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Iraqi and Coalition forces Order of Battle as of April 30, 2009. |
The May 2009 updates to the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle are now available at the ISF OOB homepage. The significant changes to the Order of Battle that occurred in April are summarized below.
Iraqi Army Force Developments.
The Taji National Maintenance Depot is now known as the Joint Base Factory, or the JBF. This re-designation indicates the continued expansion of the support base. One of the functions of the JBF is the refurbishment of transferred US HMMWVs. The 5,000th M1114 was transferred on April 22. The target goal is still 8,500 of the vehicles transferred by July 2009.
The Al Memona Location Command is currently scheduled for completion by September 2009. This facility is part of the addition of a new Iraqi Army Division splitting the 10th Division area.
The Iraqi Army is also starting K9 training. The 2-6/2 Battalion is reported receiving K9 training. It appears that dog training is now a priority in the Iraqi Security Forces.
The training of Iraqi troops on M120 120mm mortars continues. Elements of the 46/12 Brigade are training on 120mm mortars at the Sabre Range in Diyala Province. The Iraqi Army 46/12 Brigade and 47/12 Brigade are both reported receiving training on the 120mm mortar. At Taji, the Iraqi Army 42/11 Brigade is also receiving M120 120mm mortar training. The Iraqi army is scheduled to receive 120mm mortars starting June 2009. Pending receipt of their own mortars, this training has been with US Army M120 mortars. Ten Iraqi Army brigades are to form and equip 120mm mortar batteries in 2009. Five of those 10 brigades have been identified in training. They are 23/17, 38/10, 42/11, 46/12, and 47/12 Brigades.
The Iraqi Army continues to add reconnaissance battalions to the divisions. The 17th Division’s Commando/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Battalion was first reported on publicly in April. The 3-39/10 Battalion is training as commando battalion at Camp Ur. That makes two commando battalions trained or in training in the 10th Division. One located in Maysan (3-41/10) and one in Dhi Qar (3-39/10). This duplication of divisional commandos is probably for the planned split of 10th Division into two divisions.
The 10th Division conducted a combined arms live fire exercise on April 19. The exercise included the coordinated use of mortars, DZIK3 armored personnel carriers, HMMWVs. Mi-17 helicopters, and troops, including US air and artillery support. This was the Iraqi Army’s first combined arms live fire exercise.
A new battalion has been identified in the 10th Division. The 4-41/10 Battalion has been reported operationally based at FOB Hunter.
Iraqi Air Force Developments.
The official contract for 24 Bell 407 helicopters, with an option to purchase up to 26 additional Bell 407 helicopters has been awarded. This contract allows 27 months to deliver the 24 helicopters and up to 13 months more if the option for 26 more is exercised. This means the delivery of the first 24 helicopters will be by August 2011 and the option for 50 total Bell 407s (if exercised) is to be complete by Sept. 30, 2012.
The purchase of six C130J aircraft has been reduced to only four. This reduction in the order is probably due to the budget cuts.
The Basrah Air Base has expanded its quarters. According to the report, “…this expansion is vital for the 450 additional airmen who will be reporting for duty here.” This addition indicates that Basrah is soon to add a squadron.
The Iraqi 3rd Reconnaissance Squadron based at Kirkuk is receiving Hellfire air-to-ground training with their Armed Caravan (AC-208) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance aircraft.
Iraqi Navy Force Developments.
The new flagship of the Iraqi Navy is to be reflagged and commissioned on May 15, after which the “Fatah” (PS-701) is to set sail for Iraq from Italy. The trip from Italy will take 29 days. This slow transit will be used as a shakedown cruise and will include training en route.
On April 30, the Khawr al Amaya oil export platform transferred to Iraqi command. The Iraqi 1st Marine Commando Battalion has been in the lead for security on the two oil transfer platforms for over a year.
Iraqi Ministry of Interior Forces.
Reports of Iraqi Police K9 training continue. The Tikrit Police and Wassit Police have been reported receiving K9 training in April. Apparently, dog training is a priority for the Iraqi Security Forces at this time.
The Dhi Qar Police have added a 4th Emergency Battalion to its operational paramilitary force. The Basrah police paramilitary brigade is now being called a Tactical Support Unit. All of the Iraqi Police provincial paramilitary emergency brigades in Ministry of Interior Region V are now called Tactical Support Units.
77 Comments
Nicely done 🙂
I noticed some changes with the IzAF’s Turboprop light attack aircraft procurement:
https://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/OOBpage15-Equipment.pdf
What is going on with the Lt Attack AT-6B and Trainer T-6A? The ISF need independent Close Air Support (CAS) capability. Light turboprop is the cheapest capability available.
Could Iraq be switching some orders to the K1; since Koreans seem to be their new BFF?
Could the Iraqis be planning to buy more T-50s in lieu of turboprop?
It takes many years to learn how to use CAS effectively. The Iraqis need to start the process ASAP; and that means not messing around with procurement orders.
Anand:
Budget, Budget, BUDGET.
No money means delays, cancelations, or streaching of the purchases.
They have already cut the first F16 buy in half, reduced the C-130J buy to two-thirds, etc.
It has nothing to do with who their friends are. It has to do with the price of oil being in the basement and the GoI budget being based on oil exports.
It does not matter what you want or need. If you do not have the money, you do not get the toys…
I wonder if that is why the Lasta 95 order is still hanging around then?
Speaking of which DJ; have you heard any rumors of a certain Serbian 8×8 in competition with the Stryker, Saur etc. (Lazar I believe it’s called?) Or is this still just more wild speculation by an overly zealous Yugoimport?
A turboprop light attack aircraft costs perhaps $12 million up front; $25 million including spares and ammunition.
20 aircraft cost $500 million, and not all up front. Iraq can’t afford $500 million?
Maybe it can. Until a few weeks ago the global market for emerging debt was mostly closed because of the global financial crisis. In recent weeks the credit markets have opened substantially. Oil closed at a 5 month high today.
I think the GoI could perhaps pull off a $5 billion sovereign debt offering in current markets. If I were Iraq, I would do it, and fund the ISF.
__________
What is the latest update on the combat engineering and construction engineering units? I would imagine that the MoD has delayed procuring capital equipment for its construction engineering units.
