Just last week, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al Qaeda’s commander in Iraq, once again declared all out war on the Shiites, an Islamic sect despised by al Qaeda for their interpretation of the Koran and their ritual practices. The timing of Zarqawi’s statement coincided with the assault on Tal Afar, but also with a Shiite holiday in Karbala that begun yesterday. Regardless of the threats, the Shiite faithful are make the pilgrimage to Karbala by the thousands.
Karbala has been relatively quiet despite the difficult security situation created by the mass movement of Shiites into and out of the city. Eight Iraqis are killed in two separate car bomb attacks on the road to Karbala in the towns of Mahmoudiya and Latifiya. A plot to kill pilgrims within the city was uncovered. Karbala is a target rich environment for al Qaeda, yet their weapons have essentially been silent thus far.
Zarqawi’s declaration of sectarian war against the Shiites is met with stiff resistance within the Shiite and Sunni communities. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has urged for calm in the face of Zarqawi’s threats. And the pro-insurgency Muslim Scholars association called for Zarqawi to retract his remarks as “It harms the image of jihad, obstructs the success of the resistance in Iraq, and leads to more innocent Iraqi bloodshed.”
But perhaps the most astonishing rebuke of Zarqawi’s jihad on Shiites comes from within the insurgency itself. Various insurgent groups, including Gaish Mohamed, Al Qa’qa Regiments, Islamic Army, Iraqi Mujahideen Army and Al Naser Salah Eddin renounced Zarqawi’s statements; “The objective of resistance in their military attacks is solely the occupation and its assistants. The call for murdering all Shiaas is a fire that would burn Iraqis; Sunnis and Shiaas Resistance consists of Iraqi military and popular organizations that are not connected with any formations outside them. The main objective is liberating Iraq from the occupants and establishing national free regime in it Resistance does not target any Iraqis, regardless of their sectarian or racial loyalties, unless connected with the occupant.”
Zarqawi feels the pressure from the traditional bases of support within the Sunni community and is forced to retract (or “clarify” ) his jihad on Shiites. Now, only the Shiites who cooperate with the infidel (basically all of them) are the targets of his wrath.
al Qaeda’s efforts at creating an Iraqi civil war now lie in ruin, as the group they claims to represent, the Sunnis, including the most “militant’ among them, reject the plan outright and in public. They fully understand the implications of declaring a civil war against the majority of the country that controls the levers of power and is backed by the United States.
This does not mean that Zarqawi cannot or will not attempt to create the conditions for civil war. He is very likely to continue to do so. However, as he has openly declared his intentions, any mass casualty attacks on Shiites will now be seen in the light of his statements to create such an environment. Zarqawi will find it difficult to openly enlist the domestic elements of the insurgency for assistance in mass casualty assaults against Shiites, as they will not want to be branded as traitors.
al Qaeda in Iraq may have tactically restrained itself by rushing to declare war on all Shiites. It will now be difficult politically to conduct major attacks on obvious targets as there is little support among the indigenous Sunni insurgency for the wholesale slaughter of the Shiites. Zarqawi may do so anyway, as his political and diplomatic acumen is often found wanting. Such is the fate of mass murderers.
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Bill–Zarqawi must create a certain amount of mayhem by attacking SOMEONE–just to keep the media mill going that collaborates in lending the veneer of (false)credibility to claims that his jihad in Iraq continues to be viable. If these soft targets of opportunity are denied him by the emerging political realities, at whom can he now strike?
He knows that frontal attacks against the MNF will further decimate his forces. He knows that concentrating his assests makes them easy targets for capture or destruction. He knows that continued attacks on Iraqi civilians–even the hated apostate Shia (who are apparently thoroughly intermarried with the Iraqi Sunni population)–will make him more and more of a pariah amongst a population now willing to betray the location and identies of his fighters. It does look like he is running out of acceptable operational options. Where does he go from here?
ricksamerican,
Very good question, which I should have addressed in the post. Here goes:
Iraqi institutions – Army, Police, Oil infrastructure, etc.; US and Coalition forces; small scale attacks on Shiites to attempt to hide their nature yet still incite Shiites; Sunni and other ‘collaborators’; buildings of import (shrines, tourist spots, etc.). It is still a target rich environment as you cannot defend everything, but al Qaeda has learned it is very costly to attack US forces. And they are starting to discover Iraqi securiy forces aren’t patsies either.
