Over the past year, US special operations forces teams have deployed with the Pakistani Army to serve in a combat support role.
Small teams from the US Special Operations Command have deployed with Pakistani Army headquarters units in the Taliban-controlled tribal agencies of Bajaur and North and South Waziristan “to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice” for ongoing combat operations. The presence of three such teams have been detected over the past year.
The deployment of US special operations forces was disclosed in the US State Department cables leaked by WikiLeaks. The cable, which is dated Oct. 9, 2009, was written by Anne Patterson, then the US Ambassador to Pakistan.
The deployment of the first team was to the tribal agency of Bajaur, where the Pakistani military has twice declared victory against Taliban forces under the command of Faqir Mohammed. The Pakistani Army first claimed a total Taliban defeat in March 2008, and did so again in March 2009.
“The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations,” Patterson wrote. “The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK [Special Operations Command Forward, Pakistan] elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in Bajaur Agency, occurred in September.”
The deployment of a special operations team “provided ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] for an FC [Frontier Corps] operation. This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.”
In early October, the Pakistan Army General Headquarters again requested the deployment of teams to North and South Waziristan “in order to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice” to 11 Corps. “SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the [location redacted] and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video.”
The Pakistani request for US special operations teams occurred just two weeks before the Pakistani Army launched its military offensive against the Taliban under the command of al Qaeda allies Hakeemullah and Waliur Rahman Mehsud in the Mehsud tribal areas in the eastern region of South Waziristan. The Pakistani Army did not advance on al Qaeda and Taliban havens in the Wazir areas in South Waziristan and has continued to rebuff US pressure to move into North Waziristan, which is considered the headquarters of al Qaeda’s global operations.
Ambassador Patterson’s cable highlights the limited role the US military has played in Pakistan.
“U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role,” she wrote. “The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations.”
The presence of US special operations forces in northwestern Pakistan was confirmed in February 2010 when three US soldiers were killed in a suicide attack in the settled district of Dir, just north of Bajaur. The US embassy in Islamabad insisted the three US soldiers were providing training and assistance to the Pakistan Frontier Corps.
The deployment of US military teams in support of military operations was cause for optimism, and “appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking,” Patterson stated. “Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point.”
But Patterson warned that disclosure of the deployment of US ground teams would jeopardize future cooperation.
“These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil,” Patterson said. “Should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or US media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.”
16 Comments
Nothing surprising here. In fact, it would be both surprising and disappointing if this was not happening. The only “news” is the level of it being common knowledge and the associated political pressures.
And the increased likelihood of retribution from low level types in Pakistan.
damn wikileaks, bastards are putting soldiers lives at risk
JT, I agree. What I think may be surprising to some is how rare this seems to be, at least between 2001 and Oct. 2009. Many seem to think NW Pakistan is a special operator’s playground, and this cable shows just how hard a time the US has had getting advisers in at a combat support role at the corps and division level. Also, it is interesting that Pakistan saw a need for advisers in Bajaur given how they’ve touted success there.
Pakistan seems to have claimed success several times in several places, only to have to return there. I wonder if they are truly stretched too thin or they simply don’t want to send any soldiers somewhere for extended periods.
In any case, I worry more about the apparent confirmation of suspicion about the Pakistan nuclear weapons security. The leaks apparently have shown that the US is indeed concerned a great deal, and at high levels. This should be our primary focus with respect to Pakistan, in my opinion.
When learning of a change in tactics by the Pak Army during the S Waziristan operation – to take the high ground first – I recall commenting that this was the same tactic that brought success to the Frozen Chosin in Korea.
Very encouraging if the institutional memory of the USMC were responsible for this very successful change. I seem to recall that the USMC was finally allowed to participate in SOCOM starting about 3 yrs ago?
Not to play favorites among the service branches, but I was somewhat appalled to find out from Stan Crist that IEDs were a huge problem in Vietnam too, but the US Army’s institutional memory didn’t reach back that far, so you’d have never guessed it by the way they went into Iraq completely and utterly unprepared for them.
