More fighting near Avivim; prelude to invasion?

An unknown sized force of Israeli mechanized infantry units are pushing into the Lebanese town of Maroun al-Ras. This town is the scene of the Hezbollah ambush on the Golani Brigade just two days ago, where the Israelis retreated after taking casualties. Today’s fighting does not appear to be a raid or reconnaissance in force. Israeli forces have now established control in Maroun al-Ras and are occupying the town.

Richard Fernandez reports the town sits astride Hezbollah’s supply line from Syria into southern Lebanon, and may act as a jump off point into the Bekaa Valley. “This is an attack into central Lebanon,” says Fernandez. Whether todays action in Maroun al-Ras is the opening move of a wider Israeli invasion into southern Lebanon and beyond remains to be seen. The IDF certainly has focused plenty of attention on this region over the past week.

Stratfor looks at Israel’s political, military, tactical and strategic options to engage Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley [Tigerhawk has the full text.] There are essentially three parts to the military strategy: 1) Insert troops north of the Litani river to the rear of Hezbollah’s main forces using an air mobile operation 2) An armored thrust into Bekaa from eastern Israel 3) Special operations forces operating south of Beirut to disrupt Hezbollah’s command, control and communications.

Based on the latest intelligence that Hezbollah maybe in possession of SA-18 surface to air missiles, the Israelis may be planning to insert troops north of the Litani river using an amphibious operation, either as a substitution to or in addition to an air assault. The Israeli Navy does possess LCTs and LCMs (though not in large quantities), and has conducted such operations in the past. An Israeli amphibious operation would likely be limited in sized and scope, and may be used to insert the special operations forces into the south of Beirut. The Israeli naval commandos of Shayetet 13 (Flotilla 13) and the Sayeret Mat’kal (General Staff Reconnaissance Unit 269), can be inserted in the region south of Beirut, and would operate with Close Air Support and perhaps air mobile units from the IDF.

This would be a mission fraught with risk, but has the potential for high reward. As we have explained, the Israelis have suffered from major intelligence failures in the opening 12 days of this conflict. An an air mobile or amphibious operation behind enemy lines are difficult to support from a logistical standpoint. If the commandos can kill or capture senior Hezbollah political and military leaders, or a larger operation can cut off Hezbollah’s supply lines from the north, the Israeli military will be in a better position both politically and militarily to strike a fatal blow to Hezbollah.

But the insertion of Israeli troops north of Hezbollah’s lines, either by air or sea, would be a bold move that may help to restore the Israeli military’s prestige, which has been severely compromised since the fighting began on July 12.

Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, has openly mocked the Israelis for their unwillingness to confront Hezbollah on the ground. And Sheikh Naim Kassem, Nasrallah’s deputy, claims Israel has no wish to confront Hezbollah on the ground. Whether this is true or not does not matter, the perception in Lebanon and the wider Muslim world is the Israelis are avoiding a ground battle. The Israeli military, which fought multiple nation-states on its own during several regional wars now is perceived as unwilling to battle a single enemy in the form of a militia. Each day Israeli fails to move against Hezbollah, Hezbollah’s stature rises in the Muslim world.

Israel has called up another 5,000 reservists to free up active duty unit to fight on the Lebanese front. Meanwhile, the New York Times reports the Israeli military still wishes to engage Hezbollah primarily via air, according to an anonymous ” senior Israeli commander”:

“I believe in airpower. I believe in our ability to destroy Hezbollah without going into Lebanon again the way we did in 1982. And the only way to do it is to attack any movement we detect, any launch or any activity aimed at hitting Israel – especially from the villages we see.”

The overall aim, Israel says, is to weaken Hezbollah sufficiently so that the international community can help the Lebanese government to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 and exercise its sovereignty all over Lebanon, expelling any foreign fighters and disarming Hezbollah.

Israel is more interested in having an international force patrol the border than it has been in the past, officials say, especially if the force has rules of engagement that will allow it to ensure that Hezbollah cannot reinfiltrate to the border.

Again, this may very well be a sophisticated Information Operation designed to catch Hezbollah with its guard down. But the anonymous officer’s words match those of other senior political and military leaders who have gone on the record. Each day Israel fails to confront Hezbollah on the ground is a victory for Hezbollah.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

Tags: hezbollah, Israel, lebanon