Marines deploy a MEU to Anbar, a Baker report possibility
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Iraq. Click map to view. |
After the Democrats seized the House and Senate during the U.S. midterm election, the concern has been how the change in Congressional leadership would impact Iraqi policy. Would the Democrats demand an immediate withdrawal, leaving the nascent Iraqi government and military to fend off al Qaeda, the Sunni insurgency and Sadr’s Shiite death squads? Senator Carl Levin, who is in line to head the Arms Services Committee, has called for “a phased withdrawal that would begin in four to six months.” Gen. John Abizaid, the commander of U.S. Central Command, warned that “Specific timetables limit… flexibility” in dealing with the political and military problems in Iraq.
Much of the speculation on how the U.S. would proceed in Iraq has hinged on the Baker-Hamilton Commission Report. Since the election, General Pete Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has initiated a policy review on Iraq, and President Bush has called for an internal review of Iraq policy within the administration. General Pace’s report will be difficult to ignore politically, and may level out some of the worst fears from the Baker report.
Early reports indicated the Baker report would recommend setting benchmarks and timetables on the Iraqi government, a phased withdrawal accompanied by negotiations with Iran and Syria. The latest speculation comes from the Guardian which states the commission will recommend a four point plan, which includes a troop increase of about 20,000 (Senator John McCain has called for an additional 50,000 troops). The Guardian summarizes the recommendations as follows:
· Increase US troop levels by up to 20,000 to secure Baghdad and allow redeployments elsewhere in Iraq
· Focus on regional cooperation with international conference and/or direct diplomatic involvement of countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
· Revive reconciliation process between Sunni, Shia and others
· Increased resources from Congress to fund training and equipment of Iraqi Security Forces
Perhaps by coincidence, General Abizaid announced the deployment of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit to Anbar province. This is an unplanned, additional deployment to the 150,000 plus troops in the Iraqi theater. “A MEU typically has about 2,200 Marines split into four elements: a battalion landing group; an air wing with Harrier jump jets, Cobra helicopters, and other aircraft; a Marine Logistics Group; and a command element,” notes Stars and Stripes.
While the Military refuses to name where the 15th MEU will deploy in Anbar, there should be no doubt its destination is Ramadi. Ramadi continues to be the hotspot in Anbar province. The failure to clear and hold Ramadi during the ‘Anbar Campaign’ in the fall of 2005 continues to haunt the Iraqi government and the U.S. military. Portions of the city are contested, and neighborhoods remain sanctuaries for al Qaeda.
In Baghdad, the Iraqi police remain a serious impediment to securing the city. Elements of the Baghdad police force have been infiltrated by Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and are either participating in the sectarian murders or turning a blind eye. An American military intelligence source recommends disbanding the Baghdad police and declaring martial law, bringing in the Iraqi Army along with U.S. forces to secure the city. This would inevitably lead to a confrontation with Sadr and the Mahdi Army as he will suffer a loss in power.
As we noted days after the election, the midterm election results and the Baker report are likely to influence the direction of U.S. policy in Iraq, but serious question still exist as to how much the policy will change. The U.S. has been planning for a drawdown this year, and working to increase the number of embedded trainers for Iraqi Army and police, while the Iraqi Army is raising three additional divisions and overmanning their existing combat formations. The American public, while unhappy with the current direction in Iraq, are still looking for a positive solution. The Democratic victories in the House and Senate were not won by the antiwar wing of the party, but the “Blue Dogs,” or conservative Democrats.
Meanwhile, the planning for troop deployments in Iraq continues. The Department of Defense released a partial list of the units for the next round of deployments. A division headquarters, five combat brigades (about 20,000 troops) and “approximately 27,000 active duty and 10,000 reserve component troops in combat support and combat service support units smaller than brigade-size elements” are slated to deploy to Iraq early next year.
One thing is clear: American’s enemies perceive our wavering on Iraq as vindication. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, al Qaeda’s commander in Iraq, released a tape just days after the election declaring victory in Iraq. “The victory day has come faster than we expected… Here is the Islamic nation in Iraq victorious against the tyrant. The enemy is incapable of fighting on and has no choice but to run away,” said al-Masri. Osama bin Laden has referred to America as a paper tiger after the Somalia intervention in the early 1990s.
