Operation Thunder has temporarily put a dent in the car bombings in Baghdad. Mohammed from Iraq the Model provides a situation report based on the local Iraqi media, and states “The last 24 hours or so resulted in arresting some 300 terrorists and suspects in addition to confiscating amounts of weapons.” The number of arrests stemming from Thunder is well over a thousand. The insurgency appears to have pulled up shop and moved north, executing a series of four attacks directed at Iraqi Security Forces. The Coalition is conducting an offensive in Tal Afar, and as mentioned last weekend, an additional 4,000 US troops have deployed to the Mosul – Tal Afar region. This is twice the amount of men used in Matador and New Market combined.
James Janega of the Chicago Tribune reports on the scarcity of US and Iraqi troops available to secure the Anbar province. He Estimates 4,000 Marines are patrolling about 30,000 square miles of territory. For good or ill, the strategy in the Wild West of Anbar appears to be one of establishing distinct garrisons in locations such as Qaim, Haditha and other locations, patrolling the territory, conduct search and destroy missions at opportune times when targets and threats materialize, and waiting for Iraqi Security Forces to train up and deploy to fill the security needs of the region.
Michael Schwartz of the Asia Times states the rise in the use of car bombings (a quick look at the numbers) as a tactic of choice against police and civilian targets is working against insurgency. Mr. Schwartz is no ‘neo-con or Iraq hawk; he writes for MotherJones.com, mind you. The insurgency has abandoning idea of infiltrating/co-opting local police as Coalition shifted tactics by deploying troops from outside regions, and the car bomb attacks are alienating large segments of the population.
But there is another aspect to these attacks that is even more symptomatic of a shift in the resistance strategy: the targeting of police and police recruits. While these attacks have occurred in the past, they have now become the key weapon in the resistance struggle against Iraqi armed forces, replacing one that was almost its direct opposite.
Before the current campaign, most of the resistance attempted to co-opt, rather than defeat, the Iraqi police and National Guard. The patterns were simple: when police and the national guard were stationed in cities, the resistance would cooperate with them in enforcing criminal law, delivering criminals to them and avoiding armed conflict, except when they participated in campaigns against the resistance itself. When the US called on local Iraqi forces to fight the resistance, the resistance would issue an appeal for the Iraqi armed forces to defect or abandon their posts and melt into the population. In virtually every important confrontation police stations were abandoned to the resistance, Iraqi units deserted and went home rather than fight other Iraqis, and some even joined the resistance and fought the Americans. The most highly visible of such cases occurred in the two battles in Fallujah last year and the confrontations in Sadr City, where the US could not mobilize any Iraqi units except those from the Kurdish areas.
This strategy was more successful than preventing the recruitment of police and national guards, since it created a “Trojan Horse” supplied and trained by the US that was frequently an ally and almost never the enemy. In Mosul, for example, US reliance on the local police allowed the resistance to take over the city (during the battle of Fallujah, when the US forces were otherwise occupied) with almost no fighting. A force of 3,000 policemen simply melted into the population (except those that joined the rebels) and left their weapons and supplies behind.
This new car-bomb strategy will therefore hurt the resistance whether it succeeds or fails. Any reduction in the size of the army will be more than offset by the antagonism to the resistance among the surviving forces, definitively undermining the “Trojan Horse” strategy.
So why have at least some elements of the rebellion abandoned the co-optation strategy? The most important answer lies in changes in US policy for deploying Iraqi military forces. Until last fall, the US recruited local residents for the local police force and assigned army units with matching ethno-religious backgrounds to local patrols. That is, they recruited Fallujans to police and patrol in Fallujah, Ramadans in Ramadi and Sadr City residents in Sadr City. When this was not possible, Sunnis were assigned to Sunni areas; Shi’ites were assigned to Shi’ite areas.
The adaptation of the Coalition in Iraqi force deployments demonstrates the recognition of shortcomings in past policies and the adaptability to the situation on the ground. Mr. Schwartz predicts the use of outside Iraqi Security Forces in local areas will lead to a rise in sectarian strife, a fair conclusion. Time will tell, but the Iraqi government has been successful at suppressing the desire for Shiite and Kurdish elements from retaliating against the Sunni butchers.
A. Heather Coyne, the chief of party of US Institute of Peace activities in Iraq, pens an opinion piece in the Christian Science Monitor titled Far from media focus: steady democratic progress in Iraq (hattip Austin Bay). Ms. Coyne states that while the media appears to be all over the map with respect to the situation in Iraq, the progress towards democracy in Iraq has been one of steady, behind the scenes progress. Her analysis is not viewed through rosy glasses alone, she recognizes the obstacles that remain in both the security and political realm.
Take the security situation, for example. The threat has not decreased, nor have the insurgents lost their will or capability to inflict damage. But behind the headlines of the recent spate of attacks, the step-by-step approach is gaining momentum. Iraq is producing new police and military forces that are gradually winning the confidence of the people they serve – so much so that the public is providing more and more valuable information on insurgent activity. That enables the weapons cache seizures and high profile arrests that then increase public respect for the forces, which helps with recruiting and decreases support for the insurgents.
While the media continue their longstanding tendency to focus on the most dramatic and destructive events – the capture of a terrorist, a deadly attack – the real story changes too gradually to make headlines: the steady stream of volunteers at recruiting stations that bit by bit brings force numbers up to significant levels, the increasing numbers of tips to the police, the growing sense of public ownership of the newly trained forces.
Ms. Coyne provides examples in the political realm as well (see additional examples from MilBloggers Major K. and Chuck).We again return to the intrepid bloggers of Iraq the Model to provide one of those underreported successes that can change the landscape of Iraq. The Iraqi Assembly has agreed to disbanding the militias of the political parties and suggests integrating them into the national army and other security services. This should go a long way to quell Mr. Schwartz’s fears of pending sectarian violence, but don’t count on it.
