The February 2009 updates to the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle are now available at the ISF OOB homepage.
The updates and key information from the release of the December 2008 9010 Quarterly Report to Congress were addressed separately and will not be addressed in this update. The significant changes to the Order of Battle that occurred in January are summarized below.
Provincial Iraqi Control.
While the Jan. 30 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction’s Quarterly Report focuses on reconstruction, it also lists the order of the transfer of the remaining five Iraqi provinces from Coalition control. Despite political claims and distractions, the first two provinces to transfer are Salahadin and Kirkuk. These provinces are to be followed by Diyala and Ninawa provinces, and finally Baghdad province by July of 2009.
Iraqi Air Force.
The Iraqi Air Force continues to concentrate on building up bases and its infrastructure. Kut Air Base is currently under renovation for operations. At Kut, “Future mission plans include stationing Iraqi Air Force Mi-17 helicopters at the FOB, as well as an Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance ground station for downloading data from ISR aircraft. The IqAF is in the process of procuring fuel trucks to support aircraft and generator requirements.” This will be the fifth Iraqi Air Force base to be made operational.
Communications infrastructure is part of the upgrades required to make air bases operational. Communications squadrons are being formed and given specialized training as part of the build-up. “The courses provide the basic technical skills for each career field and prepare NCOs to contribute to the mission when they report to their Communications Squadrons. The graduates will be stationed at Taji, New al-Muthana, Kirkuk, Basrah, and Al Kut Air Bases, and the Iraqi Air Operations Center.”
According to Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Iraqi Air Force’s current bases include Taji, Basrah, New Al Muthanna (NAMAB), Kirkuk, and Kut. The Iraqis’ plan indicates they will expand as soon as personnel, funding, and equipment become available. The expansion is to include the following bases: Ali (Tallil), Suwayrah, Al Asad, H2, Irbil, Habbaniyah, and Shaibah. Basrah may or may not remain a permanent base after Shaibah opens.
Balad, Q-west, Mosul, Sinjar, and Najaf were not mentioned as currently planned Iraqi Air Bases. Balad, Q-west, and Sinjar are current US air bases. Mosul and Najaf International Airports are probable dual military and civilian bases. This indicates that these bases are further down the planning list, probably part of Phase 2 (2011-2015) upgrades.
Iraqi Arms Purchases.
Reports of an Iraqi deal for rebuilt T72s are incorrect. This is a resurfacing of an old Defense Solutions proposal and is not a formal deal. The Office of the Commander-in-Chief — Iraq’s Prime Minister — stated in response to that story that Iraq has no intention of purchasing T72s. Multi-National Force-Iraq has also dismissed this story as incorrect. Defense Solutions has been unsuccessfully and repeatedly trying to sell this proposal since 2005.
Korean press reports have been talking about a deal for T/A-50 aircraft, possible artillery, and co-production of armored vehicles. However, according to Lieutenant Commander Russell, Multi-National Force-Iraq Press Desk Officer, “We are getting information that the commanding general of the Iraq Air Force stated MOD is only in discussions with South Korea on the purchase of TA-50 aircraft. There is no agreement, no quantity, and no schedule at this time.”
Similar reports of possible purchases of armored vehicles from Serbia are being aired. The deal has not been made; it is only negotiations. Iraq is shopping, but that does not mean it is buying. Competitions for potential buys like the armored personnel carrier are to be expected.
The transfer of HMMWVs from the US Army to the Iraqi Security Forces continues. In January, the 4,000th HMMWV was transferred. The current plan is for all 8,500 HMMWVs to be transferred by July, instead of the originally planned deadline at the end of 2009.
Iraqi Army Force Developments.
A new Iraqi Army brigade, called the Baghdad Brigade, appeared on Jan. 1, 2009. The Baghdad Brigade took over the lead for security of the International Zone from Coalition forces on New Year’s day. In response to a request for information, Captain Calio of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s Press Desk amplified:
The Baghdad Brigade is different from the Presidential Brigade. The Iraqi Army’s Presidential Brigade is used primarily for the President’s Office protection. It consists of three battalions, one for the president and one for each his two deputies. The Presidential Brigade was established after the collapse of the previous regime. The Baghdad Brigade reports directly to the Prime Minister and its commander is Brig. Gen. Emaad Yahseen Al Zuhary.