“After leaving Afghanistan, the Muslim fighters headed for Somalia and prepared for a long battle, thinking that the Americans were like the Russians,. The youth were surprised at the low morale of the American soldiers and realized more than before that the American soldier was a paper tiger and after a few blows ran in defeat. And America forgot all the hoopla and media propaganda … about being the world leader and the leader of the New World Order, and after a few blows they forgot about this title and left, dragging their corpses and their shameful defeat.”
A precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would hand al Qaeda a victory it has not earned, and only embolden al Qaeda to strike America and her allies worldwide. U.S. policymaker must must keep this in mind when deciding how to proceed forward with Iraq.
15 Comments
We have lost this battle in the War on Terror.
The result of this battle remains very much in contention. The only way we could lose this battle in the near-term would be to leave the field. The longer term trends are mostly positive, but not exclusively so. Iraq has a fledgling democratic government and a true national army which answers to it. The increase in size and experience of the Iraqi army over time spells disaster for those who would bring down the elected government. The problem is mainly on the political side. It will take time to purge the political process of threats and intimidation by those with factional backing. The body politic (the people!) must trust their government as a whole and want it to survive more than they want their faction to prevail. In the meantime, the only thing that will work will be to continue fighting those who try to disrupt the process. It will take multiple elections with peaceful transitions of power to finalize the stability of the government (read ‘years’).
The failure to establish the same kind of national unity in the Iraqi police as has been fairly well achieved in the Iraqi army is undermining this process. If you recall, the early training of the army had the same problems. These were corrected. The same process is starting to take place with the police. The idea proposed of disbanding the police in Baghdad could be a huge step in the right direction.
Iraq: Ramping Up or Drawing Down Forces, and the Baker Report
Courtesy of The Fourth Rail:
Marines deploy a MEU to Anbar, a Baker report possibility
After the Democrats seized the House and Senate during the U.S. midterm election, the concern has been how the change in Congressional leadership would impact Ira…
DJ, I just saw Col Larry Nicholson, Commander of Regimental Combat Team 5’s comments. And here are my observations of your observations:
Correction RCT5.
– After hearing his brief, I have the following comments:
1. 1st IAD is under 50% manning.
–9 combat battalions and 3 brigade HQ companies have 4,000 troops between them (assuming that the MSR and BSU are not included in the total) or about 380 troops per combat battalion assuming the Brigade HQs are understrenght at 195 each.
2. 1st IAD is good enough for the Col to refer to them as “Marines” without even thinking about it. He thinks they are getting good.
–I agree, this is one of the most hopeful signs in an otherwise very mixed situation in Iraq
3. Recruiting of sunnis for IA is still a problem.
–Yes, there are 700 cops in Falluja. For a city of 400,000 there should be 2,000 cops given how dangerous and vulnerable to outside events Falluja is. NY city, with 10 million people has 39,000 cops.
4. While violence is down in Fallujah, locals do not trust Maliki Govt.
–Duh . . . but we Americans can’t solve this problem.
5. Future will not be decided by US or Iranians; will be decided by Iraqis.
–Spot On
6. 15th MEU is not going to Fallujah. (I expected it to be headed to Ramadi.)
–Almost certainly right
7. He has expanded the MiTTs in his area out of hide.
–Go Col Larry Nicholson. He has 270 MiTTS ( = 3*30 + 9*20). This needs to be not doubled but trippled the support 9 combat battalions, 3 Brigade HQs, AND the local police.
8. The Col is over identifying with the locals.
–Agree with this. Col. is getting dangerously entangled with domestic Iraqi politics. This is why Shia public opinion of the US has crashed since the Samarra bombing. Without criticizing Baghdad (that enrages Shia and even Kurds), the US Congress should appropriate more funds for reconstruction, in the safer parts of RCT 5’s AO. Congress also needs to appropriate more money to buid up the Iraqi Army 1st and 7th divisions, and more importantly to build up Al Anbar’s police.
