The Iraqi insurgency appears to be making another concerted effort to deter foreign governments from establishing diplomatic missions in country. Attacks on foreign diplomats are nothing new in Iraq. We have seen this in the past with attacks on the Jordanian embassy and the UN Special Mission in the summer of 2003, the Turkish embassy and International Red Cross headquarters in October of 2003, and the Australian embassy in January of 2005.
In the past few days, Al Qaeda has taken credit for the kidnapping of the newly appointed Egyptian ambassador, the charge d’affaires of Bahrain’s diplomatic mission was injured in a kidnapping attempt, and Pakistan’s Ambassador narrowly escaped death after his convoy was ambushed. His bodyguards fended off the attack.
While al Qaeda has not taken responsibility for the attack on the Pakistani and Bahraini diplomats, the timing of the events indicates either they are directly responsible or cooperated with allied insurgent groups to carry out the mission. The tight spacing of these events fits al Qaeda’s profile of multiple (and nearly simultaneous) dramatic high-visibility operations, and they were designed for political shock value.
Ed Morrissey of Captain’s Quarters argues that al Qaeda has miscalculated by attacking Arab and Muslim diplomats, and “they threaten to turn Arabic governments from positions of benign neglect to active and deadly opposition to AQ and its supporters. No government will blithely allow its envoys to become targets for Islamists, no matter how sympathetic they might be.” The primary targets of the attacks are not the Muslim governments, however, but the Iraqi government.
Al Qaeda wants to demonstrate to foreign governments Baghdad is not safe to send their ambassadors, as well as deny the Iraqi government the prestige and legitimacy that is conferred with the establishment of foreign embassies (the Taliban government of Afghanistan was never viewed as legitimate, as only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates recognized them as such and established diplomatic ties, which left them isolated from the world).
The leaders of Egypt, Pakistan and Bahrain are considered false Muslims by the Islamists, and the governments are considered illegitimate puppets of the West. Egypt has ruthlessly suppressed Islamists within their border, and Pakistan has killed or captured well over a thousand al Qaeda operatives since 9-11. None of these countries have troops in Iraq, nor will they be inclined to send any to fight the insurgency in Iraq despite attacks on their diplomatic missions. There is little political will and public support within these countries to do so. Security for diplomats and embassies will no doubt be increased, but this hardly means these Muslim countries will join the fight.
Al Qaeda has misjudged every political move in Iraq, and there is little reason to doubt they have made yet another mistake. Al Qaeda can only be successful if nations withdrawal their missions due to targeted violence, or the threat of violence. If countries decide to press forward and upgrade their diplomatic relations, al Qaeda will be handed yet another defeat, just as they were unable to stop the election, the transition to the interim government and successfully conduct attacks on US bases.