The Government of Iraq’s National Media Center confirmed that the “Baghdad Brigade belongs to Iraqi Army under the supervision of the office of the General Commander of Armed Forces.”
Also on New Year’s day the 41st Iraqi Army Brigade graduated from initial training at Besmaya.
On Jan. 3, the 5-44/11 Battalion was reported in Sadr City. This is the first report of a 5th Battalion or the inferred 4th Battalion in the 44th Brigade.
The 8th Iraqi Army Division is receiving mortar training. This recent emphasis on mortar training indicates this division will be the first to receive mortars heavier than 60mm.
The first 30 Iraqi M1A1M tank instructors started training at Besmaya in January. “…[T]he instructor candidates will serve as assistant instructors when the initial crews begin arriving in April 2009, building basic M1A1 skills prior to the arrival of the 140 Iraqi M1A1 tanks in the fall of 2010.”
The Jan. 30 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction’s Quarterly Report provides planned completion dates for US Iraqi Security Force Fund construction projects. The Feb. 25 completion date for the 26th Brigade facilities in Ramadi may explain why the 26th Brigade, 7th Division, is still in Basrah and the 53rd Brigade, 14th Division, is still in Baghdad. The 26th Brigade is awaiting its new home, and the 53rd Brigade is waiting for the 26th Brigade to transfer home so the 53rd Brigade can move into its facilities.
Iraqi National Police.
The new 3rd Iraqi National Police Division in Mosul continues to fill out and expand. Of the reported 1,797 new graduates for the 3rd Division, most are for the Abu Risha Brigade.
The first mention of a 4th National Police Division was reported in January. These reports indicate that the Basrah Brigade, which is still building up, is to be the first element of this new division. The Basrah Brigade’s third battalion remains in the planning stage, according to Staff Sergeant Thacker of Multi-National Division-South East Public Affairs Office. “We don’t know at this point what other province they [4th INP Division] will control. The permanent headquarters hasn’t been identified as of yet.”
Possible New Iraqi Army Division Planned in West Baghdad?
There are signs that a new Iraqi Army division probably is assembling in Baghdad. Ministry of Defense Order 151 established the numbering pattern for Iraqi Army divisions in February 2008. The IA has six brigades that are abnormally designated according to that order. All of the abnormally designated brigades were so designated over the last year. All six brigades are west of the Tigris River in Baghdad Province:
• Presidential Brigade – One of only two brigades in the Iraqi Army that does not have a publicly stated numeric designation. Suspect it is a Kurdish transferred brigade.
• Baghdad Brigade – The other named-only Iraqi Army brigade. First mentioned on Jan. 1 when it took over the International Zone. Suspect it is a Kurdish transferred brigade.
• 54th Brigade/6th Division – When Ministry of Defense order 151 renumbered the brigades a year ago, this brigade received a number that should belong to a 15th Division brigade.
• 55th Brigade/17th Division – When formed in May 2008, this brigade received a 15th Division brigade number (54th-57th), rather than 17th Division (62nd-65th).
• 23rd Brigade/17th Division – When formed in May 2008, this brigade received a 6th Division brigade number (22nd-25th), rather than 17th Division (62nd-65th).
• 25th Brigade/17th Division – When split to form 17th Division in May 2008, this brigade was not re-designated. It still has a 6th Division brigade number.
While temporary brigade designations are possible, these abnormal designations are over eight months old and are showing no signs of changing. There is one possibility that makes sense if these brigades are not to be renumbered. A new IA division (15th) could be being assembled in west Baghdad. As the 62nd thru 65th Brigades are built for the 17th Division, and as US forces depart the facilities around Baghdad International Airport, the abnormally numbered brigades will shift subordination and adjust areas of responsibility:
• 6th Division (22nd-25th Brigades) in Northwest Baghdad and Baghdad International Airport. Probably Airborne Division.
• 15th Division (54th, 55th, Presidential, and Baghdad Brigades) in International Zone, Mansour, and Bayaa districts.
• 17th Commando Division (62nd-65th Brigades) in south Baghdad Province.