Trophy Wench:
The Lasta 95 is an already signed contract with the money previously obligated. And it was part of the deal to clear the former Yugoslav debt. That deal had more to do with clearing old debt than buying needed equipment. If they could, they would probably canx it. But the former Yugoslav debt is greater than the deal.
I do not expect any APC contract to be signed this year. The IA, like most countries, will have to make do with truck mounted infantry for awhile. Unless they can talk US out of some freebes.
anand:
A single role COIN aircraft is a luxury in a tight budget. Notice that the EC-635, Mi-17, and Bell 407 is being bought. All are capable of ground attack and troop transport.
If they are cutting the only F16 purchase in half, an aircraft essential to Air Defense and capable of ground support, then they do not have a budget for a single role COIN bird.
Replacing the US engineer support by 2011 is a political priority. The primary route-clearance vehicles (Badger) were already funded and contracted for prior to the budget tanking.
Start looking at the plans from an mission essential view.
– Tanks are essential.
– Fighters and multi-role helos that can provide air support are essential.
– Protecting the oil export terminals and pipelines are essential.
– APCs and single role aircraft are luxories.
Keep in mind that they are not hiring new personnel.
– Last summer, they planned to add 70,000 to the IA this year.
– Now, the only personnel in training since October are personnel already in uniform that are being retrained for new roles (SIB, ISR, etc).
– The 120-135% manning authorized was reduced to 100% and the excess is being used to form those new battalions and to expand the IZAF/IZM/IZN.
Even the MoI is capped. They are training their backlog of untrained police already on the payrole and transfering emergency police from the provinces to the INP/DBE/OPD…
If they are not capable of expanding their personnel, then capital investments (equipment) will and is being cut.
Ignore the politicians statements. They are reassuring the voters. They are holding what they got and focusing on mission-essentials. Reorganizing, resubordinating, and retraining existing forces to fill the needed roles. The gold-plated toilet seats will have to wait until the price of oil goes back up…
I think you confused me a little. Serbia is paying back debts owed to Iraq? …Why, for those MiG-23’s they never gave back? Well whatever, maybe something useful can come out of the deal (I mean I have to believe that the Lasta 95 can’t be that bad, I’m sure its not.) On the flip side though, this does create another potential source for your missing arty DJ;
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/nora_b52.htm
Trophy Wench:
The same week the Serbian Arms deal was announced, Serbia also zeroed out Iraq’s debt to former Yugoslavia. Serbia is the nation that inherited the former Yugoslavia’s finances.
The Iraqi debt elimination was part of the backroom deal that included further cash up front purchases from Serbia by Iraq.
The arty is a possible. Especially given the above political deal.
Oh I see, its the other way round. Well that makes more sense to me now.
The Mortat Training is Hold on M1113 Vehicles
Posted by anand at May 4, 2009 3:41 PM ET:
you dont think we are going to have Perfect Army in this crunch you Know ,, Ah you are For California are you good you have there bad Flu Ha ??
Q : Where is the Spartan APCs i cant see them Anywhere the same as the Talha and the Fuchs and the Mohafiz which i cant find a Picture for and they say that its produced in Iraq !!! Do you Have Pictures for these Patrol Ships PS 701 – 702 – 703 – 704 ??
And The PM is In France ,, They Talked About Weapons But still Away Chance What do you think France Have very Bad Weapons Ans As i see Small Update No thing Big Important !!
I meant Very Bad Prices
Almaleki at May 6, 2009 10:27 AM ET:
They are training on US M120 mortars pending delivery of their own starting in June. Most of the US units are mech. The US uses M113s as 120mm mortar carriers in mech units.
Almaleki at May 6, 2009 10:37 AM ET:
– I haven’t seen the Spartan APCs for some time either. Suspect they are assigned to 9th Div mech engineering support.
– Type 63 Talha looks very simular to M113. All are in the 4-34/9 Mechanized Reconnaissance Battalion.
– Saw a Fuchs in photography from Sadr City last year. Operating with elements of 9th Div. Never did get a bn/bde ID.
– I have no idea where the Mohafiz are.
– Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008 has the best photo of the Italian built Saettia class Patrol Ship.
As to France, it depends on the nature of the deal. I am hearing straight oil for weapons deal. Barter. That would mean that the prices would vary with the price of oil…
Note:
All of those vehicles were donations from 2005. Some, perhaps most may be out of service by now.
– Spartan APCs were donated by Jordan.
– Type 63 Talha and Mohafiz were donated by Pakastan.
– Fuchs donated by the UAE.
The Pakistani Mohafiz’s were fielded in the 1st IA Division in 2006-07. Not sure if though if the 1st IA deploys with them, looks like the M-1114 is their expeditionary vehicle of choice.
Hi DJ
I think from what you have reported that Iraq in the near term is focusing on internal securety up to 2012. Focusing on getting more hummves, more tanks, more helo’s, more mortars and some f-16s aircraft and surveillance birds duplicating predators and focusing on special operations roles.
Basically trying to duplicate the American role on a smaller scale internally. That means they are nowhere near defending the country from outside threats even by 2012. In other words from 2012- 2020 Iraq will not be able to defend its territory from outside threats for another 8-10 years. Even if Iraq orders more aircraft more helos and FA it will take time to train equip and defend the country.
This means that countries surrounding Iraq will continue to do what they are doing right now for some time to come. So after all that why do American commanders say that Iraq can defend itself after 2012?
Can please explain that to me DJ
Thanks
And do you think my analysis is correct?
iraq will rely on the USAF until at least 2018.
there’s no questions about that.
Otherwise the USAF wouldn’t be spending $$$ upgrading al asad, balad, kut airbases … (which are for their use, not IrAF).
put that together with the fact that iraq has NO airdefences…
and it doesn’t take a PhD in strategy to work out what’s happening.
The only reason this hasn’t been announced publicly by the iraqis is due to the December Elections.
once that’s gone and dusted. they can announce that we need the USAF’s assistance for a few more years.
no rocket science here.
1st of all, let me state that I’m a combat advisor w/ the Iraqi Army 10th Division, and most of what’s reported here re: 10th IA Div is incorrect.