We cannot forget that more than 90% of all GI’s killed in Iraq have been killed by Sunni Arab Militia–most of which operate out of Al Anbar (many Baghdad/Diyala attacks are planned and supported from Al Anbar.) Since August 2004, Muqtada has been trying to avoid a major clash between his militia and the US military. For him, America is not enemy #1–although he loves to criticize us in public. He’s happy with us killing Sunni Arab Militia. Note that in early 2004, Muqtada attacked America for being in Cahoots with Baathists and Salafis that were attacking Iraqi population centers to kill Shia. He attacked us from the right. Much as most South Vietnamese soldiers thought America was in bed with the communists in 1972. The largest (though not majority) cause of Anti-American sentiment in South Vietnam was the perception that America was quietly soft on or even sympathetic towards the Communists.
Anand:
Re: Item 1. Your numbers would be good if only 3 Bde HQs and 9 combat Bns were involved (52% manning) but,
– From RCT5 Brief:
“The regiment’s force subordinate battalions work closely with their Iraqi army brigades and police over an area of operations that stretches 30 miles from east to west, and 60 miles from north to south. We cover most of the distance between Baghdad and Ramadi, and include some cities you may not have heard of, like Gharmah, Amiriya, Ferris, Sakalaweyah, Habbaniya, and one that is certainly very familiar to you, and that is the city of Fallujah.”
– Habbaniya is the HQ of the 1st IAD.
Includes the 1st Div STB, 1st MTR, 1st BSU and forming 1st Engr Bn.
And the Col says only 4000 IA.
100% would be ~10,000.
– By my math, the 1st IAD in that area is 35-40% manned overall. (250-300 per Bn)
According to some press reports, two of the 4-1 Bde’s Bns are 25%.
– I am not including Habbaniya RSU and RMTC in those numbers. Just 1st IAD. Those logistics and instructor personnel factored in would make 35% a better bet.
Note: At last report, 1800 junji are in training at Habbaniya for duty with 1st or 7th IADs. Graduate end of this month…
Not sure how many more of the 10,000 graduating thruout Iraq are destine for 1st and 7th but, at least half of the IA shortfall in personnel is in the Anbar Divs.
http://www.dvidshub.net/pub_show.php?id=1567
Pg8 – 1st MTR hands off to 1st IAD on 2 Nov.
– That makes it 8th, 4th, 6th,
5th (on 1 Nov) and 1st (on 2 Nov)…
– That leaves 3rd, 10th, 2nd and 7th (plus new formations) left.
(Listed in order of hand off)
– Original TO/E briefed in Feb for MTRs was: HHC, HSC, Maint Co, Sec Co & 3x Trans Co.
– In Sep, it was mentioned that the TO/E was changed to 4x Trans Co in MTRs.
– The announced planned addition of three Divs and their support in Oct.
9x MTRs at 4x Trans Co each = 12x MTRs at 3x Trans Co each.
= 3 extra MTRs.
(Maint, Sec, HSC and HHC can be cadred out at 25% each. That keeps experience in all 12 at 75% or better.)
– Expansion of MTR’s Trans Companies was to provide Cadre for new formations when they are established.
Are they doing the same for the BSUs, etc?
Accelerated stand up of the new formations once the new recruits are trained…
http://soldiersdad2.blogspot.com/2006/11/progress-in-iraq.html#links
Notice MG Mixon’s comment about 3rd IAD.
Going in-lead beginning of Dec…
That leaves 2nd IAD (Mosul) in MND-N.
Great and extremely pertinent news DJ. Major General Mixon’s comments were very encouraging. He won’t be quoted much by the global press.
Thanks for the link to soldiersdad2. Haven’t been there in a while.
MTRs and BSUs need to be overstrenght in my opinion, incase they suffer losses through direct attacks, so that the IA can sustain several simultaneous prolonged major engagements with the enemy, so that the IA can offer logistical support to the ministry of interior forces, and so that its easier for the IA to further increase its size in the future.
I haven’t seen BSUs mentioned in press releases. Why? What is the current status of the IA’s BSUs?
Is a IA division in the lead and under the control of the IGFC that controls its MTR, BSU and engineering battalion completely independent of US support excluding MiTTs?