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/
Busy month. Several key events mentioned there.
RED
LINES,
R
I thought the Pakistanis had no interest in attacking North Waziristan.
Graham, the deployment was requested a year ago, and nothing has happened since….
@Civy
This is in lots of books on Vietnam. It was caused by
USAF dropping lots of duds, which the VC would then saw open (hazard pay?), and use for their own booby traps. One of the books I have shows a pic of this. I am very surprised that the US Army forgot about it, when lots of books in bookstores talk about it.
David,
Very true. Stan and I were doing every possible thing to get more mine-resistant vehicles into Iraq – AnBar in particular – in the early ’05 timeframe. Stan’s a track bigot, and I favored the SADF Caspir V-hulled wheeled designs for their lower operating costs, but we agreed HumVees were inadequate.
Of course we now know the USMC’s theater commander was also requesting these, and as his top priority, but that request was denied for political reasons. Better late than never, but I hope this is one lesson we will never again have to relearn.
Nope, not the USMC; comes from digging up the old British Indian Army’s “Manual of Frontier Warfare” from (IIRC) 1937.
With all due respect, I doubt there is all that much the USMC can teach the PA since the two militaries have such diametrically opposed philosophies. The PA is still a foot-infantry army with very limited access to the hi tech gadgetry loved by US forces, and certainly nothing like the lavish use of firepower, air support and logistics that the US deems as being absolutely essential.
As far as US forces being with Pakistani troops in FATA, I was told by a Pakistani general in 2004 that Americans were there already with Pakistani troops, and that the US had been told strictly ‘no blacks, no blondes and no six-footers.’ Obviously so that at a distance no one could tell that they were Americans and not Pakistanis. Hispanic US troops, for example, at a slight distance are virtually undistinguishable from Pakistanis.
Where is the “Like” button?
Appreciate this report Bill. Very interesting.
Civy- If I recall the first ever MARSOF unit was kicked out of Afghanistan shortly after it deployed. It was the Marines who mostly fought against joining the SOF community for years. I’m all for esprit de corps and all that but here is a simple fact. The marines did not invent clearing the high ground. I’m pretty sure that is why armies have built castles and forts on hilltops for thousands of years. It’s always been advantages to have the high ground. Unless the enemy knows you always clear the high ground and then place IED’s there. We here in Afghanistan have been clearing the high ground long before the Marines set a wet foot in country.
Fuzair,
Well, uhhh, in December 1950 USMC CAS was a bunch of WWII Corsairs. Of course in the breakout from the Pusan Peninsula they were good enough to be dropping 500 lbs bombs on enemy MG nests 50 yards ahead of infantry – accuracy honed in the recent unpleasantness with the Japanese.
As for the current Pak Air Force, it is now, and always has been, primarily a CAS force, not obsessed with strategic bombing, dog-fighters or interceptors. Like the USMC, and vs the US Army, they don’t have the silly fixed wing prohibition on their CAS assets either.
While the USAF does many things well, with respect to CAS, it has been slower to respond, and with less firepower, in every conflict since it was created – in spite of endless commitments to improve. It wanted rid of the A10 so badly it was willing to give them to the Navy to create a Sea Hog.
If not US influence, how do you account for the radical shift in tactics in the S Waziristan campaign? The timing of the request for advisers was pure coincidence?
Out of curiosity, please list what you consider weapons, and what you consider gadgets. I ask because in the past I’ve found the dividing line between tends to depend almost entirely on the age of the guy making the list.
US SPEC OP forces operating with the PA is not a surprise, so Wikileaks didn’t score any coups there if you ask me. But what really sucks is that the PA refuses to go into the tribal areas where the terrs consider themselves safe. Everyone knows that if they go in these areas and wipe them out, though bloody it would slow down and possibly halt the incursions into the ‘Stan. Their reluctance is blatant proof that they have sympathizers in their ranks.