1. While a new location command (al-Memona) may be in the planning stages at Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), we’ve heard nothing of it down here either thru IA channels or from the IGFC advisors w/ which we have frequent contact. Insofar as “[t]his facility is part of the addition of a new Iraqi Army Division splitting the 10th Division area,” this is utterly incorrect. 10th Div is in the process of standing up what they term a “Field Factory” which is nothing more than direct support (DS) maintenance unit for 10th Div alone. The “factory” isn’t anything more than a maintenance regiment and is akin to the US Army’s brigade support battalions which most combat BCTs have. Further, 10th Div isn’t about to be split, have no idea where that info comes from, but can say w/ reasonable certainty gained 1st hand that what’s said here is incorrect.
2. The IA’s intel, surveillance and recon (ISR) BNs are being shrunk down to a company again (after being grown to a BN), w/ DS ISR PLTs being sent down to the IA BDEs in a similar fashion as the 120mm mortar (“light artillery”) batteries are. The IA is not standing up more, they’re splitting them up across the board.
3. 3/39/10 and 3/41/10 are NOT “commando battalions”, as is written here. All of the 10th Div’s line battalions are straight motorized infantry. However, they ARE going thru warfighter training at Camp Ur (this is reported in the news on several local Iraqi websites). 10th Div continues to have one, and only one, commando battalion which is a separate BN under the 10th Div HQs and maintained for use by the Div Commander. Nothing is being duplicated and again, completely inaccurate information that 10th Div may be preparing for a split.
4. The “new battalion… identified in the 10th Division” is just flat out wrong. 41st BDE has only 3 BNs (1st, 2nd, and 3rd); it does not have a 4th BN. 38th BDE is the only unit in 10th IA w/ a 4th BN (4/38/10), it was stood up at the same time as the 41st BDE late last year. Beyond that, none of 41st BDE is on FOB HUNTER.
The only thing that I’ve seen correct here w/ respect to 10th IA Div, is that they DID just conduct a life fire exercise w/ one of our partnership battalions up NW of Amarrah and did in fact use the equipment mentioned here. I was there and it was a great event.
Please get your facts straight and check your sources. Irresponsible reporting is dangerous; most people will only read the first thing they see and have no clue that other information is out there if the content is inaccurate — many will just not search for it. I’m not sure where you’re getting your info from, but based on the gross inaccuracies of what you report about 10th IA Div I find myself wondering what else on here is just flat out wrong?
Thanks very much for your observations “fireforeffect.” DJ’s sources are:
https://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/OOBpage14-notes.pdf
His summary of 10th IAD is here:
https://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/OOBpage7-IGFC-South.pdf
Thanks for confirming that there was a typo in the following DVIDS article from April 15th, 2009, when they referenced 4-41-10 IA:
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=32414
DJ is very meticulous about sourcing everything he writes. He often insists on 3 or more citations for something before he publishes it. I know because I have asked him many times why he doesn’t include a specific fact in the OOB even though I have sent him two articles confirming it.
Perhaps DJ might have used the phrase “warfighter trained at Camp Ur” instead of the shorthand “commando” when describing 3/39/10 and 3/41/10.
The IA had plans to create an 18th IAD back when oil prices were still high. The division was suppose to be in the south. However, those plans have been put on hold for the foreseeable future due to low oil prices (off topic oil hit a 7 month high of $59; which is very good for Iraq.) This is what DJ was referring to when he mentioned the possibility of 10th IAD being split longer term. DJ has been clear in insisting that the planned expansion of the IA was being delayed significantly.
Thanks for letting us know about how the 10th IAD brigades are getting their ISR companies (probably embedded in their Brigade Special Troop Battalions) and 120 mm mortar batteries. This confirms DJ’s prior reporting.
You are obviously far more informed about 10th IAD than anyone state side; and all of us are eager to learn from you. Hopefully you might agree to drop us a line from time to time to let us know how you good folks are doing.
I hope you don’t mind my asking you a question. The 38th Bde, 10th IAD (former 1st Bde, 10th IAD) use to be the worst brigade in the entire IA back a few years ago. It was briefly rebranded IA 3-8 and sent to Wasit for retraining. What can you share about 38-10 now? How much have they improved?
What can you share about how the 10th IAD are doing relative to other IADs? Are they anywhere near as good as the top of the line divisions (8th IAD in the upper central south, 3rd IAD in Ninevah, 1st/7th IAD from Al Anbar, 4th IAD from Salahadin)
Thank you very much for serving our country.
jack winters at May 8, 2009 7:19 AM ET:
sheytanelkebir at May 8, 2009 7:59 AM ET:
The Iraqi Minister of Defense briefed the three five-year plans last fall.
– Phase 1 (ends-2011) Tactical Independence. This means they own the internal security ground fight.
– Phase 2 (2011-2015) Operational Independence. This means they own internal and external security on ground and waterfront.
– Phase 3 (2016-2020) Strategic Independence. This means they own all security aspects.
The claim that Iraq will be able to completely provide its own security in 2012 comes from the politicians. The uniformed military says they will be able to “provide (internal) security”. And the Iraqi Minister of Defense is on public record as to what the plan is and agreeing with that timing.
fireforeffect at May 8, 2009 3:13 PM ET:
1. Try reading the links. Or reviewing the notes pages of the OOB (with links).
2. If what you are saying is correct, then the US PAOs and quite a few US senior officers are breaking US law. It is illegal for US Military to lie to US press.
3. “Iraqi Army Commandos Graduate in Southern Iraq”
A. When they started training with the Romanian 26th Battalion, these personnel and their battalion was called the 3-39th Battalion. “Romanians Prepare Iraqi Army Commandos”
B. When they graduated, their battalion was being called the “Commando Battalion, 10th Iraqi Army Division”
C. The 10th Division is not the only division that I am seeing these reports on.
So who is telling the US press wrong?
You from your tactical viewpoint or the official press releases from every division (USMC and USA) and most of the BCTs in MNF-I?
I have seen US military press reporting on Divisional Commando/ISR/Recon Battalions being stood up, training, or operational in all except 5th, 11th, and 12th IA Divs.