What are your comments on:
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/985qugel.asp?pg=2
It is also excellent news that the Ramadi police force is being built up to 1 police officer per hundred residents. The ratio across all of Iraq is 55% of that. I hope that this can be accomplished within 18 months, allowing the Iraqi police to assume full control from the Iraqi Army in greater Ramadi within 2 years.
The 1st Brigade of 1 IAD is based in Ramadi. From everything I have read, 1/1 is extremely high quality. But I thought 1/1 had 3 battalions, this article says it has two with: “With a total complement of several thousand soldiers.” This suggests that the two battalions are at full strenght with 750 soldiers each that when combined with a brigade HQs company of 300 soldiers amounts to ~1800.
To summarize, the 1st IAD division HQs has 4 brigades with 3 combat battalions each for a total of 12 combat battalions, 1 MTR, 1 BSU (that will be fully operational within three months?), and a level 4 engineering battalion (that will be fully operational within 6 months since it is the farthest along engineering battalion in the IA.) A total of 15 battalions under 1st IAD control. Does this suggest that 1st IAD might be fully independent within 1 year?
It is also possible that that the 1/1 will become the nucleus of Iraq’s 3rd MSR IAD, leaving post re-org 1st IA division with 9 combat battalions.
Is there any public info on the ordering of the IA divisions taking control over their respective engineering companies?
Scary article on the Iraqi police. Is this representative?
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/19/world/middleeast/19captain.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Anand:
MTRs and BSUs need to be overstrenght in my opinion, incase they suffer losses through direct attacks, so that the IA can sustain several simultaneous prolonged major engagements with the enemy, so that the IA can offer logistical support to the ministry of interior forces, and so that its easier for the IA to further increase its size in the future.
– True. I suspect they will do that after they get the teeth overstrength and form the new Divs.
—-
I haven’t seen BSUs mentioned in press releases. Why? What is the current status of the IA’s BSUs?
– They train and form in parrallel with their Div’s MTRs. Think of the two as the Div’s Supply Bde (without Bde HQ). MTRs cannot go independent/assigned to Div without BSUs being operational. Last time I saw a release mention one was as mention of 4th IAD hand off to IGFC. Got the breakdown on them from brief last spring.
—-
Is a IA division in the lead and under the control of the IGFC that controls its MTR, BSU and engineering battalion completely independent of US support excluding MiTTs?
– Yes. If they need it there are coalition QRFs available and the MiTTs can call in air support as needed. Or coalition helos for AAslt transport…
—-
What are your comments on:
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/985qugel.asp?pg=2
– Good article. Sharp individual. He notices the changes. Progress is not so visable when doing ops like this…
—-
The 1st Brigade of 1 IAD is based in Ramadi. From everything I have read, 1/1 is extremely high quality. But I thought 1/1 had 3 battalions, this article says it has two with: “With a total complement of several thousand soldiers.” This suggests that the two battalions are at full strenght with 750 soldiers each that when combined with a brigade HQs company of 300 soldiers amounts to ~1800.
– Error in reporting. He was talking about two BRIGADES vice battalions. (Read the para again and you will see what I mean.)
1-1 Bde has SE Ramadi and 1-7 Bde has NE Ramadi. (USA/USMC in the middle.) Six IA Bns in Ramadi…
– While 7th IAD is young, the only two Bns in the Div in the lead/owning battlespace are at Ramadi: 1-1-7 (west Ramadi) and 3-1-7 (north Ramadi).
——-
To summarize, the 1st IAD division HQs has 4 brigades with 3 combat battalions each for a total of 12 combat battalions, 1 MTR, 1 BSU (that will be fully operational within three months?),
– Already operational.
Scary article on the Iraqi police. Is this representative?
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/19/world/middleeast/19captain.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
– Baghdad is what it represents…
Correction to this-
Note: At last report, 1800 junji are in training at Habbaniya for duty with 1st or 7th IADs. Graduate end of this month…
– 600 in current class. Next class at Habbaniya is 1800. Graduates in Jan. All of these are for 1st/7th IADs.
I expect these all go to 7th IAD and those elements of 1st to remain in Anbar.
TOA means?
TOA – Transfer of Authority
– When one unit formaly relieves another of responsibility for an area or unit.
In these cases, elements of 1st IAD transfering from MNF-W to IGFC command.