Minor engagement in Sadr City while searching for missing U.S. soldier
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A U.S. Army soldier from 3rd Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Division provides security during a cordon and search mission in Baghdad, Iraq, Oct. 1, 2006. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Mike Buytas. Click image to view. |
U.S. forces have yet again entered Sadr City, and had a brief battle with Iranian proxy Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. “There was a short exchange of fire with members of the Mahdi Army when US forces equipped with armoured vehicles reached “Sector 28″ in the heart of the slum area just as crowds were leaving Friday prayer,” reports AFP. No casualties were reported in the short gunfight.
U.S. troops entered Sadr City under the guise of searching for the missing Iraqi-borne U.S. soldier who was kidnapped earlier in the week “after he left the heavily fortified Green Zone without permission from his commanders and went to visit relatives living the city.” Lieutenant Colonel Chris Garver, the U.S. spokesman Baghdad, intimated that further operation are in the works. “Iraqi and coalition forces continue to conduct operations in order to recover the missing soldier,” said Lt.Col. Chris Garver. The prior raid in Sadr City, which targeted Abu Dura, was followed up with a raid on a mosque in search of the missing soldier.
Sadr continues to maintain the violence is stemming from “rogue elements” of his Mahdi Army. “The revolting and disobedience to the leadership has divided us and brought us many enemies,” said Sheikh Jaber al-Khafaji, a Sadr cleric, during Friday prayers. While this is certainly an attempt to hide Sadr’s role in the sectarian violence, the choice of words is interesting. Sadr is now worried about his “many enemies.”
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I thought the following comment by Sheikh Jaber al-Khafaji threatening Sadr’s rogue commanders during those same Friday prayers today was even more revealing.
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Radical Iraqi cleric Moqtada Al Sadr has threatened rogue commanders in his Mahdi Army militia with the wrath of God, his principle mouthpiece told worshippers at prayer Friday.
The Mahdi Army is one of the most powerful armed Shiite groups in Iraq and has been implicated in a number of recent battles with police, despite orders from Sadr to his followers not to spill Iraqi blood without permission.
“This disobedience to the leadership has divided us and earned us multiple enemies,”
These signs of disarray within the Mahdi “organization” means that the pressure applied by the joint operations is working. If it takes so few well-targeted instances of military intervention to produce so many fractures within the enemy’s ranks, it’s not just working, it’s working well!
We are probably talking about elite Iraqi forces working closely with US support in these recent operations. The example they provide is precious.
This should embolden both the IA soldiers and those already inclined to support them among the population. Nothing wins as well as winning does. Every military victory against the Mahdi army can only decrease Al-Sadr political influence, thereby broadening the range of operating options available to Al-Maliki.
Good going! Dom.
“We are probably talking about elite Iraqi forces working closely with US support in these recent operations. The example they provide is precious.”
Dom:
Bill identified the IA Brigade:
1st Iraqi Army Special Operations Force Brigade.
– The 36th Commando Bn/1 SOF is their Ranger Bn equivalent.
– The 2nd Counter-Terrorism Bn/1 SOF is their “Delta Force” equivalent (SFD-D).
– They also have a CSS Bn and a Training & Development Detachment that takes care of their support and trains the Scout/SF elements in the IA.
This Brigade is three years old and trainned by their coalition counterparts. Equipped with 91x HMMWVs and fully Air Assault trained.
Heavy Peshmerga component.
In other words, your comment is a serious understatement…
Well if the Iraqi Police are willing to mix it up with the Mahdi Army then perhaps the MA is more fragile than previously thought.
Well, it seems to be focusing on al Sadr as the big impediment to national reconciliation. With hime out of the way, and his movement discredited (soon they will have had their butts kicked twice by the U.S. and once by the Iraqi Army), the oil revenue question can be worked out, and all Iraqis can have a field day hunting al Qaeda fighters. So the PM can make his choises or step aside for a new leader, with some grit. The sooner they do that, the sooner the “great occupier” can reduce our forces to advisors and trainers.
Security cordon still up around Sadr City.
It may never leave…
U.S., Mahdi Army Skirmish in Sadr City
Courtesy of The Fourth Rail:
Minor engagement in Sadr City while searching for missing U.S. soldier
U.S. forces have yet again entered Sadr City, and had a brief battle with Iranian proxy Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. “There was a short …
We could play on the “rouge elements”
I’m a little surprised Sadr is so obviously hanging his most radical allies out to dry. He’s shown a tendency to panic under pressure before but this is blatant. He’s basically saying that he won’t control them and can’t control them. If push comes to shove he will disavow them. That’s a big deal if we are hearing it right.
The correct response to this is to once again, signal Sadr that he can save his skin but the “rogue elements”
I’m a little surprised Sadr is so obviously hanging his most radical allies out to dry. He’s shown a tendency to panic under pressure before but this is blatant. He’s basically saying that he won’t control them and can’t control them. If push comes to shove he will disavow them. That’s a big deal if we are hearing it right.
The “rogue elements” excuse comes up just about every time that violence meets politics anywhere in the world. Look at the way Dawa, which is Maliki’s party, explain Dawa’s history of terrorism. It wasn’t they who suicide-bombed the American embassy in Kuwait, they claim, it was Iranian-backed rogue elements. The statement from Sadr is anything but a big deal. I think that you would understand how small of a deal it is if he had called his supposedly rogue commanders “a few bad apples”. He might as well have used that phrase.
By the way, it is a mistake to think of Sadr as Iran’s one big investment in Iraq. Life is not that simple, although I’m sure that Sadr is getting some help from Iran. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the other big Shiite militia faction, has the most Iranian backing. A lot of these fights with Sadr, for example the one in Amara, are more Sadr vs Hakim than they are Sadr vs the Iraqi “government”. The US is trying to limit the power of a man who the Iranians see as a loose cannon; if it worked, it would go to the benefit of the Iranians’ favorite son.
Question, how does Sadr replace his subordinates? Does he have a “crony”