MOSUL, IRAQ: The 2nd Iraqi Army Division is considered one of the most mature and effective formations in the Iraqi security forces. The 2nd Iraqi Army Division is led by the charismatic Major General Mouta’a and operates in Mosul and throughout Ninewa province. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense recently established the Ninewa Operational Command under the command of Lieutenant General Riyad to coordinate Army, police, and intelligence operations in the northern province.
While the idea of the Ninewa Operational Command coordinating operations between the disparate security forces is largely welcomed, the new command is largely seen as a burden by Iraqi officers in the 2nd Division. The Ninewa Operational Command has failed to secure needed resources for operations in Mosul, such as materials needed to build the Riyad line, the berm, and checkpoints around Mosul. The new command has also caused friction in the ranks in the 2nd Division by accusing officers of incompetence or corruption, and has pressed for a Baghdad counterinsurgency model when some elements may not work well in Mosul, according to several Iraqi officers. The command is viewed as just another layer in the failing bureaucracy of the Ministry of Defense.
The Ninewa Operational Command has also bled the division of needed resources. The command took over Tiger Base, a combat outpost in southwestern Mosul, to set up its command center, and absorbed almost a full battalion to serve as its base security and quick reaction force. This has hampered the second division’s operations in the city.
The command also ordered Iraqi officers from talking on the television or radio, insisting all communications go through the Ninewa Operational Command. “Before we could communicate with the people,” Mouta’a told The Long War Journal at Forward Operating Base Marez. “Now with the Ninewa Operational Command we are not permitted to talk with the people.” Mouta’a explained he would frequently appeal to the residents of Mosul to provide tips on insurgent activity and cooperate with security forces. “Now I receive calls asking me why I am not talking to the people and telling me this has hurt confidence,” Mouta’a said.
But US officers say the problems between the Ninewa Operational Command and subordinate units will work themselves out over time. The Iraqi Army sees value in elements of the Riyad Line, as controlling traffic into Mosul is needed to prevent insurgents from moving materials into the city. The decision to place the Iraqi police in the central neighborhoods of Mosul and the Iraqi Army in the outer neighborhoods is also welcomed.
This slideshow looks at a day with the 2nd Iraqi Army Division and the Ninewa Operational Command in Mosul.
6 Comments
Well we still debate base closures and bureaucracy over here
Bill,
Great photos and reporting. Interesting comment about Gen Keane’s visit. Its a shame some of our (senior) leaders just cannot get off of their high horse to talk to people. A dynamic that must challenge the relationship of the transistion teams and their counterparts.
Bill,
Great piece! And man, the photo slideshow is outstanding.
Stay safe over there and send us more – it’s great stuff and info we sorely need.
Bill Roggio, this is one of the best pieces I have read in the years I have been regularly following your blog.
The slide show is classic. Slide 14 is very important. This is exactly what many foreigners mean when they refer to the “ugly American.” I am extremely disappointed with Gen Keane. I think that Secretary Gates should have a “talk” with him.
One observation I have heard from foreign militaries is that some but not all American generals can be pretty darn arrogant and dismissive of the capabilities of foreign militaries (and other units in the US military as well . . . if these foreign officers were observant enough 😉 .)
As many of the readers here know, I have long been a fan of the finally promoted MG Mouta’a. Baghdad (National Operations Center), MoD, IGFC, and NiOC should get out of his way and let him do his job.
If we assume that IA 2-4 is 90% Kurd, and all of 2nd IAD is 55% Kurd, this implies that 43% of the rest of 2nd IAD is Kurdish. This is a pretty good ratio. (All of Ninevah is maybe 35% Kurdish-shia, sunni, atheist, and Yezidi.) 2nd IAD is pretty nonsectarian and nationalistic.
The NOC (corps headquarters) is tying up valuable resources. And sorry to break it to them, but they are not as charismatic, telegenic, or popular as MG Mouta’a.
If it were up to me, which it isn’t, the GoI would overstrenght each of his bns by 50% instead of 35% and attach additional bns to Mouta’a’s existing bdes. Some of his bns should be upgraded to wheeled mechanized. And he should get one tracked mechanized bn. Then the 9th IAD should redeploy to where it is more needed, and allow Mouta’a to get on with his job.
2nd IAD has suffered enormous wear and tear (IEDs) on their vehicles, and needs replacements. They also need some fire bns added to their brigades.
For casual readers here, a breakdown of the NiOC is below:
https://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/OOBpage5-IGFC-M.pdf
https://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/wiring%20diagram%20Mosul%20Sector.JPG
2nd IAD received its MTR and BSU later than many other divisions. Currently 5 BSUs are fully staffed and 8 are operational, with 5 in various stages of force generation (probably 4 at C4, and 1 at C5.) 2nd IAD’s BSU seems to be operational and not fully staffed.
Bill, if they let you disclose info on the 2nd IAD, please consider writing about their combat enablers: intelligence (scouts), engineers (each brigade is getting one EOD company and another combat engineer company, + the division as a whole is getting a construction engineering bn), logistics (transport, supply and maintenance), as well as command and control at the division headquarters level.
Public information suggests that 2nd IAD is pretty good (I would say very good) at combat, COIN, and battalion/brigade level command and control.
How did GEN (R) Keane disrespect the IA CDR? I’m sure he was on a government paid fact finding trip, but very interested on how his actions disrespected the IA. Was COL McMaster any help or just the horse holder? or did he add to the disrespect?
Some GO or Retired GO TTP are to fly in crap on everybody and fly away. Hey, I’m here to help!!
General Keane cut off Gen Riyadh – TWICE – while he was speaking, and said he wasn’t there to accuse the IA of not doing its jib. He then accused the IA of not doing its job, and asked the 3ACR how they were utilizing “their” Iraqi troops.
General Keane also brushed aside the 3ACR briefer and proceded to tell them what the situation was like in Mosul – after flying in and flying out. This one I except and give some leeway because I know it is not uncommon for senior officers to do this. But insulting the Iraqis is not needed during a fly-by.
Colonel McMaster didn’t have anything to say during the briefing.