This would also explain the reports of Kurdish troops in Baghdad. Kurdish troops have been reported to be guarding the International Zone. The Presidential and Baghdad Brigades could be transfers to Baghdad from the previously reported 15th Mountain Division in Sulmaniyah. The 15th and 16th Mountain Divisions are Kurdish transfers to the Iraqi Army. These troops could be part of the ethnic balancing of the forces in Baghdad by adding Kurdish forces.
Speculation on Iraqi Lend/Lease and/or Armor Transfers.
The reported M1A1 training being performed has a time problem. The first Iraqi-purchased M1A1M tanks will start delivery in the fall of 2010. The tank crew instructors are already in training. They are to start training the first tank crews in April 2009. There will be 18 months of training crews before the first Iraqi-purchased M1A1s arrive on the fall of 2010. If it only takes three months to train instructors, why does it take 18 months to train the tank crews?
One possible explanation is that there are plans to loan or lease US M1A1s to the Iraqis prior to the delivery of their own tanks. There are almost 1,000 M1A1s in the US inventory that have not been upgraded to M1A2. On a normal year, 140 US M1A1s are upgraded to M1A2. It is possible that the US plans to loan M1A1s to the Iraqi Army until they receive their own M1A1Ms. If they were to loan or lease these US tanks, approximately 700 could be loaned and then, upon return to US custody, be refitted to M1A2s without disrupting the upgrade program. This would allow the Iraqi Army to take over the tank support role from US forces by equipping up to four Iraqi divisions with US-loaned tanks.
In addition to the existing 9th Armored Division, three other Iraqi Army divisions show signs of having a priority to being upgraded to tracked armored or mechanized status. These divisions are:
• 3rd Division in Ninawa is using M113 armored personnel carriers.
• 7th Division in western Anbar is using BMP1 mechanized infantry combat vehicles and has a tracked repair facility co-located with its headquarters.
• 11th Division in eastern Baghdad is using BMP1s and MTLB armored personnel carriers.
The US Army has also started replacing its 7,000 M113 armored personnel carriers. The M113 is used in many support roles in addition to its role as armored personnel carrier. These roles include mortar carrier, armored ambulance, and ammunition carrier. The transfer of some of these armored personnel carriers to the Iraqi army would provide much of the required support armor to accompany the M1A1s loaned to or purchased by the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Army already uses more than 200 M113s.
The US Army is also in the process of replacing its M109 self-propelled howitzers. Some of these howitzers could be donated or loaned to the Iraqi Army to fill the indirect fire role for these Iraqi tracked heavy divisions, pending purchase and receipt of their own new howitzers.
All three of the above possibilities have a higher likelihood of occurring than the proposal being pushed by Defense Solutions to sell Iraq used and rebuilt Soviet-designed T72 tanks. The current Iraqi Ministry of Defense has shown a distinct aversion to buying Soviet-designed ground equipment. Almost all of the Soviet-designed ground equipment used by the Iraqi Army today is leftover or donated. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense prefers to purchase new Western equipment. The Iraqis have experience losing Iraq’s last two conventional wars while using predominately Soviet-designed equipment like the T72.
29 Comments
Hi DJ
I just want to talk about Iraq’s choice of buying AT-6B, some people on the net are saying that Iraq should have bought the AH-64D or AH-1Z.
And what I want to say to them is this:-
1. 36 AT-6B are cheaper to get than the Helio’s mentioned, Taiwan recently bought 30 AH-64D for 2.5 B while Iraq bought 36 for 500 M. Big difference isn’t it. Plus running it is much cheaper as well, if you need to hit a target with a bomb it’s much cheaper to send an AT-6B than it is to send an F-16 to do the same mission; less fuel less maintenance per flight hour.
2. Iraq is a big country the AT-6B can get from point A to B much faster than Helio’s, plus it’s great for COIN operations if you have a group of bad guys in a safe house the AT-6B can drop A 500P bomb on top of them and maintain surveillance for a longer time.
3. These aircraft have HUD displays and targeting equipment, which makes it very accurate when hitting targets; not like other similar aircraft that do not have this ability. That means they can take out tanks and other targets, not to mention they can fly much higher to hit a target with Paveway bombs or if there is an air defense they can hit them with Mavericks from a safe distance. Or fly low and fast.
4. Last but not least if you have an AT-6B with sidewinders and an AH-64D with sidewinders. Who do you think will win?
What do you think DJ
The helo would win.
