Tom Bevan of Real Clear Politics and I had the opportunity to conduct an interview with Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey, the Commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). LTG Dempsey’s command is responsible for developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which includes the Iraqi Army, Iraqi National Police, Provincial Security Forces and local police.
You can listen to the interview in full here. [MP3 format | 14.5M file size]
The issues discussed include: A recent New York Times article on the performance of the Iraqi Army, the affect on the morale of U.S. Forces, and that this article described the exception, not the norm; the importance of leadership in the Iraqi Security Forces; the replacement of Iraqi National Police commanders over the past year – 7 of 9 Brigade and 14 of 24 Battalion commanders relieved over the past year; the creation of the 11th and 12th Iraqi Army Division headquarters, the addition of 24 battalions and the effect of moving experienced cadres to new units will have on leadership; efforts to diversify the National Police from Shia to mixed (currently 85% Shia forces); the efforts of the ministries to take control over the security forces; and the logistical capabilities of the National Police.
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All in all, a very good interview.
In addition to the take-a-ways Bill cited above, I would add that:
– There are 114 IA combat battalions (presumably the original 112 IA + 2 SOF). He didn’t mention the addition 24 IA + 1 SOF combat battalions under formation. I thought that some of these new battalions are Cat level 3 and in the fight. Perhaps Lt Gen Dempsey was referring the original force, and the forces under formation in a more general way.
– Probably most GIs are frustrated with the “speed” of progress in the ISF, especially GIs on their second or third tours. Note, the complaint appears to be not that the ISF isn’t improving, but that it is not improving quickly enough given the sacrifice and efforts of our GIs. This observation also gels with many press reports of dissatisfaction with the ISF on the part of our soldiers, although the press often misses the massive and continuing improvements in the ISF that these same soldiers would attest to if asked the right questions.
– Progress at the ministry level, and in logistics, support and force generation functions is not yet irreversible.
– While there are considerable improvements in parts of the “support functions,” these improvements in the different parts of the process chain aren’t yet working well or integrating together to create a seem less supply and support chain for the ISF.
– Gov of Iraq expects to spend $9 billion on the ISF this year [my comment, the total might even approach 9 1/2 billion]
– The US government expects to spend 4 1/2 billion (can’t remember if he said 4.3 billion?) on the ISF this year
– The ISF is much more careful about spending Iraqi money than American taxpayer dollars.
– The ISF culture values obedience over honor, country and values to a much greater degree than our military.
– Trying to develop a second Lt. abbreviated 5 month class for existing Iraqi college grads. Right now, 2400 second Lts. are graduating a year.
– Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey was a straight shooter . . . saying the good with the bad . . . and there is plenty of both.
My thought on strategy going forward:
For officer and senior NCO corps . . . quality more important than quality. Therefore I would do the following:
1. Greatly increase the recourses aimed at the staff colleges for existing senior NCOs and officers. Dedicate far more of our best officers and NCOs (and try to persuade other countries to do the same . . . many countries that oppose the “occupation” might be open to training the ISF if it can be spun the right way) to these staff colleges. Improve the quality of instruction and curriculum. Most importantly, greatly increase the lenght of time officers spend at staff colleges between promotions.
2. To do this, the through-put of the staff colleges will have to be greatly increased.
3. Ditto for 2nd Lt. courses.
4. Perhaps have a similar course for NCOs upon promotion to lt. corporal.
5. Rotate existing entire combat brigades through 13 week (instead of the 5 now), military exercise, refitt, training courses. Coordinate these exercises with adding newly trained and experience senior NCOs and officers to their ranks, as well as fresh jundi and weapons.
For all this to happen, there needs to be a big increase in the throughput of ISF leader instruction.
To facilitate all this, a big increase in US tax-payer funding for the ISF and Iraqi reconstruction in the safer and more cooperative, and better locally governed pockets of Iraq (Ramadi, Tal Afar, Babil).
It is ridiculous that we spend more on our GIs in 3 weeks in Iraq than we spend on the ISF in one year.