4. Al-Memona has been in the works for more than a year now. The last four 9010 Reports to Congress have projected and updated its completion date. Press releases from GRD have bragged about it. Current estimated COMPLETION date (per March 9010 report) is 30 September 2009. If you are correct, then some very senior US officers have publically lied to the US Congress. In a written report no less.
B. “we’ve heard nothing of it down here either thru IA channels or from the IGFC advisors w/ which we have frequent contact.”
What else is new? Are you on all of the IMoD’s distribution? Is the 10th IA Division on distro for all classified material in IMoD? Force development details are classified in most countries.
(E.G. In May of 2008, the 17th Division IOC occured. Up to two weeks prior, MNF-I and MNSTC-I was still saying that the activity that I had been tracking for nine months was not a new IA division forming. That is because IMoD did not bother to tell them that they were doing it. That is according to what the MNSTC-I PAO e-mailed me. There is a distinct disconnect in what IMoD tells MNF-I and what they are actually doing.)
The USG and MNF-I/MNSTC-I have made it clear to the GoI/IMoD that we are only supporting and the US Congress is only funding support for training 13 IA Divisions.
MNSTC-I ForGen only recognizes 1st thru 12th and 14th IA Divs, 17th and any other that may be planned do not exist in their eyes or reporting. That fact is direct from them.
If the US is not going to support training and forming additional IA divisions, then why should the IMoD bother to tell the US forces about them?
C. 10th Division already has a Location Command at Nasiriyah. All of the LCs built and building were listed on the last page of the September 2008 9010 Report to Congress.
The ongoing construction of a second location command in 10th Division’s AOR is a clear-cut indicator of another division planned. After all, why would they need two divisional support brigade equivalents for only one division? IMoD spokesman stated there are plans for an “18th Division” in Maysan early last fall. It probably will be delayed with the budget issues.
5. “The IA’s intel, surveillance and recon (ISR) BNs are being shrunk down to a company again (after being grown to a BN…”
The official reporting is playing up the divisional commando/ISR/recon battalions publically in the US Military Press Releases. What you are saying is not what is in the OFFICIAL public reporting. If that is happening, did you just violate OPSEC? I use open source data only in this unclassified OOB.
6. “3/39/10 and 3/41/10 are NOT “commando battalions”, as is written here.”
Then why are these formations reported in US military press releases as “commando”?
You are aware that is is a federal crime for US military officers to lie to the US press?
So, when are you filing charges against those US Military officers for these fraudulent official press releases?
When I hear about the CM or firings of PAOs and senior officers suddenly retiring as a result of your charges, then I will give you credability. They are the OFFICIAL command spokesmen, you are not.
7. “The “new battalion… identified in the 10th Division” is just flat out wrong. 41st BDE has only 3 BNs (1st, 2nd, and 3rd); it does not have a 4th BN.”
Did you bother to go to the link in that entry? Unlike you, I provide cites to my writing. Quote:
Unquote
It is possible the 4/1 Cavalry BCT PAO bothched the report. They are only human. If so, I recommend you take it up with them and ask them to send me an official correction to their official release.
(Note: FOB Hunter is the only location in that report. It is possible that the location is referring to the US 5-82 FA’s base of ops. But that still means the IA battalion is in that area.
And that is the first and only report of that IA Battalion so far. I specifically stated this was a first report.)
8. My sources are public and cited on the notes page. This OOB is strictly open source data.
Where are your sources cited?
I am accredited with PMI as a reporter and your comments constitute providing information to the US press. (A distinct downside to this work.)
Are you authorized to talk to a US reporter on these subjects? Or did you just put yourself on report by commenting on them? I know this site is monitored by the OPSEC gods. I have been told we hit their top 10 list enough times. Say the word and I will errase this comment thread. Damage control.
If you want to correct the reporting, I sudgest you look at the links in the article, plus the OOB notes page, and see what is being released publically. Then you can correct the sources, which are in these cited cases:
– US Military PAO’s press releases,
– Iraqi Ministry of Defense spokesmen, and
– official US Military reporting to US Congress.
This OOB is based exclusively on OPEN SOURCE reporting. There are errors in it. All reports have errors in them. Even the classified ones. Humans are known for that failing.
I make no claims of perfection. Perfection does not exist. And this is OPEN SOURCE reporting.
I do know that it is accurate enough that US Army TRADOC asked permission for and uses it for unclassified documents. Apparently the declassification and sanitization hurdles are as bad or worse than they were when I was active duty. Using this gets arround that problem. Apparently, we are good enough for government work…
all:
Since I did not really expect fireforeffect to place himself on report, I sent an e-mail RFI concerning the 4/1C BCT’s press release.
Quote:
DJ,
I am the public affairs officer for 4 BCT, 1st CAV DIV. I am researching this error, but you are correct that there is NO 4th Battalion in the 41st IA Brigade. The MiTT commander informs me he believes it is the 4th Company from one of the 3 battalions. I am researching. We apologize for the confusion.
MAJ Chad Carroll
4-1 CAV PAO
Unquote
– The 4-41 IA Bn has been deleated from the master OOB and the RFI response has been added to the notes in the master OOB document. When the OOB updates at the start of the month, it will be corrected and addressed in the update article.
The other topics already have unanswered RFI requests with IMoD, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I.
Almost all of the RFIs are in my unanswered list.
The only clear response to those earlier RFIs was that the IA is not transfering a Division to Maysan. It did not address new formations even though I asked.
Then a IMOD spokesman mentioned the 18th Div planned for Maysan in a press brief early last fall. NFI.
That brief was prior to the fallout of the oil crunch, so the 18th may be on the back-burner. No budget. Plans change. But the progression of the building of the facilities continues and two LCs in one Div area only exists in 10th IA’s AOR…
Of note, only about 30% of my RFIs get answered. And understandibly so. Force development of the ISF falls under two sets of OPSEC/security classification regulations. The GoI’s and the USG’s. Which means US personnel are not legally authorized to discuss Iraqi classified material without their approval.
“Knowing and willfull compromize of classified material” is still a felony in US Federal Law.
So I get stonewalled quite often. The very nature of this OOB project makes the OPSEC gods nervious…
DJ,
you’re obviously well informed, but have a thick skin pls.
After looking at the “press releases” you cite (mea culpa for not looking at them first), they’re from our attached BCT’s PAO office and I know both SPCs that write the articles and the PAO himself. They’re well-meaning, but don’t know the difference between “commando” and “warfighter training”.