But that is grading an apple and an orange as to their ability to impersonate a steer.
Neither is designed for Air-to-air.
In their role as air-to-ground aircraft, you are still comparing an apple to an orange.
The AT-6B is a light attack aircraft that cannot land just anywhere and cannot opperate at extreme low altitude.
The Apache on the other hand does not have the same range or higher altitude capability.
In a high missile threat conventional environment, the Apache lives longer than the Texan. In the low-intensity environment that exists, the Apache is not cost effective.
Interesting updates regarding the tanks. fwiw, it appears to me that the M1A1M tanks on order are not truely new builds, but upgraded M1A1 from storage…(they are probably as good as new however…)would certainly fit the lease/loan option.
masayo22311:
They are new built per contract. That is why it is taking until Fall of 2010 for them to be delivered…
The US Army is cycling 140 rebuilt to M1A2 per year in addition to the 35 new built per year to bring them up to strength. They are not selling imaginary stored M1s.
The guard, reserve and USMC have replaced their last M60s with M1A1s as of three years ago. (The last to finish that replacement was the USMC’s MPS elements, 403 M60s. That was in the fall of 2006.)
Hi DJ
News coming out from Iraq on buys is not good. According to General Frank Helmick who is in charge of training the Iraqi forces, because of budget constraints.
For one Iraq is not going to buy 400 APc’s, and the national police will have problems expanding.
This is the link:-
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/2/8/worldupdates/2009-02-07T184558Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-378952-3&sec=Worldupdates
What do you think DJ?
And what do you think this means?
jack winters
As I have repeatedly pointed out before. Phase 3 (2016-2020) exists to provide the insurance time for just this type of problem. It is the extra five year fudge-factor for delays in upgrades.
The delay in APC buys is not surprising. Also watch them look at cheaper versions. Cost-cutting measures…
Note: The article referred to 15 Patrol Ships. They ment 15 Patrol Craft. And the payments are already made from earlier budgets. So that part of the article is in error.
What is probably going away is the extra 20 Patrol Craft and three Support Vessels in the 9 Dec 2008 FMS notice. Those were not funded and I have not seen a contract on them yet.
The priority will remain with Tanks and Air and the delays will be in the other categories…
Note: This increases the odds of loans and donations of used US equipment to Iraq. To facilitate our own reductions in Iraq…
DJ:
Thanks for the excellent update.
Are the Iraqis planning to establish any military academies akin to West Point or Annapolis to ensure long term a well-trained officer corps dedicated to maintaining civilian authority? Lower level officers were reportedly a major weakness in the Iraqi military command. Moreover, looking back on Saddam’s rise to power, he essentially used the military/security services to seize control of the Iraqi government.
Cordell:
The four Iraqi Military Academies were re-established in 2004/2005.
They are based on the Sandherst model.
They are listed on Page 3 of the OOB under:
• Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC)
” They are not selling imaginary stored M1s. ”
I assume from you definitive statement that you have actually seen a copy of the accepted Letter of Offer and Acceptance?
masayo22311:
No.
But I do have that very clear statements from MNSTC-I SAO, MNF-I, and the US Army.
– These are NEW tanks. Not rebuilt used tanks.
– Entirely paid for by the GoI. Not the USG.
And that is why it is taking two years for them to start delivery…
Some people are of the false belief that we have more military equipment in storage than we need for some major mobilization.
That ended with the peace-dividend of the end of the cold war.
M1s were not the majority of tanks we had at the end of the cold-war. They equipped only the front-line units. The preposition sets and second-line were M48A5/M60A3s. The M1s in the 24th Div in 1990 were basic versions with 105mm guns. The USMC was all M60A3s in 1990.
In 1998, with the reductions of forces for the peace dividend and the elimination of the stored tanks in Europe as part of CFE treaty, the last US Army Patton equipped battalion was eliminated. The original version of the M1s had all been upgraded to M1A1s by then. The US Army was cut from 18 to 10 active divisions during that period.
In 2006, the USMC replaced the last 403 M60A3s in the MPS ships with M1A1s. Thus replacing the last of the Pattons in the US active and reserve forces.
As I mentioned in this article:
“On a normal year, 140 US M1A1s are upgraded to M1A2.”