At some point, the supply of useful idiots must become a limiting factor. With plentiful numbers of wannabe shaheeds who are willing to drive the car (or strap on a vest and walk) to target X, who cares if most attacks don’t kill any apostates, traitors, or crusaders. Some will.
The supply would seem to come from foreign sources (Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Algeria, Egypt) and from native Iraqis. If foreigners have more trouble making it down the ratlines, and Iraqi Sunnis lose enthusiasm for self-explosions, that could put a real crimp on the program.
Supplies of explosives, bomb-making expertise, detonators, and funds don’t seem to be big issues. Though good safe-house bomb assembly facilities do, and the crunch may get worse if more Iraqis are alienated by Zarqawi’s tactics.
I wonder what proportion of shaheeds are ‘recycled,’ i.e. had already been arrested. But were then released for lack of evidence, lack of an organized criminal/combatant-status procedure, or lack of secure detention facilities.
I wouldn’t think Ahmadinejad is too keen on a nice peaceful festival. If Z-man cannot deliver then I would bet on some Shi’ite militia action.
Zarqawi overplayed his hand too early. There is going to be one time period where I think civil war is actually possible and that is late October after the Constitution is accepted and at the start of Saddam’s trial. The Sunnis are going to get very pissed and it will be very bloodly. But, my guess is that Saddam’s trial will make the Shia content enough no to respond to Sunni attacks.
The real question is if the Sunnis will vote in the December election.
Also, the UIA is going after Allawi’s men for criminal charges before the election, they damn well better not overplay their hand.
Iraq would be far better off if the UIA, Dawa, Harkim, Badr, and the rest of the pro-Iranian losers in the chess game lose power after the December election.
Justin,
In a civil war, the provinces from Najaf south become one country, and Kirkuk north become another country. The center of the country is left penniless to kill each other.
The Iraqi’s understand this. Killing each other on a small scale as a form of “advanced negotiating” is one thing, an all out civil war is another thing.
Zarqawi blowing up day laborers and people going to pray will have made a lot of Iraqi’s stop and think about what a real civil war would look like.
Today, in Arab on Arab violence, one tribe leader in Babil was killed, and an attempt was made on a University professors life in Mosul. For all we know, both events could have been the result of a personal dispute.
BILL. ALTHOUGH I AGREE THAT THE NATIONALIST REBELS ARE NOT GOING TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT AL QAEDA MASSACRES OF THEIR SHIA ENEMIES:
A) IT SERVES THEIR STRATEGIC AIMS TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO BRING AN (ALL OUT) CIVIL WAR INTO THE EQUATION. THE POOR TRAINING OF THE SHIA MILITIAS WOULD SPELL DOOM FOR THEIR ASSAULTS ON ANY IRAQI CITY WEST OF KARBALA. THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS (ie. “THE BRIGADES OF THE 1927 REVOLUTION”), AND THEIR FEDAYEEN ALLIES(AKA “AL QAEDA IN IRAQ”)SURVIVIED THE ASSAULTS OF FULL U.S. RCT’S AND SOME VERY COSTLY ASSAULTS BY THE ACR’S. ALTHOUGH THEY TAKE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE CASUALTIES, THEY STILL HOLD THEIR CITIES AFTER THE U.S. MARINES OR ARMY LEAVE. (ie.AL SAMAHWA)
B)A CIVIL WAR ALREADY ALREADY EXISTS. IT HAS IN IRAQ FOR GENERATIONS. THE DYNAMIC OF IRAQI SOCIETY IS THAT OF SECTARIANISM AND CLAN LOYALTIES. IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THE UNITED STATES’ MILITARY OBJECTIVES (OR MORE IMPORTANTLY THEIR POLITICAL ONES)THE SUNNI RESISTANCE MUST ENGAGE AND DEFEAT THE SHITES IN A “BAD PR” EVENT, WHICH WOULD “EXPOSE THE CURRUPT COLLABORATORS”. JUST IMAGINE, APACHE’S SUPPORTING THE AL MAHDI ARMY ON CNN.
