Qaim and the Big Picture

The fluid security situation in Qaim, where the pro-government Albu Mahla tribe is battling with al Qaeda for control over the city of Qaim, has many Iraq watchers scratching their heads. Who exactly is in control? In a Washington Post article titled Insurgents Assert Control Over Town Near Syrian Border, the authors claim al Qaeda is fully in control of the city and implementing Shariah law (much like the claims made about Haditha several weeks ago). The Marines do not substantiate this claim. The Washington Post provides the proper context to the claims of al Qaeda control:

Insurgents have occasionally made similar shows of force, such as the takeover of a Baghdad neighborhood for a few hours late last month by dozens of gunmen. They then slipped away, having made the point that they can muster men as well as plant bombs. The weekend takeover of Qaim extended already heavy insurgent pressure on the people there and came after the U.S. military said it had inflicted heavy bombing losses on foreign-led fighters.

Transitory control does not fully explain the situation, however. Qaim must be looked at in the larger context of the Anbar Campaign, which now appears to be entering phase II, where the Coalition is working to establish a presence in the unsecured regions prior to the upcoming elections. As the enemy is increasingly denied safe havens, they will migrate to areas where security is wanting. Qaim, Haditha and small towns along the Euphrates River are their only options, and their entry into these towns boosts their strength (and as we have seen with the air strikes in Qaim, makes them more vulnerable to counter attack).

We are now seeing search and destroy operations designed to keep the enemy off balance being conducted along with with clear and hold operations designed to eject the terrorists and provide a government presence to prevent the enemy from reentering the cities and towns.

Search and destroy operations are currently being conducted in the region of Qaim and along the western branch of the Euphrates River. The series of recent airstrikes in Qaim are but one example. In the town of Karibalah, Coalition forces conduct a raid on a ‘foreign fighter’ safe house, kill two foreign jihadis and capture three, and then call in air support to destroy the lair. Also in Karibalah Bridges across the Euphrates River that were being used by insurgents are attacked with inert bombs filled with concrete that are designed to make the bridges impassable, but not beyond repair. These operations indicate the Coalition has actionable intelligence in the region, is attempting to disrupt the ratline and funnel the traffic elsewhere, is planning of repairing and reusing the bridges at a later date (else they would have been destroyed), and has boots on the ground to conduct raids.

What looks to be a concerted effort to maintain a presence in Iraqi cities is taking place in Tal Afar in the north, Rawah in the west and in towns surrounding Fallujah. In the towns of Faris and Ameriya south of Fallujah, U.S. Marines have established a forward operating base and are beginning to actively patrol the areas, with Iraqi troops in tow. Efforts to secure the border increase, as the Coalition continues to build fortifications on the Syrian border and train Iraqi border guards (September 6, 2005 entry).

The current operations follow the security efforts in Hit, Ramadi, Fallujah and Mosul. The efforts net results in removing the most dangerous elements of the insurgency. Near the town of Ameriya, an IED cell is dismantled. In Hillah, a senior aide to terrorist leader Sheikh Abdullah Al Janabi of Fallujah has been captured. Numerous successes such as these occur daily and degrade the effectiveness of the insurgency over time.

The strategic importance of Qaim, particularly with the northern ratline of Tal Afar being threatened, makes it a logical town for al Qaeda to regroup to attempt to maintain control of the border. As the Coalition continues to press, the enemy’s secure area in Anbar shrinks. The terrorists have two options to respond: stand and fight – and die, as several thousand did in Fallujah – or retreat and attempt to fight another day. If the choice is retreat, the places of refuge are increasingly becoming limited.

In the fall of 2004, as Fallujah fell to the Coalition, the jihadis fled to Ramadi, Samara, Hit, Baghdad, Mosul and other large cities to continue their campaign of terror. This jihadi diaspora fueled the outbreaks of violence throughout Iraq after the assault on Fallujah, as well as the post election terror from May to July in Baghdad and elsewhere across the country. The Coalition appears to have learned its lesson, as the attempt to surround the insurgents in Tal Afar shows.

The propaganda value of al Qaeda’s declarations is enormous (the media and antiwar camp’s reactions demonstrate this), but from a pure military standpoint they are meaningless. In fact, if you look closely, the declarations of Islamic Republics of Haditha and Qaim shows how far al Qaeda has been pushed from the major centers of power in Iraq. Last fall, Fallujah was the vanguard of the Islamist “resistance” , the crown jewel of Islamist power in Iraq. Fallujah been lost, and today the jihadis are relocating to the backwater towns of Haditha, Qaim and Karibalah to proclaim their miniature Islamic Caliphates.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.