What I did not mention is that 35 new M1A2 tanks a year are also built for US use as part of the expansion of the US Army and USMC BCT/RCTs.
There are no spare M1 tanks in the US inventory to be rebuilt for other countries. That is why I suspect a lend/lease type program vice a sale of used US tanks. We do not have spare M1s lying around to give away or sell.
If the GoI were willing to settle for Pattons, no problem, there are thousands floating around.
They want M1A1s…
I think I speak for everyone here when I say; ‘ooooooooh.’
Anyway, seeing this development with the M1’s and subsequently the T-72’s does this mean that the fate of the T-72’s currently in IA service make them more of an interim type now, to be put into storage at a later time or does the MoD still have a long term plan for these vehicles in a front line role?
TW:
– The GoI’s T72s (and T54/55s) are all salvage or donations.
– They are the only operational tanks in the Iraqi Army.
– Only one division is equipped with them, the 9th.
– They fall in the categories of “free” and “better than nothing”.
I expect them to end their life as training/OPFOR tanks at the Besmaya Armor School when the IA finally has enough modern western tanks to remove them from the operational units…
– Notes:
The only element that is actively and publicaly pushing large numbers of T72s for the IA is Defense Solutions.
Defense Solutions has been unsuccessfully pushing that proposal since 2005 when they saw the profit margin on refurbishing the 77 Hungarian T72s that NATO donated to Iraq.
Their target audience for this push is to get the US/NATO to fund more donations since the GoI is not buying.
Also DS is having financial problems and is actively planting these stories of their proposal to give potential investors the idea that they are solvent.
(We get inquires here at the LWJ from other reporters on such topics. I have seen what DS is promulgating to reporters and have seen reporting on DS’ financial situation. And I have seen what US and Iraqi officials in Baghdad have to say about their claims.
DS’ proposal is a rip-off. The most expensive upgrade of that generation of used tanks is the M60-120S at 1.5 million each. And that is a replacement of all but the underlying hull with M1 components.
DS is trying to sell rebuilt T72s for 3 million each with nowhere near as significant of an upgrade in capabilities. Used tanks of that generation are in the 100,000-300,000 dollar range.)
Has Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Iraq resulted in any potential new “deals” for arms in iraq?
I have heard nothing so far, but I would be very suspicious if the french president would visit any middle eastern nation without a few catalogues and contracts needing only one counter-signatory…
there’s one big-ticket item the french want to desperately shift… rafale (though I seriously doubt iraq’s ability to pay even if they’d love to have 4.5G toys).
sheytanelkebir:
Nothing new so far.
Spares for 1980s bought light armor and 50 EC635s are all that have been reported and those were announced last summer.
You are thinking along the same lines I am.
France wants in on the fighter sales to Iraq.
I suspect the reports of negotiations for Korean A50s on top of the announced US F16 buys convinced him that he needed to go to Baghdad personnaly…
Hi DJ
The French president visit was exactly for this purpose
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/11/sarkozy-visit-iraq-france
Defense was top on the agenda, with both the defense and oil ministers are going to visit Paris next month, According to the prim minister office.
What do you think?
Not surprised. France is worried that Iraq will concentrate its arms purchases from coalition members. I do not think they expected so much competition. (E.G. the A50 negotiations.)
Expect a full-court press to sell to Iraq. Bad timing for the French with the budget crunch causing the postponement of the 400x APC purchase and delaying the formation of the INP Mech Div…
I knew it! It was only going to be a matter of time before the french started shoving their Rafale down Iraq’s throat.
That being said, I wonder now if that is not such a bad idea on Iraq’s part. I mean, given the absolute desperation for Dassault to successfully export their fighter, and the fact that its capabilities (on paper at least) make it comparable to a Super Hornet in terms of flexibility, it could be a real winner and as sheytanelkebir said, their best bet at securing a genuine gen. 4.5 fighter. (Other than the Super Hornet itself of course.)
not directly relevant but…
http://www.kentucky.com/524/story/691409.html
during sarkozy’s visit to kuwait, he stated that they were interested in buying 28 rafales… among other weapons…
dassault really are throwing the kitchen sink in this marketing exercise.