“It is possible the 4/1 Cavalry BCT PAO bothched the report. They are only human. If so, I recommend you take it up with them and ask them to send me an official correction to their official release.”
That’s the case, and it’s also my experience w/ them on several occassions from other events. Email me off-line and I’ll talk more, but not here. 4/1CAV is getting ready to RIP out w/ the new BCT, and we already have strained relationships w/ them based on purely professional issues.
Our relationship w/ the BCT and its PAO is good, but that doesn’t keep me from being frustrated w/ them on the overall lack of depth of information or inadequate understanding of what they’re saying. Press releases are written at the 3rd grade level which translates to a minimum of usable information from which analysis can be done. But suspect that’s to cater to the US public at-large, which in all honesty isn’t reading blogs like this to see the thoughts of others on subjects that make it hurt when you think.
As is the case w/ any PAO, their fight is to get the story out as quickly as possible in the most digestible form possible. Unfortunately, when the story has to do w/ 10th IA Div, we are rarely asked to look it over for accuracy. The last event I set up was covered and completely missed the whole point of WHY we were doing the event. “A picture is worth a thousand words” is a mantra around here, but the words are rarely accurate despite nto really telling anything at all.
Re: al-Memona Loc’n CMD. It’s up the road from us, we drive thru the place regularly and I’ve never heard of it, but that doesn’t always mean anything. However, in dealing w/ the Div G4 for the past 7 mos. we haven’t heard of it. Deal w/ the Nasiriyah loc’n command all the time, they support 10th Div.
And to reiterate, there is absolutely NO TALK of splitting 10th Div, here, at IGFC, at MoD, anywhere that I’ve heard w/ my own two ears.
“I am accredited with PMI as a reporter and your comments constitute providing information to the US press. (A distinct downside to this work.)”
And I give a lot of thought to what I say and write. And also know the OPSEC lines w/in and external to my job. And I’ll admit that I’ve haven’t been motivated to say anything here before, I surf this website and several others along w/ our MAST members for info daily. This one just got to me. As I said, all of the info that I commented on is in public knowledge, if it’s wrong, it’s still open-source. (Your point here.) Which is what prompted me to say what I did. (Counter-point.)
And lastly, get off your high horse. You’re a public forum and open to criticism and comment. You have no more of a lock on the truth than I do. The issue here is that I’m looking in the horse’s mouth; you’re reading a report from someone who talked to the guy that was next to the person that looked in the horse’s mouth.
Good day, sir.
fireforeffect
Fair enough.
I tend to be a hard case. 22 years in the Navy made me very blunt and to the point. Ask Anand or any other commenter here,
Also it is a bit of fallout from also being one of only two moderators on the site and having to deal with the trolls, spammers, and people that cannot follow the comments rules. You caught me on a bad day.
I am not surprised about you not hearing about the planned split. I do not expect it to happen this year. 2010 to 2012 timeframe, as they start fielding more armor battalions. Which means the IMoD probably has not bothered to say much. I have only seen one IMoD spokeman mention it publically.
The new LC is being built under GRD-CE and has been repeatedly mentioned in GRD releases and the 9010. Construction is due to complete this September after which they should start standing up the personnel and equipment. That is a major indicator of future plans. And IMoD does not tell US everything. (E.G. 17th Div was a surprise to MNSTC-I/MNF-I and it is in south Baghdad province.)
I expect the Maysan IA Div to eventually be Mechanized while the DhiQar IA Div is to be Armor. The 10th IA providing the infantry components to both. Hense the two LCs in one IAD LOC. That is speculation which is why the listing does not state that. Only my more cristal-ball articles talk of it.
I am seeing the Div ISR/commando designation in other IADs reported on. It is not just the 10th that I am seeing this in the releases. 11 of the 14 divisions so far. It looks to be a scout/cdo plt per bn, scout/cdo per Bde, and ISR/Cdo bn per Div.
I am also seeing reports of USMC Recon training them in 1st and 7th, Army SF training them in the rest and ISOF patches on trainers for 8th Div. Then there is the Romanian 26th Bn (SF) training 10th Div.
Outside of ISOF Commandos, I consider the IA Div commandos to be more of a recon role than what we consider to be commando. But commando is what they are calling them. And not just in 10th Div. This is showing up throughout Iraq.
As to getting off my high-horse, re-read what you wrote. Your wording was an assault on my credibility. And you did it publically. Quid-pro-quo. There is a link to Bill listed in the comments policy. You chose the forum.
DJ Elliott, IS1 (SW), USN (Ret)
Fireforeffect ,, Just small question … as you are combat advisor for the Division Command i see ,, well do you have any info on what Artillery Divisions will be having ,, and for you or DJ ,, when will the first Iraqi Corp will be constructed ?? and do we have one in Southern Iraq ?? where will be its HQ ,, if we have corp then we will have operational Corp Ability Just Like Turkey have i saw info saying that they can send a corp to combat in less then 40 min !!!! will we have this in 2015+ and last but not least i think this is out of your area but i hope you have an idea ,, Iraq will have the their first 18 F-16 Operational in the skies in 2012 as the Airforce commander says ,, But still we will need USAF to at least 2015 ,, will we built new Huge Airports ?? or What ??!!
Almaleki , Basra / Iraq
Almaleki at May 10, 2009 3:40 PM ET:
“when will the first Iraqi Corp will be constructed ??”
– It was planned for all four to be formed in 2009-2011. But that plan was before the price of oil dropped. This requirement is probably being delayed in budget…
“and do we have one in Southern Iraq ?? where will be its HQ?”
– The two most logical places are Basrah and Nasiriyah for the “southern” corps.
– I think you are not to familiar with what a corps is in this context. What you are describing sounds more like a QRF battalion, not a corps.
– A corps is a grouping of two-five divisions plus command, control, support, and fire-support elements.
“But still we will need USAF to at least 2015 ,, will we built new Huge Airports ?? or What ??!!”
– The airfields listed in the OOB are the ones being looked at for use. With one exception, they are not looking at building new airfields. What they are looking at is refurbishing what is already there. Iraq has more than enough airfields, they just need a bit of work….
