Divisions in al Qaeda, moderataion and a potential merger
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al Qaeda in Iraq’s Mujahideen Shura. |
The Iraqi government has released a letter that highlights the differences inside al Qaeda. The letter was seized at the site of the death of former al Qaeda in Iraq commander, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and was written by Attyia al-Jaza’ri. Al-Jaza’ri is described as “an Algerian high-ranking figure of al-Qaida,” by the Stars and Stripes. Al-Jaza’ri means ‘the Algerian’, and he is a member of al Qaeda’s Mujahideen Shura, according to an American intelligence source.
Al-Zarqawi is criticized for making military political decisions without asking higher leaders of al-Qaida outside of Iraq. Indeed, the letter writer criticizes al-Zarqawi and reminds him that he is viewed only as an operational commander, not as a political or religious leader.
The letter says that senior al-Qaida leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan are “unhappy with methods in Iraq,” particularly attacks targeting civilians and possibly turning Iraqis against the group.
Al-Jaza’ri purportedly asks al-Zarqawi to step down as al-Qaida in Iraq leader in favor of other, better-qualified men.
Letter of this nature have been intercepted in the past,and have shown the internal divisions within al Qaeda in Iraq and between al Qaeda High Command and al Qaeda in Iraq. In November of 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri attempted to push Zarqawi away from a strategy that openly divided Sunnis and Shiites and alienated fellow travelers in the Jihadi world. During the formation of the Mujahideen Shura in February of 2006, there were serious questions in jihadi forums about the status of Zarqawi and his denial of a leadership position.
In may of 2006, just prior to Zarqawi’s death, there was a slew of information about the internal problems in al Qaeda. Seized documents showed al Qaeda had serious concerns about its strategy (or lack thereof) and prospects in Anbar province and Baghdad. Al-Qaeda’s assassination program in Anbar highlights the fears that al Qaeda was losing the support of religious and tribal leaders in the region. Attyia al-Jaza’ri’s letter to Zarqawi makes sense in light of these other reports.
While Zarqawi was popular in the rank and file, as well as with wealthy jihadi donors for his ability to fight and kill Westerners and the hated Shia, there were divides between him and senior al Qaeda leaders inside and outside of Iraq. And one thing the communications make clear is there is contact with al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda High Command in “Afghanistan and Pakistan.” This also reinforces the fact that al Qaeda is still a centralized organization exerting influence in the theaters of war. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri certainly aren’t operating from caves and constantly on the run.
The death of Zarqawi has provided an opening for al Qaeda in Iraq to ‘moderate’ its message (all in relative terms of course.) Gone are the days of Zarqawi beheading videos and screeds against Shiites. While al Qaeda still desires a Shiite-Sunni civil war, this isn’t being called for in jihadi press releases and statements. The targets are now ‘collaborators.’
This moderation has allowed al Qaeda in Iraq to reach out to Ansar al-Sunnah, one of the most powerful jihadi organization operating in Iraq. Evan Kohlmann reports that the chatter in jihadi Internet forums indicates “a major effort is now underway to bring the notorious Ansar al-Sunnah Army in Iraq officially under the umbrella of Al-Qaida’s Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC).” As Evan notes, Ansar al-Sunnah is a pro-bin Laden / al Qaeda organization. “Active since at least mid-2003, Ansar al-Sunnah is one of the few Iraqi insurgent groups other than Zarqawi’s Al-Qaida to openly advocate a pro-Bin Laden platform, to carry out suicide bombing attacks, and to distribute beheading videos on the Internet.” An American military intelligence source indicates disagreements over Zarqawi’s leadership style and methods have prevented a merger in the past.
Ansar al-Sunnah’s union with the Mujahideen Shura would be a coup for al Qaeda, as previously only small, insignificant jihadi groups have incorporated. This merger would help legitimize al Qaeda’s standing in the Sunni community, and could mitigate some of the repercussions of the potentially damaging organization of the Anbar tribes against al Qaeda and the national reconciliation program.
7 Comments
Zarqawi unlike the al-Qaeda high command knew exactly what it would take for him to win.
The current violence in Baghdad that is destabilizing Iraq and making it impossible for the Iraqi government to provide security or services is all do to Zarqawi’s strategy.
The US is now stuck in an extremely difficult situation in Iraq. How do we deal with the pro-Iranian militias when the Iraqi government refuses to let us.
Iran is using the militias to destabilize the Iraqi government to set the stage for a coup and Maliki is weak like Jaafari and refuses to do anything about it.
The al-Qaeda high command may not have liked Zarqawi’s strategy, but al-Qaeda in Iraq would not exist today if not for his strategy, the Shia militias would be much much smaller and would not be butchering Sunnis, and other nations around the world would be investing large amounts of money into Iraq.
Zarqawi in his 2003 letter to Bin Laden charted the only possible strategy for a destabilized Iraq that allows for an al-Qaeda safe haven in Western Iraq while different factions are killing each other around the country.
Zarqawi was a ruthless monster. But, when it came to knowing what it takes to destabilize Iraq he hit the nail on the head from the very beginning. In order to win the US is going to have to force the Iraqi government to destory the Madhi Army or change the government to find one that will.
My belief before was that Zarqawi was fingered to the US by AQ, in order to be rid of him. This sounds like confirmation.
Colonel Lucas: Your mission is to proceed up the Nung River in a Navy patrol boat. Pick up Colonel Kurtz’s path at Nu Mung Ba, follow it and learn what you can along the way. When you find the Colonel, infiltrate his team by whatever means available and terminate the Colonel’s command.
Willard: Terminate the Colonel?
General Corman: He’s out there operating without any decent restraint, totally beyond the pale of any acceptable human conduct. And he is still in the field commanding troops.
Civilian: Terminate with extreme prejudice.
Bill, I am learning to come in each day to your blog and get a good dose of unbiased reality as to the crap that is going on in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc. No one out here that I have found is matching your insights and analysis, in fact other blogs are only hotlinking into you now. I mean why bother duplicating research when they can tap into the man and his sources.
Keep up the good work, sir. You are still the only one that I have seen that has presented the unvarnished view as to what is really happening in Western Pakistan, it is utterly amazing how the media con the American public. But I am learning to filter out their crap.
Web Reconnaissance for 09/22/2006
A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention.
“wealthy jihadi donors”
Hum. What do we know about them?
A Zarqawi Letter and a Potential Merger with Ansar al-Sunnah
Courtesy of The Fourth Rail:
Divisions in al-Qaeda, moderataion and a potential merger
The Iraqi government has released a letter that highlights the differences inside al-Qaeda. The letter was seized at the site of the death of former al-Qaeda in I…
“AlQueda/Ansar al Sunnah Merger”
via Kuwait News Agency
“IRBIL, Sept 21 (KUNA) — A joint Iraqi police and army force arrested Thursday 18 suspected terrorists near Kirkuk..also confiscated warehouses where various kind of weapons and explosives, including a ton of TNT, were hidden, added the source.
He noted that Iraqi police also confiscated 80 rockets hidden near Al-Marai Village, west of Kirkuk”
I always thought there was a Northern RatLine controlled by Ansar AlSunna…it may not exist much longer.