The Combating Terrorism Center report on jihadi intellectuals and a strategy to fight them; media reports of bin Laden and Zawahiri “losing influence” misinterpretted the findings
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has released a study “of the Jihadi Movement’s top thinkers and their most popular writings.” Titled The Militant Ideology Atlas, the report provides a look at the writings and a brief profile of each of Jihadist movement’s top ideological leaders, as well as information on who is citing who.
In the executive summary of The Militant Ideology Atlas, recommendations are made on how to fight the radical Islamist ideology. The authors identify the layers of the Sunni “jihadi constituents,” with Muslims on the outer ring, then Islamists, Salafist and then the Jihadis on the inner ring.
The report recommends a renaming of the jihadist movement, influencing and promoting statements made by Salafists and Jihadist that oppose terrorists’ actions and tactics, and explain the implications of what happens if the Jihadists come into power. For example, Abd al-`Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbu` “famously argues for the legitimacy of killing women, children and the elderly in the course of jihad.” This is a common theme in jihadi literature and should be made known to mainstream Muslims.
The first item is interesting, as the CTC notes that the term “jihadi” (like muhajideen) is actually a badge of honor to the terrorists, like calling an American soldier a patriot. The CTC recommends calling them Qutbists, after Sayyid Qutb, the most influential of the ideologues. This would ‘humanize’ their identity (something they abhor) instead of connecting their actions to the mainstream concept of jihad.
The report notes that “Since Western governments lack credibility in the Muslim world, they should pursue these efforts indirectly” (page 283.) This means that non-Muslims are not suited to make Islamic arguments to convince the Muslim world as a whole. The West must quietly foster elements within the Muslim world to fight radical Islam. This war has always been a war within Islam.
Unfortunately, the report was misinterpreted by some mainstream news outlets. The New York Times ran a headline stating “Qaeda Leaders Losing Sway Over Militants, Study Finds”, as the report noted that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are not cited that often by the jihadi intellectuals. This theme was repeated by Reuters. The CTC devoted one paragraph to this subject, in its 23 page executive summary and 383 page analysis:
Not surprisingly, Bin Ladin makes our list of influential ideologues (see Appendix II: Most Cited Authors), although he matters much less in the intellectual network than Maqdisi and others (see Appendix I: Ideological Influence Map). His lieutenant, Zawahiri, often portrayed by Western media as the main brain in the Jihadi Movement, is totally insignificant in the Jihadi intellectual universe. To be sure, both men have had an enormous impact on the wider Jihadi Movement, but our data shows that they have had little to no impact on Jihadi thinkers. (Page 10, executive summary)
This does not mean bin Laden and Zawahiri are ‘losing influence” or declining in stature in al Qaeda. Bin Laden and Zawahiri are the political and military leaders of al Qaeda, who are on the front lines of jihad. They are reverently referred to as the Shiekh and the Doctor. New recruits and commanders in al Qaeda swear bayat (an oath of loyalty) to them, and not to Qutb, Tantari or Maqdisi. Bin Laden and Zawahiri plot and approve strategy, rally the rank and file, produce propaganda tapes, raise money and are the face of jihad. The ideologues provide the religious and moral underpinnings for al Qaeda to exist and thrive.
Just as western military strategists would likely site Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Niccolò Machiavelli, John Boyd or a host of contemporaries, so to do the Islamist thinkers cite their ideological predecessors. That Osama and Zawahiri are not often cited does not mean they are losing influence or being sidelined from the movement
This report does highlight our lack of a strategic communications and our failure to target ideological leaders. Some of these jihadi theorists, such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi and Abu Qatada operate openly in England.
Resources:
Executive Report, Militant Ideology Atlas [PDF format]
Research Compendium, Militant Ideology Atlas [PDF format]
5 Comments
Thanks for the post and the link to the report. I think it’s important to shut down the intellectuals in the longer term. However like you I don’t think Bin Laden or Zawahiri are less influential, they are the tactical frontline leadership along with Mullah Omar.
I’ll read this in detail a bit later.
Bill, excellent report. How many senior US gov’t officials understand all of this . . . even if they do not act upon it? Are there departments that get it more than others (Pentagon civilians, military officers, NSC, CIA, State, White House staff, Congress, or subsets within these larger groups)?
Do some of our GIs in Iraq get it more than others? How much do officials in other governments understand this?
Thanks,
CTC and The Militant Ideology Atlas
Courtesy of The Fourth Rail:
The Combating Terrorism Center report on jihadi intellectuals and a strategy to fight them; media reports of bin Laden and Zawahiri “losing influence” misinterpretted the findings
The Combating Terrorism Cent…
Bill, thank you for the best summary of the CTC data yet. My .02: you have to reach back to the Civil War to understand bin Laden’s place in the scheme of things. He’s a modern John Brown and, like JB, neither a great intellectual nor a great general, but a reflection of the zeitgeist of a telling part of Islam — our “Spirit of Christmas Present.”
Thanks Bill for posting this. It is a great piece of work in some ways. The extensive catalog of influential writers and thinkers in the Jihadi movement is surely a valuable tool against Jihadist terror. But the problem is how it is interpreted and used. I have a number of criticisms which in my view need to be taken seriously by the intelligence and political communities:
For a start, the nested diagram of “Jihadi Constituencies”