DJ
in 2020 In shaa allah ,, ( in God will ) ,, would we have more than 4 corps , i heard that Just Turkey and Zionist entity have such ability , will we able to load a corp fastly like them ??
ans please how is our operational Ability ??? the last Operation in Diyala Consists of 40k soldier aint that Corps Level ( 30k + ) ,, could you explain this will civilian language ??
Al Maleki, the IA will first create 4 Corps HQs and then decide whether to create a 5th Corps HQs. It is very unlikely that any decision will be made on whether to create a 5th Corps HQs for a couple years.
I personally don’t think the IA should create a 5th Corp. All the multinational forces in Iraq were managed by a single Corp HQs for a year in 2003 and 2004. Since July 2004, there have been two Corps HQs subordinate to the Army HQs MNF-I (which commands all MNF in Iraq):
MNC-I (Multinational Corps Iraq): commands all MNF combat forces and combat advisors embedded in the ISF
MNSTC-I (Multinational Strategic Transition Command Iraq): responsible for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces.
Al Maleki, why do you think that the IA needs more than 4 Corps HQs when the entire multinational forces only needed two Corps HQs at the peak of the surge?
Iraq has substantial civilian governance and economic development needs that would be harmed by excessive defense spending.
“the last Operation in Diyala Consists of 40k soldier aint that Corps Level”
My understanding is that Iraqi Joint Forces Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Iraqi Ground Forces Commander Ali Gaidhan (sp?) assigned part of his IGFC staff to help him to direct the Diyala operation.
The IGFC is significantly below authorized strenght as of the last public reporting, especially in capable mid grade and senior officers. I would rather that there were fewer and higher quality higher HQs elements.
Almaleki at May 11, 2009 6:20 AM ET:
Since the Iraqi Army is all active and has no reserve component, then mobilization time does not count. Which makes the comparison to Turkey and Israel meaningless.
Half of the 40,000 in Diyala are IP/INP/DBE POLICE. The Army component is a reinforced Division (5th IA plus a brigade each from 4th and 12th.). Even the Iraqi press has repeatedly and specifically stated it is 5th Div plus two augmenting brigades.
A corps is 2-5 Divisions and has a formal command element. At 30,000, a corps would be understrength. V Corps in 2003 was 58,000. Multi-National Corps-Iraq now is about 135,000. At peak of the surge it was almost 200,000.
What is going on in Diyala is joint ops at a division level and the command is claiming all personnel in Diyala, including those not actually involved in the operation.
anand at May 11, 2009 2:40 PM ET:
If they do create a fifth corps, it will be a political deal with the KRG for an independent Kurdish corps commanding their 100,000 peshmerga. There are serious pros and cons to this. Being a political decision, who knows what the backroom deal will be?
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq is not a corps. It is a support/training command. Only operational forces are called corps.
The only corps in Iraq since late 2003 is MNC-I.
For the invasion it was:
– V Corps: 3ID, 101ABD, and parts of 82ABD plus other support units. 58,000 personnel.
– I MEF: 1st MARDIV, UK 1st Div, 2MEB, and at least two MEUs plus other support units and allies. 88,000 personnel.
IGFC is augmenting the staff of Diyala Operational Command for these operations.
Also of note: 34th KRG Brigade is working with 4/1 IA Brigade in north Diyala. 34th KRG is a planned component of 15th Mountain Division (whenever it is officially activated).
Today the 9th Division carried out a live fire exercise in the latifiya area (south of baghdad). The MoD and abboud qanbar were present at the exercise and the live fire exercise was a combined arms operation involving infantry, armour, artillery, mortars and air-power (there were some armed Mi-17s).
Interesting is the live fire using artillery and mortars which indicates that at least the 9th division now has arty/mortar units. (though the explosions were shown, the artillery pieces were not shown on the video).
One note, Both the MOD and Abboud Qanbar were careful to separately state both the use of artillery and mortars.
this is from al-hurra TV (the US sponsored TV station).
sheytanelkebir:
When they did the same type of exercise in 10th Div, they used US mortars and artillery…
The IA did call in the fires and the mortars were partially fired by IA personnel.
Today the MoD has made an callup announcement calling on the former employees of the Military Industrial Commission of the following companies to rejoin their workplace:
-yarmouk company
-Harith Company
-Hattin Company
-Qa’Qa’ Company
-Hamurabi Company
-Qadisiya company
This shows that the MOD is ramping up the local production of armaments and munitions.
http://www.mod.mil.iq/news/2009/5/10/156.html
the companies in question had the following functions previously:
-yarmouk company
ammunition and barbed wire
-Harith Company
Research & Development and repair of air defence equipment
-Hattin Company
explosives, propellants ammunition and fuzes
-Qa’Qa’ Company
bombs, explosives and rocket propellant production and testing
-Hammurabi Company
civil engineering and construction
-Qadisiya company
small arms and anti-aircraft artillery.
apologies.
the hamurabi company produces pistols and small arms. There is a company with the same name (under another ministry) which builds roads and bridges.
Hmmm. Qadisiya and Hammurabi companies are coming back on line? The plot potentially thickens in regards to the Serbian deal… (though, knowing the way the reconstructive efforts have been thus far, they’ll just be recycling old AK’s and M16’s et. al.)
May12: 9th Div CALFEX at Lutifiyah.
(Watch video.
At least reinforced bn, probably bde strength.
Tanks, APCs, ILAV, and SP Howitzer with Iraqi Markings.
US aviation support.)
http://www.alsumaria.tv/en/Iraq-News/1-31519-Iraq-Defense-Ministry-prepares-for-US-Forces-withdrawal.html
DJ
I saw the Video on sumaria the Howitzer is a US made Paladin M109A6 with the Iraqi flag on it.
can you get for us more info on how, when, where the iraqi 17Div got them?
thanks
The video is 9th Armored Div.
17th does not have armor.
Detachments from 9th have augmented 17th periodically for months. Elements from 34th, 35th and 37th Bde.
I know that some M109s were salvaged from the old IA. Captured Iranian and Kuwaiti equipment.
Thats is Good ,, this operation is also Brigade Level Right ??
do you think we may get some from US ??
I will download Video ,, 3.4 MB with the Accelerator … how long is it ??
