A US Marine, an interpreter, and an Afghan soldier talk to a village elder in the town of Karamanda in Musa Qala in Helmand province, Afghanistan. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal. |
Bill Ardolino interviews the deputy district governor of the Musa Qala district in northern Helmand province. The deputy district governor discusses the state of government, the economy, and security.
A key pillar of a successful counterinsurgency is the existence or development of a legitimate civilian government, run by officials who are recognized by a majority of the people. While the Musa Qala District in northern Helmand province has many of the key ingredients for COIN – actively applied doctrine, burgeoning reconstruction efforts, and effective local security forces – the validity of local government remains an open question, and its reputation is plagued by a recent history of corruption and ineffectiveness.
When ISAF forces retook much of the area from Taliban forces during Operation Snakepit in December 2007, they appointed a defected local Taliban field commander, Mullah Abdul Salaam Alizai, as the district governor of Musa Qala. By all accounts, Mullah Salaam’s time in office was a disaster. He had terrible relationships with his British and then American partners, and he maintained a corrupt private militia that clashed with the police. Numerous officials list sloth and self-interest as Mullah Salaam’s guiding characteristics; he was extremely energetic about taxing local businesses, but little else. His failure to deliver progress on the most basic services and reconstruction projects made him widely unpopular in the district, reinforcing an intense local skepticism of government that lingers today.
About three months after the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine regiment took over responsibility for Musa Qala in March of this year, Mullah Salaam was out. Although health reasons are cited as the official reason for his departure, the subtext is that Americans refused to work with him and sought his replacement in a bid to rehabilitate civilian governance. In his stead, Niamatullah, a former teacher and a government employee since 1985, was appointed as the new district governor about a month later. Americans have high hopes for the new district governor: he is experienced, and like nearly all of the citizens of Musa Qala, Niamatullah is a Pashtun, but he hails from a different district in Helmand. This may give him enough cultural authority to be effective, but also keep him clear of the intertwined local political and tribal ties that can distort fair governance.
While the incoming district governor has been training in Kabul and Lashkar Gah, and attempting to pass the exam that certifies all district governors (he just passed the exam on his second try Monday), the interim responsibility for government in Musa Qala has fallen to Deputy District Governor Mohammad Akbar Khan.
Appointed as the deputy district governor in May 2009, Khan is a former shopkeeper, farmer, and police officer who has lived in Musa Qala for most of his life, with the exception of seven years in Lashkar Gah. Dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of Mullah Salaam’s government, in May of this year he proactively formed a district shura council, a group of local leaders who advocate for the interests of their villages within the district. Mullah Salaam left a week after the council’s formation, and Khan’s ability to get government moving has naturally increased with his promotion to the post of acting governor until Niamatullah arrives.
Americans hope Khan will work well with the new governor; they regard Khan as a good civil servant and a competent individual, but question his willingness to make tough decisions that might inflame local politics and tribal ties. As an outsider, Niamatullah will have fewer of these constraints, while Khan may be able to serve as a local link to sometimes insular political circles.
Khan’s demeanor is calm and intelligent, and he sports the unmistakable polish of politicians the world over – his answers to questions were carefully measured, and steered clear of controversy.
The interview with Deputy District Mohammad Akbar Khan follows.
The Long War Journal: What is your experience in politics and background, and why did you decide to serve in the government?
Mohammad Akbar Khan: I graduated from school (12th grade) in 1969. I’m from Musa Qala – I lived here in the time of the Mujahadeen and the Taliban, moved to Lashkar Gah [the provincial capital] for a time, and came back. I decided to work with the government because I wanted to serve my country. I was told ‘If you want to work with the government you must pass an exam and we will assign you as the deputy of a district, and you may select some districts.’ So I passed the exam and had many different choices, but I decided to serve in Musa Qala because it is my home and I want to serve my community.
LWJ: How has security been since ISAF forces retook Musa Qala from the Taliban?
Khan: Day by day, security is improving. A lot of places are now in the hands of the government. For example, Sher Ghazi, Salaam Bazaar [in neighboring Now Zad district], Karamanda, many areas were controlled by the Taliban and are now controlled by the government, so it’s improving.
LWJ: What do you think of the Afghan security forces, what kind of job are they doing?
Khan: Both the ANA and the ANP are working well, but Musa Qala is a very big place, so we need more of them. For example, Sher Ghazi is under control of the government, but unfortunately the Taliban still intimidates the people there, and say ‘Don’t work with the government or else.’ So ANA and ANP are working well, but we need more of them to stop the intimidation.
LWJ: Who are the people who are staging attacks against security forces and intimidating the people? Are they criminals, are they Taliban?
Khan: The men who control the hand of the insurgents are foreign Taliban. They are trained in foreign countries and sent here, so I do not think they are from this area.
LWJ: When I spoke to the District Police Chief [Haji Abdul Wali], he seemed to disagree, saying that the majority of the fighters were local people .
Khan: Well, he is also correct because the economy here in Musa Qala is not doing well and we have high unemployment, so some people are compelled to work as insurgents for pay. So if the government makes jobs for those people, day by day, fewer will work for the Taliban. The people who plant bombs are locals who are unemployed. But the people who train and pay them? They are foreigners.
LWJ: What do the people think of the Taliban overall? It’s hard to get an honest opinion from someone because many people are afraid, but what is the general opinion of the Taliban?
Khan: Most people don’t like the Taliban, but they are scared of them. Because if a person works [on a construction project], like to pave roads, the Taliban will kill him, so people are scared. But they don’t like the Taliban.
LWJ: What can be done to stop this intimidation?