THE POINT IS THIS: THE ARMY’S OF THE RADICAL SHI’ITE MILITIAS DID NOT TRAIN FOR A MAJOR URBAN GUERILLA WAR. ZARQAWI AND THE REPUBLICAN GUARD DID. THERE ISN’T ANY WAY TO DENY THIS. LOOK AT THE NUMBERS. 2000 U.S. DEATHS. ALMOST 20000 WIA. THE MOST CAPABLE COMBAT FORCE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD AT THE MOMENT CAN’T COMPLETELY DESTROY THE INSURGENCY’S CAPABILITY TO DISPERSE AND RE-DEPLOY.
ALTHOUGH THE SHIA WOULD HAVE NO MERCY ON THE CIVILIAN POULATION OF THE ANBAR A/O, THIS WOULD LOOK VERY BAD FOR NOT ONLY THE ADMINISTRATION IN D.C., BUT WORSE FOR THE “INTERIM GOVERNMENT”.
Soldier’s Dad,
I am well aware of that. When I said civil war, I more meant Sunnis on mass trying to kill Shia, I also said they wouldn’t respond even if they did in a way that would lead to the kind of conflict a real civil war would bring.
Just FYI:
1) The metric watched by the CJCS, total security incidents continues to rise at a slow and steady pace since shortly after the election in January, despite our success’ in Tall Afar and Anabar. Even if you discount the attacks on 14 Sept, there was a substantial increase in overall attacks. I understand the problems with this particular metric, so don’t lecture me, I only mention it because it is the one watched by the CJCS.
2) Out of the 11 VBIEDs on the 14th only one can be considered a direct attack on the Shi’a, the one targeting the day labourers. The rest of the target set included: IP CP’s, US CP’s, an EOD team, 2x IP stations, US convoy, Iraqi MOI convoy and others.
3) I think that most of you give Z-Man more credit than he is due. I’m not so sure he is responsible for as much activity as he claims to be. I also think that we try to understand his statements in western or military political terms that really do not apply. He is nothing more than a murderous thug with a big name and a few connections. And now that he has the medias attention and obviouslly ours we over anaylse everything he says. All of these terror organizations border on anarchy and are glorified gangs and to lose sight of that gives them the power they strive for.
4) We do not have to defeat, and I contend that we cannot (completelly), the insurgency to win. We have already won, Saddam is gone. We only have to leave when Iraq can police itself. Much like Afghanistan today. Karzi called for us to leave, in so many words. And it is time. Afghanistan and its people are close enough to give them a shot. If they fail we come back.
A few facts and my $.02
I think that most of you give Z-Man more credit than he is due.
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The media only covers suicide bombings and mass casulity IED blasts. And, virtually all the ones that have reached the news have been done by al-Qaeda in Iraq or Ansar al-Sunna. Both of which are Zarqawi’s main umbrella groups. The Zarqawi umbrella groups like Jaysh Muhammad which are made up of Baathists are less controlled directly by Zarqawi, but they work with him and he provides them money.
I am not saying the weaker Zarqawi umbrella always agree with him, but they work with him because he has a good support structure and lots of money.
Zarqawi also is a grave threat to Europe and his network presents a threat in the future to the US. If there is one person you could point to in the world with the most control of al-Qaeda right now it would be Zarqawi. He controls the jihadi base, because the base has been moving to Iraq.
There is a report in al Mendhar that Iranian Intelligence has totally infiltrated the southern provinces, complete with death squads, money, arms and explosives imports to friendly militias, and the taking over of southern governmental institutions.
This raises two questions. Zarqawi has not complained about the Iranians too much, if at all. If Zarqawi is adamant that Iraq not fall in the hands of the Shias, then he should be more vocal on this, and thereby attract the nationalist elements. It appears that Zarqawi is not so much against Iranian influence. Zarqawi and the rest of the Sunni insurgents should know that Iranians are a larger impediment to Sunni restoration, than are the Americans.
Also, if it is true that Sadr controls the Basra police force and the Mahdi army is rampant, then why is Sadr not taking action against the Iranians in southern Iraq? The animosity between Sadr and the Iranians have been reported in the past.
