“The question we should all be asking is why US Military Officers, who are supposed to be educated (BA/BS or higher w/ officer basic & advanced military schooling), are only now realizing that socio/political engagement is an effective military tool??”
I’m not much impressed with fault finding questions -especially those which assume the people doing the job don’t know what they are doing.
I think the tribes in Anbar needed to experience al Qaeda first hand before they were ready to understand what American armed forces can do and are trying to do for them.
I don’t think conditions on the ground were receptive to the current strategy until recently. OTOH my views are based more on my what I consider to be logic than a knowledge of the facts on the ground.
Terry Gain
I fully agree. The universal truth of warfare is that one side gives up when and only when it is exhausted.
Peter Mcmillan
Are you aware that Zinni was Centcom commander in the years leading to 9/11? With successful planning like that; what American city goes up in a mushroom cloud?
We are winning in Iraq precisely because of the foundation laid down by prior actions. Iraqi forces are coming to maturity at the right time, our actions and force levels are appropriate and the “nation building” that we had envisioned from the start is taking hold. We are, and have been, using all the elements of national power (DIME). Not everything has gone swimmingly but it never does. This is a large undertaking and we knew from the start that it would take a long time. Aside from separating Saddam from his WMD we had the mission to establish a democratic form of government that could secure itself and not be a threat to its neighbors. Our government is not set up to do this efficiently and it hasn’t. This should be no surprise. We are, however, moving in the right direction and will continue to do so as long as we stay in Iraq. Several years ago I saw a slide developed in late 2002 that estimated the time it would take to complete the mission. It was a best guess slide from people at CENTCOM. We are still within that timeframe.
As far as “intellectual” grunts – they are the norm in today’s military not the exception. The US has traditionally been good at COIN and we utilize past lessons learned as appropriate. One of the key lessons is to have patience.
BTW I wouldn’t put too much stock in Zinni’s purported plan. If it really existed it was outdated by the time of execution and was likely not aligned with the mission at hand.
Allow me to retort: As with all Arm Chair Quarter backs not privy to operational or planning opsec etc… The Marines are not just beginning to becken to these “New” found COIN operations as you have mentioned. the Marines throughout there history have employed and been as adaptive to these techniques as any COIN operations in Americas history can atest too. From their coveted small wars manual which they wrote from lessons learned during Americas intervention into the Carribean, i.e. Haiti, Panama, etc etc..Also Known as The Banana Wars to employing Combined Action Platoons (CAP PLt’s) in Vietnam (Perhaps Sir, read the infamous book by Bing West (“The Village”) allow yourself to Flash Forward to Al Anbar Province where the USMC has taken the most violent province in Iraq and turned it into one of the most successful, (starting with Operation Steel Curtain)and reversing the tide on AL Queada with local militias who have banded together to fight for it’s own people. (Amazing in itself whens the last time you met with a Imam or Sheik? mine was recently) So if you dare to allow yourself to think that this all has happened in AL Anbar in just one Month or Day is highly refutable. But has blossomed over a couple years of conducting COIN operations. So with U.S. Officers not applying lessons learned from the past then indeed you have not read the past, knowing one key point of any and all COIN operations is that most will quickly point out that a Insurgency at the minimum will last 10 years at the least, before withering, I believe we are ahead, wouldnt you say? and to say that doing this while also building a Government which is not part of COIN operations is a remarkable feat! I am tired of the old WW2 mindset emplaced onto 4th Generational Warfare. there is no standing Army to stand toe to toe with and no beaches to assault on this one. however the enemy is now the sand on the beach and the lines are drawn differently and daily by every wave that hits them and changes there pattern. I did and have witnessed the ability of Marines
to go from full out Kinetic Warfare using everything in the arsenal to shaking hands in a matter of one day and being highly successful at both, it is truely amazing to behold. If you think this is easliy accomplished then the next time you get in a no holds brawl at your local watering hole and you slug it out, I beseach you to stop mid stride wipe the blood from your lip and buy the guy a beer and have him by the end of your conversation pay for the damages at the bar and your own medical bills, and do this on a daily basis around your local city. And I believe that one of our ethos as service members is to have unity of command, so train all your buddies you go out with to do the same. How successful will you be? Marines are. And so has their Officer Corps been.
Jackal
Jackal
The slow steady progress in Anbar is not something that was very apparent to most. Those of us that track it close have seen this shift in Anbari attitudes for over a year now.
What happens to those that are not tracking the nit-picking details is the apparent overnight sea change. This is what the “tipping-point” looks like when the pieces come together and momentum reverses. Up until then it looks like a stalemate to the average person because, they are not as familiar with the nit-picking details. Especially since most of the press ignored the early signs thus denying the average person the data to see the change growing.
The insergency will continue for over 10 years. Some will refuse to quit and will have to be killed (irreconcilables). Others will change sides (reconcilables). In Anbar, the fight is being reduced to tolerable levels as the momentum grows for our side…