I think there may be a possibility for iraq to acquire the french aircraft mainly because the acquisition will not be managed under the FMS and therefore more open to “presents” for the iraqi officers and politicans involved. the french are of course not new-comers in managin this particular brand of middle eastern corruption and there should be enough leeway in the price of the aircraft to price in any necessary commissions… at least 5-6M euros per airframe… say on a 36 aircraft purchase.
in an unrelated note… kamal barzanji has retired… and replaced with a former Mi-17 pilot…
DJ,
Firstly, it is always a pleasure to read these post.
Brass Tacks:
I was of the understanding that as far as small arms were concerned, the IA were to continue the conversion to the M16A2 and the IP/INP were to continue to use old stock of AK’s until such time that operational needs/budgetary contraints were balanced. This made wonderful sense to me….
So, why am I seeing an ever growing number of new-used VZ-58’s in the hands of the INP? 5 months ago I saw maybe 1 out of 200, now I can’t even pass a CP without seeing 2 to 5.
Is this the INP simply shuffling their own inventory, or did someone make a bargain purchase. It only peaked my interest since the VZ-58 has been showing up en-mass on the US commercial gun market (semi-auto,rebuilt from parts kits). Century Arms obviously found a seller willing to unload a few thousand.
Not that I have anything against the rifle, but it would be aggrivating to find yet another waist of defense funds for a non-advantagious replacement. Even if this was reshuffling old stock, would it be worth the separate maintenance and parts LOG to have these fielded? You can’t tell me they wouldn’t have the nessisary AK’s availible to phase these out even if they were old stock.
Your thought’s…?
SomeGuy:
“I was of the understanding that as far as small arms were concerned, the IA were to continue the conversion to the M16A2 and the IP/INP were to continue to use old stock of AK’s until such time that operational needs/budgetary contraints were balanced. This made wonderful sense to me….”
FALSE ASUMPTION: You never heard that here.
– Only the MoD (Military) is changing to M4s and M16s.
– MoI (Police) is sticking with AK varients and is buying more.
– Also, those weapons are paid for by GoI. Not USG. Thier choises and their dime…
I seem to remember a Czech small arms deal with Iraqi MoI about the same time the deal with Serbia was being negotiated last summer. Wasn’t a large deal. NFI on what specific weapons were bought. If they are just now showing up, that would fit with refurb/delivery times.
Always keep in mind that the MoI components are police and not military. Seperate ministries, seperate budgets, seperate rules…
The INP is like the USCG:
Belongs to a seperate ministry from the military services,
is an Armed Force with police authority,
and it is a service that augments the military services in wartime.
But it is still equipped, budgeted, and operates under a seperate hiarchy…
Hi DJ
Since we’re talking about small arms why did the Iraqi army order the M21 and M84 from Serbia if they are going to get M-16’s
“In 2006 and 2007, Zastava M21 assault rifles were spotted in the hands of Iraqi forces and private military contractors during the Iraq War. In March 2008 Iraq ordered 2,000 M-21 rifles to serve in their army. (wikipedia)”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zastava_M21
“1,000+ M84 orderd by Iraq in March,2008(wikipedia)”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zastava_M84
By the way, Iraq is getting M4’s and M-16A4 not M-16A2.
What do you think DJ?
jack winters
– You are citing wiki. Talk about lack of credibility. GIGO factor.
– The actual cite says “GoI” ordered those rifles, not IMoD. Details.
– The interpretation that they are for the IA is the author’s assumption. You know how that breaks down.
They are more likely to be for INP, DBE, IP, OPD, or FPS (MoI services) use.
lasta 95 finally takes to the air… and iraq order (20 units) still claimed to be on….
http://www.emportal.rs/en/news/serbia/78647.html
interesting tidbit.
according to this article
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article5748562.ece
Iraq had requested apache helicopters but the americans rejected the request…
[edited to correct damaged link]
sheytanelkebir:
There are so many errors in that article, I do not know where to start. The author is clearly clueless on military organization and equipment.
Iraq has not formally asked for data on Apache helicopters, nor has a formal request been made.
That would require notices to congress to be published…
Draw a line thru the 5/2 SBCT on the bottom left of the map (Scheduled to deploy to Iraq).
They are going to Afghanistan instead.
Along with 2nd MEB.
http://www.defenselink.mil//releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12493