Jacj could i know you Iraqi Channels sources Time ,, Mean News Times i just Watch those :
1- Alhurra Iraq , Aliraq Alyum 8 PM
2-Humat Aliraq , Aliraqia , 7PM every Wed
3-Aleion Al saherh , Aliraqia , 6:30 Pm every tuesday
Almaleki
The video is only 2 min long.
And yes, it looked like a brigade level combined arms live fire exercise
saw it ,, DJ how many Divisions do we have and why does the Video say its 17th Division ??
The Harith And Qadisya are About Anti – Air what do you think DJ ??
All,
Please don’t confuse “artillery” and “mortars” when talking re: the IA. Historically, the IA draw the line on mortars at 60/82mm as infantry support weapons maintained in the maneuver line battalions. 120mm and larger mortars (used to have 140s and 160s, no kidding) are classed “light artillery”, and cannons/rockets were just “artillery” all managed at the division or higher level. I’m the FA advisor to 10th Div in addition to being the Division MiTT XO (and G1 advisor, and G5 advisor, and so on, and so on…). G1 happens to be a Brig Gen w/ 42 years IA FA experience and is a former FA Regt’l CDR, Dep CDR is a cannon guy. Between the 2 of them and the FA Coordinator, they’ve got 27 years FA experience in Iran-Iraq war alone.
What the IA are trying to do right now is field 120mm mortars as the division “light artillery”. Based on former Saddam-army tactics, this makes sense, but insofar as conventional maneuver mindset goes, it’s grossly unbalanced when considering what the external threat to the nation might be (do the math here). I’m sure there’s a plan at some point to reinstate the cannon/rocket IA FA, but when and what I have no clue. Right now there just flat out are no FA formations w/ cannons or rockets in the IA.
Further, given that there is no real “schoolhouse” for anythign other than trng courses at Taji for MOS, I don’t see any real quality at the nat’l level w/ re: to actual standardization and future operations. There remains a HUGE need for some sort of IA-level training and doctrine command and individual branch schoolhouses in order to set and keep professional standards.
The FA used in the 9th IA life fire exercise was more than likely US. This is what we did for the 38th BDE live fire exercise a few weeks ago. As far as I know there are NO cannon artillery systems in the IA right now, only 120mm mortars.
Almaleki:
Officially the IA has 1st thru 12th, plus 14th and 17th Divisions: 14 divisions. The 15th and 16th are the KRG divisions awaiting commisioning in the IA, The 34th KRG Brigade is part of 15th Division and is currently working with 4/1 IA Brigade in Diyala. Despite the 15th Division not being officially commisioned.
The number 13 is skipped in IA nomenclature.
The Armor in the exercise is 9th Division elements attached to the 17th Division. 17th Division does not have tracks.
Almaleki:
Makes sense for the IA to build whatever gun based anti-arcraft weapons they can. Keeps the money in country.
fireforeffect:
Concur. And so far, the IA is still scheduled to get its first 120mm mortars next month. There is a training element for the mortars standing up at Besmaya range. Nothing for howitzers reported to date. I believe the Iraqi M109 in the video is for static display only…
You mean that the M109 are Just No thing ??
i am Civilian ,, Inexperienced one . What is FA
Dj if the Oil sustain its Rise will we Cancel the cuts ??
Almaleki at May 13, 2009 2:43 AM ET:
– “You mean that the M109 are Just No thing ??”
I mean the M109 was probably a static display. there is no footage shown of it firing.
Almaleki at May 13, 2009 2:50 AM ET:
FA is Field Artillery. Most countries only count mortars, howitzers, and rocket weapons of 100mm and up. Iraq does not have an artillery battalions yet.
Almaleki at May 13, 2009 2:51 AM ET:
You can’t cancel a non-event. Iraq’s budgets are year-to-year. Even GoI does not know what they will be spending next year. Or what they will be buying. They only know what is funded this year and what they hope to get in the future. When the budget permits…
Effective immediately, I am no longer an unpayed volunteer author and moderator at the Long War Journal.
My association with the Long War Journal is terminated due to an editorial dispute.
Fair well readers.
sad to see you go DJ. Your blog was pretty much the best non OPSEC source of info on the iraqi military.
Hope you will reconsider.
Hi DJ
I can’t believe that you are going, what is wrong with these guys!! the only reason we visit this web site is because of what you write about the Iraqi army no one on the web does what you do!!!!!
I can’t tell how many people read your blog, I have friends in Iraq, the Gulf and the US both Iraqi and American who constantly check this blog. I’m one of the people who waits from month to month just to read the updates.
Besides thelongwarjournal sponsors work in Iraq like Gryphon Airlines and free range if cash is reason then I and others are willing to make donations No Kidding.
I hope you reconsider, if you don’t please make your own blog and tell us about it and we will visit you.
Jack Winters
I think the reason is that FIREFOREFFECT ?
DJ’s parting company with LWJ was a decision made by him & him alone. I have asked DJ to remain. He is welcome at the LWJ at any time, now or in the future. I do hope he reconsiders his decision.
And yes, DJ has the best open source (and I’d wager it rivals the closed source) look at the ISF around.
Very disappointed to see you go DJ. Your analysis’ were (are) the best on the web. Though I am never one to infringe or decry on anybody’s personal decisions I certainly hope that you reconsider. And as jack winters said, if you do end up creating a personal blog please let us know.
Godspeed Mr. Elliot.
Will there continue to be an Iraqi order of battle update on LWJ? If so, who will write it?
God May help you in your Life , I am sure even if the OOB stay it wont be as before
Eric,
I have no suitable replacement for DJ. There will be no continuing updates if DJ decides not to return.
Sad to read that you’re leaving, DJ. I’ve always read your material with great interest and would again should you publish again online, whether with LWJ or elsewhere. Let us know where next you find yourself… and I can only hope LWJ finds someone to maintain these ISF ORBATs!
FYI:
Looks like IMoD went with Strykers.
5 Feb 2009 slides on FMS. Slide 13-Iraq.
M1A1: 140 Active/140 Proposed.
Bell407: 27 active/26 proposed.
Strykers: 281 active/119 proposed.
ASV: 80.
M16: 140k.
