Sadr continues his double game and U.S. and Iraq forces dance with Sadr in central and southern Iraq
U.S. forces continue to chip away at Muqtada al-Sadr’s power base in Iraq. The Kuwaiti News Agency reports on two small raids against the offices of Sadr’s Mahdi Army in the cities of Hillah and Diwaniyah. In Hillah, there was a gunfight between U.S. and Mahdi Army fighters. No injuries were reported and no arrests were made. In Diwaniyah, a joint U.S. and Iraqi force “broke into the house of Mahdi Army local leader in Diwaniya Province but failed to arrest him.”
This is a continuation of the plan to erode Sadr’s power base within the Mahdi Army, and force Sadr to openly denounce the Mahdi Army or confront the Iraqi government. As Sadr’s most capable and dangerous lieutenants are killed or captured, his power and standing within the organization comes into question. Iraqi and Coalition operations against Sadr in in Diwaniyah is a microcosm of this plan. The real question is does the Maliki government have the will to folow through to completion.
These operations occur as fighting in Amara flared again after clashes between local police (largely manned by members of the Badr Brigades) and the Mahdi Army killed over 25, mostly Mahdi Army fighters. Sadr’s forces stood down, but then yesterday retaliated by executing four police officers. A source in a local hospital in Amara described the events as follows: “gunmen dragged police Lt Sarmad Majid al Shatti from his home before dawn, dumping his bullet-riddled body at a farm on the city’s outskirts… Another policeman, Lt Alaa al Kabi was shot to death outside his house… At about the same time, provincial policemen Hamid Majeed and Hassan Abdullah were kidnapped from their homes. Their bodies were later found dumped outside the city…”
The Los Angels Times follows “a death trail to Sadr City” and documents Sadr and the Mahdi Army’s power in the Baghdad stronghold. The article is a good primer on Sadr’s control and the nature of the Mahdi Army, however the claim is made U.S. and Iraq forces have not conducted operations in Sadr City. As we’ve documented, Operation Together Forward has conducted patrols inside Sadr City during September, and have conducted projects such as refurbishing health clinics in the neighborhoods. Iraqi and Coalition forces have also recently conducted raids in the surrounding neighborhoods of Karkh and Shula. Coalition forces were active in Sadr City during the spring and summer of 2006 as well.
Sadr continues to maintain he is against the sectarian violence, and the media has been complicit in providing him cover by claiming the violence conducted by the Mahdi Army is due to rogue elements outside his control. AFP quotes Sadr’s recent statements at the end of Ramadan. “I totally reject any Shiite-Shiite or Shiite-Sunni killings, whatever their motive… Our only objective is to end the (US) occupation… My only enemy is the occupier and the Nawasib [Sunni Islamists/al Qaeda]… Aggression against any Iraqi is an aggression against me,” said Sadr. AFP also paraphrases Sadr statement from early in October, “if rumors about his followers taking part in such killings were true, he would denounce them.”
His followers are complicit in numerous incidents of sectarian murders,and yet Sadr has yet to denounce a single incident. As we noted on October 20th, “He has not identified these out of control militias, closed offices or denounced them specifically. Sadr is playing a double game of maintaining his militia against the law while pretending to be a responsible member of government.”
11 Comments
He seems to be playing his double game with the advice and consent of al Maliki. The military efforts of the coalition will be built on sand, until we get a stable political situation within the elected government. It’s time for al Sadr ot go to the hangman for his murders of rival clergymen. There was enough of a case to issue arrest warrants, he should be in communicado in prison and tried now.
Raids on Mahdi Army, Amara flares
Courtesy of The Fourth Rail:
Sadr continues his double game and U.S. and Iraq forces dance with Sadr in central and southern Iraq
U.S. forces continue to chip away at Muqtada al-Sadr’s power base in Iraq. The Kuwaiti News Agency reports on two…
Best option would be for Sadr to die of natural causes.
Do not make a martyr of him like his father…
Mookie needs to go down for the dirt nap; it’s long overdue.
I’ve linked to you here: http://consul-at-arms.blogspot.com/2006/10/re-bout-time-seeya-boy-cleric-al-sadr.html
Interesting article by a Sunni insurgent. He says Sunnis dont want a religious government and will accept US presence if a plan is drawn up. He rightfully thinks the main danger comes from Iran and not the occupation.
http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=6797
Mookie has one use though. He is a bogeyman for SCIRI and its Badr militia. Mahdi and Badr have started to kill one another in earnest.
In order to keep SCIRI and some other Shiites on the US side, they have to be reminded of the Sadr bogeyman now and then. US must find a way to break up the UIA coalition. Maybe by promising a federal south, this can be done.
Although SCIRI is beholden to Iran, its Iranian backers are the reformists and Rafsanjani, who are willing to cooperate with the US (unlike Ahmadinejad, the backer of Sadr).
Bill, you do excellent work. Thank you for your great reads on situations as they unfold.
One thing I cannot understand is why do US forces put up with this punk?! From everything I’ve read over the last few years, he has essentially been nothing but trouble, with Iranian backing to boot.
The only conclusion I can reach is there must be a reason (or reasons) we haven’t taken him out yet. Can anyone shed some light on that? What is going on behind the scenes that we haven’t dealt with him more harshly (lock him up or kill him)? What leverage does he have that helps maintain his antagonizing existence?
Thanks.
I would think that there would be a downside to killing him. If we did it covertly the Shiites would blame the Sunnis and retaliate accordingly, how far the retaliation would go is speculation but it wouldn’t be just a few people. If we did him in publicly the Shiite community could turn on us. The Badr folks would not care that he was gone but they and others might think we were going to begin assassinating problem leaders. I could see unrest turning to violence even in previously peaceful areas as a result. If you weigh the consequences it might not be a good idea now, but I would never rule it out.
I generally agree, grognard, that the risk of a Shia backlash against the US is medium/high. While it might not be a good idea now, I find it hard to believe that there hasn’t been a good time to do it in the last 3+ years.
It is common knowledge that al-Sadr is an Iranian puppet and that Sistani is not very fond of al-Sadr and his Iranian backers, to put it mildly.
While there may be some backlash to taking him out, there may be less if the Iraqi security forces did it. It might send a message to the local population that militias will not be tolerated in the “new” Iraq. (How much of that is offset by long-standing tribal politics and culture, I don’t know.) I think the bigger and more important message it sends is to Iran. Iran has been meddling in Iraq since shortly before we invaded. They sent thousands of intel agents, etc. then and have provided a steady flow of personnel, weapons, training and funding to al-Sadr and others since. It seems to me it’s about time to slam the door on Iran’s antics in Iraq. We’ve danced with them enough.
Into Darth Sadr’s domain – UPDATED
I find your lack of faith disturbingBill Roggio covers the recent action…
Matt, you pose an interesting solution, could the Iraqi security forces did away with Sadr? I don’t know what the political fallout would be. Some would rejoice, and since Sadr has more than a few enemies that number would not be low. On the other hand he is a Shiite and former rivals could band together if they thought this was an attempt by the central government to silence dissent. I do agree that we should have done him in the first time he tried to use his militia.