Khan: We can stop the intimidation when we have better security. But at the same time, we can stop it by calling shuras [councils] that ask the members of the Taliban ‘Why do you want to fight with us? It is your country too, let’s live peacefully.’ So we need an elder shura from every village to talk with the Taliban and ask them why they fight with their brothers, and ask them what they want. Tell us why you are fighting, tell us what you want [and if we can], we will complete it.
LWJ: Do you get enough support from the national government, as far as funds, projects, personnel, and other support?
Khan: Many of the officials in Lashkar Gah are working well with the Marines to get government resources for reconstruction. We need to build more hospitals and clinics, and we need more schools because we have few of them. But the most important thing is health care.
LWJ: Do you have a good relationship with the national government in Kabul?
Khan: When we undertake projects and file reports, we deal with the provincial government in Lashkar Gah, and that is who we work with. We’re pleased with their support.
LWJ: What do you think of the Marines and the British?
Khan: When the British and now Marines working here, security in Musa Qala is better than [neighboring] Now Zad, better than Marjah, Kajaki, and Sangin. Many people don’t understand the difference between the Marines and the British, they think they are both American. The Marines have done a little better, because they have taken control of more of the villages that were held by the Taliban.
Before the Marines and the British, there was no security. When the British came, they established a lot of the posts and checkpoints. Unfortunately the Marines don’t have as many checkpoints, but now the security is also good because now the reconstruction is underway. And before the Marines came, Salaam Bazaar and Karamanda were under the control of the Taliban, and now they are under the control of the government.
LWJ: What is the long term solution for Musa Qala’s security beyond the American [ISAF] presence here?
Khan: When Marines leave this place, the security will deteriorate, because we don’t have weapons and equipment like artillery and helicopters. We don’t have resources like the Taliban has – they don’t have helicopters, but they have artillery. So, when we have appropriate equipment [for our security forces], it won’t be a problem. But until then, we need the Marines’ capabilities. Now we don’t have anything, but we will be complete when other countries supply us.
LWJ: How long do you think that will take?
Khan: It’s not in our hands, because we don’t have anything. It is in the hands of other countries, so whenever they [supply] us.
LWJ: So has the pace of reconstruction increased since the Marines got here [in March]?
Khan: The reconstruction hasn’t really gotten underway yet, but people are hopeful about the Marines. People say, ‘Now that the Marines have come, they will build some things.’
LWJ: It’s my understanding that the government has appointed a new District Governor, but he isn’t here. Where is he and when is he coming?
Khan: Before, Mullah Salaam was governor of Musa Qala, but now the provincial governor has assigned Niamatullah as the new district governor. He is currently in Lashkar Gah and will go to Kabul to complete his training.
LWJ: Why was Mullah Salaam replaced?
Khan: I heard he was sick, but he also had some other problems, and I don’t have perfect information on what they were.
LWJ: What about the role of the tribes? Do tribes in Afghanistan often fight with each other, or do they get along? Are tribal politics difficult here?
Khan: There are some problems with politics in Musa Qala. When someone joins a shura [council], they will go home at night and the Taliban will arrest and maybe kill him. But a lot of people are happier now with the government, so we have less problems with political rivalries.
LWJ: But what about when, [for example], two people are on a shura, and one person is from one tribe and another member is from another tribe – do they tend to fight? Do they have conflicts because they are from different tribes?
Khan: Some of them. It is another reason why people sometimes fight with each other, but we don’t really have a big problem with it in Musa Qala.
LWJ: What do you think is the biggest challenge right now for Musa Qala to succeed?
Khan: If the [national] government makes Musa Qala its own province, I think it will help Musa Qala succeed.
LWJ: But what is the biggest challenge you need to conquer, the biggest thing that needs to be overcome, to improve Musa Qala ?
Khan: The biggest problem here is simply security. First of all security, because it is so important. And with that, we can develop a strong government here. Here in Musa Qala, we really don’t have any civilian offices, like they do in the [provincial capitals]. So here we need more civilian offices and more components of government here in Musa Qala itself.
[Note: Marine Civil Affairs and local contractors have broken ground on a District Governor’s compound]
LWJ: What is the government’s policy on the opium trade, and what do you think the government should do to move the economy away from opium?
Khan: First of all, when we have security we can deal with poppy and other drugs. And once the government provides other opportunities for people – with factories and such – we can move away from growing drugs. The people need work, the people need money, so if the government gives them alternate crops and more opportunities, they will move away from poppy.
LWJ: What do you think about the future? Are you hopeful? Negative? What do you think will happen?
Khan: I think Musa Qala’s future will be bright when the government supports the people with security, schools and factories. Things are now starting to go well, so I think the future is bright. 80 percent of the people are happy with government, simply because the Taliban beats people. The government hasn’t helped Musa Qala yet. But now the people are waiting – they hope and expect that we will fulfill our promises.
6 Comments
Does that guy have his helmet on backwards?
From your interviews, it sounds like there is enough disatisfaction with the Taliban to make conditions for an “Awakening” type movement possible. What would America have to do to make it work? Should we be paying and arming the locals directly and providing guarantees of infrastructure aid if they can maintain security when backed with our air and quick response assets? Can we do that without Karzai getting nervous enough to upset the apple cart?
I don’t know, listening to members of the government does not mean the population is necessarily thinking along the same lines. Usually, in 3rd world countries, there is a huge disconnect between the government and the public.
KW64, Petraeus is trying to do something like that right now. The big obstacle is Karzai, who’s worried that a network of village defense forces might not be loyal to his government.
if the govenor is afghani mullah so they have to do that.what i am saying when the Governor from our said is Mullah Salam a talib that is not importent what they do.Thank you
Foreign Taliban=Chechen,Arab and Pakistan Talibs trained and funded by the ISI/Gulf states