Mi-17: 22.
M1114: 8,500.
(Only new data is Strykers won APC competition and there are some spare Bell407s added.)
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009MES/Alpaugh.pdf
Also of note: The Pakistanis are getting 550 M113s surplus to US needs…
Welcome Back Monster ,, I Like it DJ ,, but they Deleted 3 Replays from me sorry if this dont go up
Are we going Mix with some M1117s and Strykers ??
i think it Budget who did that with the Number of the sTRYKER ?
are the Strykers will be added to the army in this year ??
and if we added the active with proposed it will be 400
Almaleki at May 17, 2009 12:35 AM ET:
I am not back, nor will I be,
I am just commenting.
If I decide to resume publishing, it will be my own site with my own rules and style.
I am also debating going back to school for my masters or writing a book.
Right now, I am enjoying my free time.
Almaleki at May 17, 2009 12:44 AM ET:
– “Are we going Mix with some M1117s and Strykers ??”
No. The M1117s are for the next INP Mech Brigade. The FMS notice said 160 for that order. Looks like they cut it in half for this year’s budget. Last summer the INP was looking at building a Lt Mech Division in Diwaniyah. Looks like it is being delayed…
– “i think it Budget who did that with the Number of the sTRYKER ?”
Yes. The FMS notice said 400. This says 281 being purchased and 119 option. Total of 400.
I suspect the initial 140 M1s and 281 Strykers represent three Mech Brigades of one armor and two mech bns each.
Plus two training bns (1 each Strykers and M1s).
The next set of 140 M1s and 119 Strykers looks like two Armor Brigades of two armor and one mech bn each.
Plus another training or recon/mech battalion.
Almaleki at May 17, 2009 12:48 AM ET:
– “are the Strykers will be added to the army in this year ??”
Unlikely. Probably looking at next year. The first may start showing up for training in the fall. Operational bns will not start until next year.
DJ ,, you know my E-mail whenever you decide to end your ” free time ” ,, give me a link to your Blog ok ??
is it personal issue or a problem will bill ,, that made you decied to leave LWJ
very interesting.
So they went with Strykers after all, hmmmm. Interesting.
I concur with the M109A3’s.
They were recovered end of last summer from the Taji boneyard (I think 5 or 6 total) and no way they could be FMC as of yet.
Tubes needed to be replaced or reconditioned, and a complete overhaul of the recoil system/ engine/commo/crew space was needed. Not to mention having trained crews and FDC’s to use them.
But they do look pretty with the new IA paint job.
DJ,
Sure wish you would reconsider (guess the dispute comments have been removed), but in either case I just want to thank you again for all the efforts and contributions you have made to TLWJ.
-KH
SomeGuy
In fact there are easily a couple of hundred SPH at taji, Basra, Kirkush etc… which have not been destroyed and are simply collecting dust.
There’s about 50 Au F1 GCT SPH, about a hundred or so 2S1 / 2S3 and several dozen M109s.
In addition there are some local conversion M46 130mm on T54 chassis, 160mm mortar on T54 chassis, 120mm mortars on MTLB.
with the massive budget cutbacks… i think the iraqis are working on reconditioning and bringing back into service some of these items… though they will simply appear randomly as all the work is carried out locally (there’s no english-language paper trail for foreigners to get a glimpse).
Some “austrian cannons” as the GH-N45 155mm are known have been refurbished… though I really have no idea about the total number (there should be about 120 or so surviving tubes).
One of the biggest problems the IA faces right now, w/ re: to just about any equipment procurement, is the mix-and-match nature of what they’ve bought and try to maintain. Buying multiple systems creates a demand for too many parts, and the IA supply system isn’t what it needs to be. Remains afflicted by much of the inefficiency that plagued the Saddam-Army and don’t see this changing until the upper ranks of IGFC G4 and MoD M4 decide to retire and let fresh blood come up from the Divisional/Brigade ranks. Moreover, quiet discussions re: tube artillery is focused on the type of system the IA want and/or need (ie, NATO vs. former Soviet). Former Soviet is obviously cheap and more plentiful, but the quality of the ammo is always suspect and varies wildly. NATO spec is more expensive and less widely available, but the existing FA officers I speak w/ (and advise) see the benefit to NATO spec equipment (1 type of ammo, quality is almost always good, interchangable repair parts in many cases). While, other than talk, there’s really nothing planned to put the “King” (of Battle) back in the throne while the Coalition remains here, but there is a definite need to just from the upset balance of power w/ re: to Iran. IMHO, Iraq needs to seriously think about moving forward w/ tube and rocket artillery, but to do so means first to re-establish the FA school (along w/ other branch schools). As long as they continue to rely on solely technical courses at Taji to train their military occupational specialities instead of having a formal, standardized school system for professional development at all levels, they’re not going to get past where they are now.
Re: the M109A3s… roger, share the assessment. They either need to be severely reconditioned or scrapped. A better gun for the IA would be the M109A5 since it’s not too technical and is widely available. I’m an FA officer, have my preferences for the M109A6, AS-90, PLZ-45, and Pz2000, but these are far too advanced for what Iraq needs right now. Simple, sustainable, and quantity is the prescription.
Re: Fireforeffect
Sir, I too am a 13A and have spent way too much time at Taji. With the huge range of tubes to choose from just on that post, it’s hard to pin down what the smart play would be to refurb. However, the LOG and Maint. of the IA are years away from the level of supporting an SP unit.
Towed D20 or D30’s in good shape are available in numbers. Most I’ve encountered need only new nitrogen seals and a tube recond. Cheap(relatively), reliable South African ammo would allow them to start making real cannoneers out of IA recuits. Just like the school house, the fundimentals learned on light towed are the building blocks for all other systems. But due to the Soviet (6000mil) Vs. the NATO (6400mil) system, it becomes an all one or the other for gunners, FO’s, FDC, Metro and Radar.
Sir, I’d rather see them use Nato standard for Armor, Fixed/Rotary Aviation, and APC’s because historically they were always limited by their equipment in these area’s. However, there was never anything fundimentally wrong with their Arty.
They do need a Ft. Sill, and have a perfect location in the old Saddam era MTA called Camp Hamra. But nothing is going to/can happen till the price of oil goes back up.