|
|
|
Iraq. Click map to view. |
President Bush will announce his new security plan within the hour. The White House has made a fact sheet available online, as well as a Strategic Overview [PDF] of new Iraq plan. This evening I participated in a conference call with White House Press Secretary Tony Snow and Brett McGurk, the Director for Iraq on the National Security Council. The fact sheet and Strategic Overview provide summaries of the Iraq strategy, but I want to highlight a few of the important items in the plan.
1) Establishing security in Baghdad is paramount, along with severing the rat lines from Syria and Iran. To achieve security in Baghdad, 17,500 U.S. troops will partner with an additional 20,000 Iraqi troops and police (18 brigades total). This is a return to the successful partnering program that was used in Anbar province and elsewhere prior to turning over more control to Iraqi units. To achieve this, the U.S. is sending in 5 additional Army brigades. Three brigades are having their deployment schedule accelerated. Anbar province will receive 4,000 additional Marines. This is not enough force to root out al Qaeda strongholds in Ramadi, according to military sources I have spoken to.
2) The plan is clear that the Iraqi government must take responsibility for security, and commit to ending the actions and dismantling the death squads and militias (read Sadr). Prime Minister Maliki has just fired a warning shot across the bow of the Mahdi Army. “Prime Minister al-Maliki has told everyone that there will be no escape from attack. The government has told the Sadrists (the political movement that supports the Mahdi Army), if we want to build a state we have no other choice but to attack armed groups,” a senior Shiite legislator and close al-Maliki.
3) The Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be modified to remove restrictions on hunting terrorists, death squads and militias. Iraqi political interference will not be tolerated. It is not clear if this means the end of the ‘catch & release’ program, where known insurgents are freed do to the current flaws in the legal system.
4) The Iraqi Army will be expanded (this isn’t new news) “from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions.” The Iraqi military will form a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force. Police reform is a priority.
5) The new strategy emphasizes getting “all elements of the national power” involved in Iraq. State, USAID, Commerce and other agencies will play a larger role in Iraq. Provincial Reconstruction Teams will be embedded within each Brigade Combat Team. The numbe rof PRTs will double. The number of State employees outside of the Green Zone will increase from 100 to 400. Bureaucratic snags to get personnel deployed will be lifted Mr. Snow indicated the department have into the plan.
6) The Military and Police Transition Team program will continue, and will be expanded. The plan is not taking a blanket approach by repartnering all units with U.S. forces. This allows units that are developing well (as they are in Fallujah) to continue to develop on their own.
7) The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) will be reinstated, and $350 million dollars will be allocated. This will place money in the hands of the military combatant commanders to spend money in their Area of Operations as they see fit. CERP is extremely popular among military leaders, and has been described as an effective tool in working the local populations.
8) The U.S. Will not negotiate with Iran and Syria on Iraq, as recommended by the Baker Hamilton Commission. Iran is being called to account for its interference in internal Iraqi affairs.
9) Reconciliation is still on the table for the non-jihadist Sunni insurgents. This is crucial to create space to split Sunni insurgens from al Qaeda and its rump Islamic State of Iraq.
5 Comments
Bill,
So, what I was hoping for was your own conclusion at the end of the article about whether this will work.
Is it a good plan? Or is it too little too late?
One good thing is that with lower oil prices, Iran’s leverage is now less than it was 6 months ago.
Here is what I belive to be the meat of the speech.
Thanks for posting that summary. Out of all of it I am particularly relieved to see 3) and 8). I thought both the President’s speech and Sen. Durban’s response made good points; however, I think the Democratic view is more idealistic and less aligned with the reality of what will happen if we just say “look at all we’ve done for you, since you’re ungrateful we’re outta here.” I understand the rationale behind it but I don’t think that view takes into account the big picture or the long term.
Success is going to be expensive both in terms of our soldiers lives, money and political capital.
We know the international news media will accuse
our soldiers of atrocities and some may well
happen. This is going to be a dirty fight for
Bagdhad.
The number of US troops will be no more than what was deployed during the election campaign
and previous ‘surges’ so how are we to take on
securing the borders and fighting a tough battle
in Bagdhad?
I’m still skeptical. Don’t want to be but I don’t see anything new here.
OTOH suppose we ‘cut and run’. The Shi’ites’ are
going to roll over the Sunnis and give them all
they deserve. I won’t weep. If Iran tries to
create a ‘client state’ in Iraq they will find
out what it was like to be in our shoes for we
can easily turn the tables on them.
One other thing. It is rumored that the Turks
are going to do an incursion into Iraq this spring to get at Kurdish insurgents. Didn’t see
the presidents speech. Did he address this new complication?
Extra troops will be just instrumental in chasing and arresting insurgents. But Iraqi problem is deeper than planting check-points, raids and arrests. There are the hearts and the minds of the Iraqis that need ways to settle their differences sectarian, political or religious. The Iraqi must agree on what country they want to live in, federal, confederate or in a broken Iraq made of new countries representing the major sections of Iraqi population: Shiaas, Kurds, and Sunnis.
The extra troops can win their battles if the locals agree to cooperate with them helping them get their hands on the insurgents. But as there are still deep divisions among the Shiaas and the Sunnis fuelled by Saddam execution, the US army will have the hard task of finding reliable intelligence sources to carry out its raid missions with success. In Iraq, there is only an Iraqi credible force that can make the difference. This means the Iraqi forces remains doubtful as they are infiltrated by insurgents or members carrying violence on behalf of their sects.
When the Iraqis agree to unite politically or come to a durable political settlement, they can have a united security force ready to act for the country and not in the name of just one section of the Iraqi society. The role of the US military will be unnecessary as the majority of stable countries depend on their own task forces.