There appears to be a lot of tactical alliances in the works.
This is the report in al Mendhar.
I give up. This is the report: http=”http://www.almendhar.com/english_6315/news.aspx”
hamidreza,
My guess is when Zarqawi will complain about Iranians, he will be very dead very soon. This kind of … people? …are hateful to anything, to Shia, to the West, to other religions, to womens and so on. HATE HATE HATE KILL KILL KILL.
They have to prioritize somehow, so US of A is first on their list.
Iranian’s disregard to human life was obvious in Iraq-Iran war. They sent unarmed teens, tied together with a rope to keep them from running, wave after wave towards Iraqi lines. Nobody knows how many were “martyrized”.
Iraqi Shia have a choice now. If they lean towards Iran and form a fundamentalist entity in the south, the RELIGIOUS war will rage for decades. Civil war term I think is improper used here, we must make clear that is a conflict generated by the “Religion of Peace” tm.
First reports of growing Iranian influence in the area and aparition of “revolutionary guards” surfaced some time ago on an Iraqi blog. My question, why the Iranians in Iraq don’t have any hard-time from coallition forces.
The Brits have all, but let Iran do this in the South because they didn’t want violence and they basically acted like they wanted to bury their head in the sand, well now they have violence anyway.
Zarqawi is basically working for the same thing the Iranians would love to occur in Iraq, a civil war.
Why is that?
Because al-Qaeda would be able to have a great deal of control over western Iraq and Iran would be able to control southern Iraq.
I’m going to state something which is very obvious to me but maybe not to others:
This war will be over when, and only when, 95+% of the people in Iraq are sick and tired of violence and killing and realise they’re going to be better off if they just sort out their differences and get on with their lives.
Anything which makes them more upset with the terrorists is going to increase this quotient. I believe we are seeing many signs that it is increasing. WE can not get rid of the terrorists but they can. We can only try to keep the situation under control while the Iraqi people decide what kind of future they want – a bloody one where almost everyone loses or something else.
I don’t think we’re all that far away from the point of no return, beyond which the terrorists lose all but the most hard core supporters, which is the beginning of the end for them. Our biggest worry beyond that point will be, as others have pointed out, the less violent but still troublesome hardline religious types. The trouble with them is that the number of “reasonable” people who might support them is much higher than the number who will support the terrorists in the end. I’m not sure what can be done about this….
Geostragegist,
“THE MOST CAPABLE COMBAT FORCE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD AT THE MOMENT CAN’T COMPLETELY DESTROY THE INSURGENCY’S CAPABILITY TO DISPERSE AND RE-DEPLOY.”
It took the most capable police department in the world 10 YEARS to reduce the NYC Murder rate from 8/day to 2/day. That police department had the advantages of language and local cultural knowledge on their side.
There was a virtual civil war between the Italian-American criminals, the African-American criminals and the Foreign Based Drug Cartels.
The only thing that is going to end the conflict in Iraq is quality neighborhood policing. The only thing MNF Forces can do is “keep a lid” on the violence until the Iraqi police force gets it’s act together.
Zarqawi’s war on Shiites rejected by other extremists
soldier’s dad:
I WAS REMARKING ON THE ODDS IN A SUNNI VS. SHIA CIVIL WAR. THE US MILITARY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO DEFEAT THE INSURGENTS’ HOLD ON THE CITIES OF ANBAR…. HENCE, THE SHIA MILITIAS WOULDN’T HAVE ANY HOPE OF COMPLETING THIS TASK.
I DO AGREE THAT GROUND LEVEL POLICING WILL INDEED BRING A HIGHER LEVEL OF SECURITY IN A GENERAL SENSE, BUT THESE POLICE FORCES STILL HAVE TO CONTEND WITH THE PROFESSIONAL IRAQI ARMY (FORMER OFFICIAL ARMY, NOW NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT) AND THEIR ISLAMIST ALLIES, WHO ARE BOTH HIGHLY TRAINED AND MOTIVATED.
THE CONSTRUCT THAT BECAME THE DEFININITION OF THE IRAQI ARMY AFTER THE FIRST GULF WAR WAS ABSOLUTE NONSENSE.